The role of small farmer cooperatives in the management of voluntary coffee certifications in Costa Rica by Snider, Anna
1 | P a g e
Délivré par SupAgro 
Préparée au sein de l’école doctorale Ecole 
Doctorale Economie-Gestion 
Et de l’unité de recherche Innovation 
Spécialité : Gestion Durable 
Présentée par Anna Snider 
Soutenue le 13 juin, 2016 devant le jury composé de 
Dr Claude COMPAGNONE, Professor, INRA Rapporteur 
Dr Maryline FILIPPI, Professor, ENITA Bordeaux Rapporteur 
Dr Ana IGLESIAS, Professor, Technical University of Madrid Examinateur 
Dr Pierre-Marie BOSC, Chercheur, CIRAD Examinateur 
Dr Sophie MIGNON, Professor, Université Montpellier II Examinateur 
The Role of Small Farmer Cooperatives in 
the Management of Voluntary Coffee 
Certifications in Costa Rica 
Page | 2 
Thesis Committee 
Guy FAURE, CIRAD Thesis Co-Director 
Ana AFONSO GALLEGOS, UPM Thesis Co-Director 
Isabel GUTIERREZ, CATIE Thesis Committee Member 
Nicole SIBELET, CIRAD, CATIE Thesis Committee Member 
3 | P a g e
Abstracts 
Page | 4 
Abstract 
Voluntary certifications offer consumers information on the process in which products are produced. 
Farmers’ organizations play an important role in the management of certifications and in small-
farmer access to certified markets. Costa Rican farmers’ organizations have a long history of 
participation in the certified value chain and in fomenting small farmers’ access to certified markets. 
Farmers’ organizations also make strategic decisions related to the organization’s participation in the 
certified value chain and how farmers are supported and incentivized to join. 
For these reasons Costa Rica provides an interesting milieu to study how farmers’ organizations 
manage certifications. Because of their importance in the certification process in Costa Rica, this 
research focuses on cooperatives and consortia of cooperatives. Considering the gap in knowledge 
regarding the role of cooperatives and voluntary coffee certifications, this thesis presents the 
following questions: What is the role of cooperatives in the management of voluntary coffee 
certifications?, What are the advantages and disadvantages of participation in voluntary 
certifications for cooperatives?, What changes do certifications induce at the cooperative and farm 
levels?, What social aspects in Costa Rica influence the management and effectiveness of 
certifications? Administrators from twenty of the twenty-two coffee cooperatives in Costa Rica were 
interviewed to obtain basic data on harvest size, membership and management and participation in 
certifications. Four cooperatives were selected for in-depth case studies. 
Certifications are often criticized for not eliciting widespread change at the farm level due to the 
selection of compliant farms, but it is the structure of the certifications, including low demand, weak 
and variable price incentives, high costs of auditing and high requirements for management and 
training, which incentivize cooperatives to choose individual certifications. 
In Costa Rica, voluntary coffee certifications promote small but real benefits to cooperatives and 
their members. Cooperatives make decisions about the management of certifications based on their 
business strategies, the type of coffee they produce and the social capital inherent in the 
cooperative, which is manifested as a group solidarity approach or a commercial approach.  
Certifications incite a more holistic approach to coffee production by requiring training and services 
related to sustainable production. Certifications encourage cooperatives to collaborate with other 
stakeholders, increasing their connectedness and organizational social capital. This gives members 
access to new knowledge and services and has the potential to create a virtuous cycle of the 
production of social capital.  
Certifications, however, may induce cooperatives to offer additional services or financial incentives 
to some members and not to others. A high level of social capital is needed at the administrative 
level to ensure an equitable distribution of the benefits of certifications while still offering members 
incentives to pursue certifications.  
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Résumé 
La certification volontaire offre aux consommateurs des informations détaillées sur le processus de 
production des produits. Les organisations paysannes jouent un rôle important dans la gestion de la 
certification et dans l'accès des petits agriculteurs aux marchés certifiés. Les organisations de 
producteurs du Costa Rica ont historiquement joué un rôle important dans la participation des petits 
producteurs aux  filières certifiées et leur motivation à accéder aux marchés certifiés. Les 
organisations paysannes prennent également des décisions stratégiques quant à la participation de 
l'organisation dans la chaîne de valeur certifiée et comment les agriculteurs sont soutenus et incités à 
participer.  
Pour ces raisons, le Costa Rica offre un environnement intéressant pour étudier la façon dont les 
organisations de producteurs de café gèrent les certifications volontaires. 
En raison de leur importance dans le processus de certification au Costa Rica, cette recherche se 
concentre sur les coopératives et les consortiums de coopératives.  Considérant le manque de 
connaissances sur le rôle des coopératives et de la certification volontaire du café, cette thèse traite 
les questions suivantes: Quel est le rôle des coopératives dans la gestion des certifications 
volontaires?, Quels sont les avantages et désavantages de la participation dans la certification 
volontaire par les coopératives ?, Quels sont les changements induits par la certification, au niveau 
des coopératives et des exploitations ?, Quels aspects sociaux propres au Costa Rica influencent la 
gestion et l'efficacité de la certification ? Les administrateurs de vingt des vingt-deux coopératives de 
café au Costa Rica ont été enquêtés pour obtenir des données sur la quantité récoltée, la gestion et 
la participation dans la certification. Quatre coopératives ont ensuite été sélectionnées pour les 
études de cas approfondies. 
Les certifications sont souvent critiqués pour de ne pas provoquer d‘amélioration au niveau de 
l'exploitation en raison de la sélection d’exploitations conformées, c’est mais la structure des 
certifications, y compris la faible demande, les incitations faible et variables des prix, les coûts élevés 
de l'audit et des exigences élevées en gestion et en formation qui encourage les coopératives à 
choisir la certification individuelle. 
Au Costa Rica, les certifications de café volontaire fournissent des avantages réels, bien que minimes, 
aux coopératives ainsi qu’à  leurs membres. Les coopératives prennent des décisions sur la gestion 
des certifications basées sur leurs stratégies commerciales, du type de café qu'elles produisent et le 
capital social inhérent à la coopérative qui se manifeste par une approche par la solidarité de groupe 
ou une approche commerciale. 
Les certifications incitent à une approche plus holistique de la production de café en nécessitant plus 
de formations et  de services liés à la production durable. Les certifications encouragent les 
coopératives à collaborer avec d'autres parties prenantes, en augmentant leur connectivité et leur 
capital social. Cela donne aux membres un accès à de nouvelles connaissances et services, et a le 
potentiel de créer un cercle vertueux de production de capital social. 
La certification, cependant, peut encourager les coopératives à  offrir des services supplémentaires 
ou des incitations financières à certain membres et pas à des autres. Un niveau élevé de capital social 
est nécessaire au niveau administratif pour assurer une répartition équitable des bénéfices de la 
certification tout en offrant aux membres des incitations à poursuivre la certification. 
Page | 6 
 
Resumen 
Las certificaciones voluntarias ofrecen a los consumidores información sobre el proceso de 
producción  de distintos productos. Las organizaciones de productores juegan un papel importante 
en la gestión de las certificaciones y en el acceso de los pequeños agricultores a los mercados 
certificados. Las organizaciones de productores costarricenses tienen una larga historia de 
participación en la cadena de valor certificada y en el fomento del acceso de los pequeños 
productores a los mercados certificados. Las organizaciones de productores también toman 
decisiones estratégicas relacionadas con la participación de la organización en la cadena de valor 
certificada y en cómo se apoyan e incentivan a los asociados. 
Por estas razones Costa Rica ofrece un medio interesante para estudiar cómo las organizaciones de 
productores gestionan las certificaciones. Teniendo en cuenta la brecha en el conocimiento sobre el 
papel que desempeñan  las cooperativas y las certificaciones voluntarias de café, esta tesis presenta 
las siguientes preguntas: ¿Cuál es el papel de las cooperativas en la gestión de las certificaciones 
voluntarias?, ¿Qué cambios inducen las certificaciones a niveles de terreno (cafetal) y de 
cooperativa?, ¿Qué aspectos sociales  y singulares de Costa Rica influyen en la gestión y la eficacia de 
estas certificaciones? 
La investigación consistió en once meses de trabajo de campo en Costa Rica. Se entrevistó a los 
administradores de veinte de las veintidós cooperativas de café en Costa Rica para obtener datos 
básicos sobre el tamaño de la cosecha, la pertenencia y la gestión y la participación en las 
certificaciones. Cuatro cooperativas fueron seleccionadas para los estudios de caso en profundidad. 
Aunque las certificaciones son a menudo criticadas por no provocar un cambio generalizado en las 
explotaciones debido a la selección única de las  que cumplen con las reglas, es la estructura de las 
certificaciones, incluyendo la baja demanda, los incentivos de precios débiles y variables, los altos 
costos de la auditoría y los altos requisitos para gestión y formación, la que conduce a las 
cooperativas a elegir certificaciones individuales. 
En Costa Rica, las certificaciones de café voluntarias promueven beneficios pequeños pero reales 
para las cooperativas y sus asociados. Las Cooperativas toman decisiones sobre la gestión de las 
certificaciones en función de sus estrategias de negocio, el tipo de café que producen y la capital 
social inherente a la cooperativa, que se manifiesta como un enfoque de solidaridad de grupo o de 
un enfoque comercial. 
Las certificaciones incitan a un enfoque más holístico de la producción de café, al exigir la formación 
y los servicios relacionados con la producción sostenible. Las certificaciones impulsan a las 
cooperativas a colaborar con otras partes interesadas, aumentando su conectividad y el capital social 
de la organización. Esto da a los miembros acceso a nuevos conocimientos y servicios, y tiene el 
potencial de crear un círculo virtuoso de la producción de capital social. 
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Executive Summary 
Voluntary certifications offer consumers information on the process in which products are produced. 
They can use this information to make more informed purchasing decisions and to espouse the 
issues of sustainability they deem important. Voluntary coffee certifications were some of the first 
certifications available to consumers. These certifications are purported to promote environmental, 
social and financial sustainability in the countries of coffee production, but empirical evidence shows 
mixed results. 
Farmers’ organizations play an important role in the management of certifications and in small-
farmer access to certified markets. Farmers’ organizations offer advisory and other support services 
to their members to help them access certifications and commercialize certified coffee. Farmers’ 
organizations also make strategic decisions related to the organization’s participation in the certified 
value chain and how farmers are supported and incentivized to join. 
Costa Rican farmers’ organizations have a long history of participation in the certified value chain and 
in fomenting small famers’ access to certified markets. Cooperatives (which in Costa Rica have a 
distinct legal status from other types of farmers’ organizations, such as alliances) and consortia, or 
second-level cooperatives, are the most important means for small farmers in Costa Rica to access 
certifications.  
For these reasons Costa Rica provides an interesting milieu to study how farmers’ organizations 
manage certifications. Because of their importance in the certification process in Costa Rica, this 
research focuses on cooperatives and consortia of cooperatives. Considering the gap in knowledge 
regarding the role of cooperatives and voluntary coffee certifications, this thesis presents the 
following questions: 
 What is the role of cooperatives in the management of voluntary coffee certifications? 
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 What are the advantages and disadvantages of participation in voluntary certifications for 
cooperatives? 
 What changes do certifications induce at the cooperative and farm levels? 
 What social aspects in Costa Rica influence the management and effectiveness of 
certifications? 
Methods 
Research consisted of eleven months of field work in Costa Rica. Administrators from twenty of the 
twenty-two coffee cooperatives in Costa Rica were interviewed to obtain basic data on harvest size, 
membership and management and participation in certifications. This data was used to create a 
typology of Costa Rican coffee cooperatives. Four cooperatives were selected for in-depth case 
studies based on the typology. Case studies included in-depth interviews with cooperative managers 
and agronomists and a review of internal documents such as training records and assembly minutes 
when available. Case studies also included social capital surveys of members and semi-structured 
interviews regarding the evolution of farming practices.  
Major Results 
Chapter 4 presents new information regarding price incentives paid to cooperatives and cooperative 
members to encourage participation in voluntary certifications. These incentives are weak and in 
some cases vary with the world price of coffee. Some types of certifications, such as Fair Trade and 
organic certification, reduce the fluctuation in prices paid to cooperatives and to farmers. When the 
world price of coffee is high, there may be no economic incentives to pursue these certifications. On 
the other hand, corporate certifications such as Starbuck’s CAFE Practices may augment the 
fluctuation of prices paid to cooperatives or to farmers. Incentives to pursue corporate certifications 
may be absent when the world price of coffee is low. 
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With the exception of Fair Trade certification which requires that all members of the cooperative be 
certified, cooperatives can choose to certify all or only a portion of their members. Cooperatives can 
often fill buyer demand for certified coffee by certifying fewer than 5% of their members. 
Cooperatives may choose different strategies for different certifications. The majority of the 
cooperatives choose individual certifications to minimize auditing costs and the pressure that 
certifications put on the human resources of the cooperative for training and management.  
Individual certifications also lower the barriers to certification, as the cooperative can select the 
members which comply with the majority of the certification standards for the individual 
certifications. Cooperative may also give priority to large farms in order to reduce management costs 
or they may give priority to members who have been loyal to the cooperative in the past as a reward 
for that loyalty. 
Therefore, although certifications are often criticized for not eliciting widespread change at the farm 
level due to the selection of compliant farms, it is the structure of the certifications, including low 
demand, weak and variable price incentives, high costs of auditing and high requirements for 
management and training, which incentivize cooperatives to choose individual certifications. 
Chapter 5 investigates changes at the cooperative and at the farm level. Certification-related changes 
begin at the cooperative level. Cooperatives may need to join a consortium to access services such as 
capacity building among cooperative staff, the collective use of equipment or financial support. In 
the first phase of implementation cooperative staff are trained, internal control systems are 
implemented and upgrades may be made to the mill. These changes correspond with certification 
requirements. 
The second phase of the implementation of certifications includes changes to the advisory services 
offered to the members. The largest change is in the subjects of the group training. Before 
certification, training focused on productivity and the management of pests and disease. 
Certifications oblige the cooperatives to add new themes to their training, such as soil and water 
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management, the reduction of agrochemicals, pesticide safety and handling and climate change. In 
the beginning, these subjects may be out of the scope of experience of the cooperatives’ 
agronomists and technicians. Cooperatives form new relationships with outside organizations and 
other stakeholders to offer trainings and support members. Outside stakeholders may also offer 
services such as recycling pesticide containers, providing shade tree seedlings or analyzing soils. 
These new topics addressed by advisory services, along with other influences such as laws and 
outside initiatives, change farmers’ perceptions about sustainable farming practices. Frequent 
attendance in group training is correlated with changes in certain farming practices such as the use a 
farm record book, use of a mask when applying pesticides, and use of a soil analysis to determine the 
amount of fertilizer they should apply. Conversely, the use of shade trees is not related to an 
individual’s attendance of cooperative trainings, rather it is related to other services that the 
cooperative provides. Members are more likely to have increased the number of shade trees on their 
farm in the last twenty years if their cooperative provided members with shade trees free of charge. 
Although quantifiable farm-level changes are ultimately small, certifications offer a more holistic 
approach to coffee production. They contribute to changing perceptions among farmers about 
sustainable farming practices. Change may be slow as farmers ‘unlearn’ old paradigms and create 
new ones. 
Chapter 6 explores the national context of Costa Rica, including the social capital in the cooperatives, 
and analyzes how this context effects how certifications are managed. 
High levels of social capital were found in cooperatives which participate in certifications. The one 
cooperative studied with low social capital does not have any certifications. The balance between 
bridging, or out-group social capital, and bonding, or in-group social capital, determines the 
willingness of cooperatives to provide equal access to certifications among the members and how 
cooperatives provide financial and in-kind incentives. 
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Social capital, as measured by generalized trust in others, also influences individual participation in 
voluntary certifications. Members who believe that, in general, one can trust others are more likely 
to pursue Rainforest Alliance certification with no financial incentives. Conversely, no relationship 
was found between generalized trust and participation in Utz certification when a financial incentive 
is provided.  
Conclusions 
In Costa Rica, voluntary coffee certifications promote small but real benefits to cooperatives and 
their members. Cooperatives make decisions about the management of certifications based on their 
business strategies, the type of coffee they produce and the social capital inherent in the 
cooperative, which is manifested as a group solidarity approach or a commercial approach.  
Certifications incite a more holistic approach to coffee production by requiring training and services 
related to sustainable production. Certifications encourage cooperatives to collaborate with other 
stakeholders, increasing their connectedness and organizational social capital. This gives members 
access to new knowledge and services and has the potential to create a virtuous cycle of the 
production of social capital.  
Certifications, however, may induce cooperatives to offer additional services or financial incentives 
to some members and not to others. A high level of social capital is needed at the administrative 
level to ensure an equitable distribution of the benefits of certifications while still offering members 
incentives to pursue certifications.  
Keywords: Farmers’ organizations, voluntary certifications, advisory services, smallholder farmers, 
social capital
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Abstract 
This chapter outlines the relevant literature on voluntary coffee certifications. Certifications have 
emerged to improve the position of small holder farmers in the value chain while at the same time 
promoting sustainable production. Their effectiveness in reaching these goals is variable. It has been 
suggested that efficacy depends on the type of certification, incentives offered at the farm level to 
pursue certifications and the national context into which they are adopted. Nevertheless there is 
little research on the differences in incentives for different certifications and on which aspects of 
national context affect certification efficacy.  
Each certification scheme focuses on different aspects of sustainability, including environmental and 
social aspects.  
This chapter highlights the lack of literature on certifications other than Fair Trade and organic, the 
lack of information on non-financial benefits of certification, and questions of which social aspects of 
national context affect the efficacy of certifications. This chapter includes a table comparing the 
standards which are discussed in this manuscript and also presents the research questions which will 
be answered in this thesis.  
Résumé 
Ce chapitre présente la littérature pertinente sur la certification volontaire du café. La certification a 
émergé pour d’améliorer la situation des petits producteurs dans la chaîne de valeur et promouvoir 
une production durable. Leur efficacité dans l’atteinte de ces objectifs est variable. Il a été suggéré 
que l'efficacité dépend du type de certification, des incitations offertes au niveau de la ferme à 
poursuivre la certification et du contexte national dans lequel elles sont adoptées. Néanmoins, il y a 
peu de travaux sur les différences entre les incitations des différentes certifications, ainsi que sur les 
aspects du contexte national qui affectent l’efficacité de la certification. 
Chaque système de certification met l'accent sur différents aspects de la durabilité, y compris ceux 
environnementaux et sociaux. 
Introduction 
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Ce chapitre révèle le manque de documentation à propos des types de certifications différentes du 
commerce équitable et de l’agriculture biologique. Il met aussi en évidence le manque d'information 
sur les avantages non financiers de la certification, et pose la question des aspects sociaux du 
contexte national qui affectent l'efficacité de la certification. Il contient un tableau comparant les  
certifications abordées dans ce  document, et présente les questions de recherche qui sont traitées. 
Resumen 
En este capítulo se describe la literatura relevante acerca de las certificaciones voluntarias de café. 
Las certificaciones han surgido para mejorar la situación de los pequeños agricultores en la cadena de 
valor, y al mismo tiempo la promoción de la producción sostenible. Su eficacia en la obtención de 
estos objetivos es variable. Se ha sugerido que la eficacia depende del tipo de certificación, los 
incentivos ofrecidos al nivel de finca para obtener las certificaciones y el contexto nacional en el que 
se adoptan. Sin embargo, existe poca investigación sobre las diferencias en los incentivos para 
diferentes certificaciones y sobre qué aspectos del contexto nacional afectan a la eficacia de 
certificación. 
Cada esquema de certificación se centra en diferentes aspectos de sostenibilidad, incluidos los 
aspectos ambientales y sociales. 
Este capítulo destaca la falta de literatura sobre las certificaciones que no sean de comercio justo y 
agricultura orgánica, la falta de información sobre los beneficios no financieros de la certificación, y 
las preguntas relacionados a  aspectos sociales del contexto nacional que afectan a la eficacia de las 
certificaciones. En este capítulo se incluye un cuadro comparativo de las normas que se discuten en 
este manuscrito y también presenta las preguntas de investigación que serán respondidas en esta 
tesis.  
Chapter 1 
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Voluntary Coffee Certifications and the Global Coffee Market 
Coffee is, by nature, a volatile market and small-scale farmers face difficulties dealing with these 
variations (Bacon, 2008). The market for coffee is plagued by times of high prices when farmers may 
invest considerable resources into expanding their coffee production and subsequent low prices 
when the price received by the farmer may not cover the costs of production (Nevins, 2007). The 
most recent prolonged coffee crisis was in 1999-2004 when farmers experienced some of the lowest 
coffee prices in over a century (Bacon, 2008). Coffee prices dropped below the costs of production 
and in 2001 Central American farmers experienced losses per quintal1 ranging from $29/quintal in 
Costa Rica and $12/quintal in El Salvador (Flores, 2002). In the past the International Coffee 
Agreement (ICA), which was in effect from 1962-1989, regulated the price of coffee on the world 
market (Talbot, 2002). The ICA was generally considered successful in increasing the proportion of 
the final price that was paid to producers and in reducing the lows of the market (Daviron & Ponte, 
2005; Talbot, 2002), although it may have been less successful in reducing market spikes (Mehta & 
Chavas, 2008). The collapse of the ICA has tipped the balance of power within the coffee chain to the 
side of the actors in consuming countries (Johannessen & Wilhite, 2010). 
Certifications such as Fair Trade2 and certified organic have emerged as a market-driven innovation 
to de-commoditize coffee and to offer farmers more resilience against price fluctuations while at the 
same time encouraging more sustainable farming practices (Bacon, 2005). 
Several studies have found that Fair Trade offers modest financial benefits to producers and their 
organizations (Lyon, 2007; L. T. Raynolds, Murray, & Taylor, 2005) and increases small farmer 
resiliency (Bacon, 2005). However the effect on the wages of farm laborers is variable (Cramer, 
Johnston, Oya, & Sender, 2014; Luetchford, 2008). On the other hand, other studies have found that 
Fair Trade and organic certified farmers have lower incomes than conventional farmers (Beuchelt & 
Zeller, 2011). 
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Perhaps more important than the financial benefits of Fair Trade are the social benefits, such as 
support for community development, empowerment and capacity building (Bacon, 2010; L. T. 
Raynolds et al., 2005). However, if poorly managed, certifications may augment inequality among the 
members in a cooperative (Fraser, Fisher, & Arce, 2013; Getz, 2008; González & Nigh, 2005) and 
destroy trust (Elder, Zerriffi, & Le Billon, 2012). There is also concern that certification standards may 
create a barrier for developing countries to participate in these global value chains because of the 
difficulties associated with complying with certification regulations (Lazaro, Makindara, & Kilima, 
2008). 
This discrepancy in the effectiveness of voluntary certifications has been attributed to national 
regulatory context (Elder, Zerriffi, & Le Billon, 2013), yet other important dimensions of national 
context which determine certifications’ efficacy have not yet been explored. These dimensions 
include levels of social capital and organization of the cooperative sector. This thesis attempts to 
contribute to the identification of these dimensions. 
Certification Standards 
The certification standards currently on the market have a variety of social and environmental 
standards. Each certification scheme focuses on different aspects of sustainable production 
(Raynolds, Murray, & Heller, 2007). This thesis focuses on coffee certifications found in Costa Rica. 
See Table 1. 
Fair Trade focuses on providing economic incentives to producers to implement socially and 
environmentally sustainable practices. Certification is only available to small and medium-holder 
farmers who are organized in democratic producers’ associations. Fair Trade specifies a minimum 
price that producers must be paid for their product ($1.40/pound since April, 2011 and for the 
duration of this study) and includes a $0.20/pound social premium. Members vote on how the social 
premium will be used during annual assemblies (Fairtrade International, 2014). Certification 
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standards focus on social justice, reducing chemical inputs, employment relationships and 
sustainability management (Raynolds et al., 2007). 
Rainforest Alliance is a member of the Sustainable Agriculture Network and its certification has the 
most developed standards protecting social welfare and the environment. Certification requirements 
focus on biodiversity, human rights and employment relationships (Rainforest Alliance & 
SalvaNatura, 2010). Because of its strategic goal of large-scale change across the coffee sector, 
Rainforest Alliance began by certifying mainly large plantations. However, Rainforest Alliance is 
increasingly certifying small-scale farmers and many small farmer cooperatives currently have 
certified farms (Raynolds et al., 2007). Auditing services for Rainforest Alliance certification are 
managed by its RA-Cert division (Rainforest Alliance, 2014). 
CAFE (Coffee and Farmer Equity) Practices is the responsible-sourcing program for Starbucks Coffee 
Company. Standards, or guidelines as Starbucks prefers to call them, consist of a scorecard with 74 
items. Criteria on the scorecard are categorized as regular standards, ‘zero tolerance’ or ‘extra point’ 
(Ruben & Zuñiga, 2011). Standards focus on traceability and origin, issues at the heart of the 
company’s mission to provide ‘the finest coffee’ (Raynolds, 2009) but also include requirements in 
social responsibility and environmental leadership (Starbucks Coffee Company, 2012). There is no 
guaranteed premium for certified coffee, but economic transparency within the supply chain is 
required  (Starbucks Coffee Company, 2016). 
Utz certification is based on GlobalGAP traceability requirements and extensive recordkeeping. It is 
considered a mainstream coffee certification which seeks to ‘hold the bar,’ rather than ‘raise the bar’ 
on issues of producer livelihoods and environmental protection (Raynolds et al., 2007). Certification 
criteria focus on supply chain management and good agricultural practices (Utz Certified, 2015). 
When the certification was first initiated it included mandatory premium, but this premium is no 
longer specified in the certification guidelines (Daviron & Ponte, 2005). Rather, the certification seeks 
to increase income by improving yields and quality (Ruben & Zuñiga, 2011).  
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Organic coffee certification has strict environmental standards, in particular prohibited chemicals, 
however, it is lacking in other aspects of sustainability. There are no social criteria that producers 
must meet for EU organic certification (IFOAM, 2014) and the premium which was once a significant 
incentive for farmers now often does not cover the costs of production (Beuchelt & Zeller, 2011). 
Harvested by Women is a certification scheme of the International Women’s Coffee Alliance. The 
certification was created in 2012 and is still in the development stage. Certification standards focus 
on gender issues, employment relations, and soil and waste management (International Trade 
Centre, 2012). 
Standard-Compliant Production 
In 2012, 40% of the world’s coffee production was compliant with the standards of at least one 
certification. However, only 12% of the global supply was sold with certification, indicating an 
oversupply of certified coffee (Potts et al., 2014). The top five producers of standard-compliant 
coffee are Brazil (40%), Colombia (17%), Vietnam (15%), Peru (6%) and Honduras (3%). Costa Rica 
produces 1% of the world’s standard-compliant coffee (Potts et al., 2014). Sales of nearly all 
standard-compliant coffee have experienced double-digit growth rates between 2008 and 2012. The 
rate of growth in 4C (Common Code for the Coffee Community)3 was 90% between 2008 and 2012 
for a total in 2012 of 152,708 metric tons. This was followed by Rainforest Alliance with a growth rate 
of 28% between 2008 and 2011 and 2011 total sales of 129, 846 metric tons. Utz experienced a 25% 
increase in global sales between 2008 and 2012 with a 2012 total of 188,096 metric tons. CAFE 
Practices grew by 14% in the same time period with 223,230 metric tons of sales in 2012. Fair Trade’s 
2008-2012 growth rate was 13% with a 2012 total of 128,000 metric tons. Sales of organic certified 
coffee grew by only 4% between 2008 and 2011 with a 2011 total of 133,163 metric tons (Potts et al., 
2014). Despite the growing importance of other certifications, current research focuses mainly on 
Fair Trade and organic certification. 
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Table 1 : A comparison of popular certification standards. Elaborated from multiple sources (4C Association, 2012; Fairtrade International, 2014; IFOAM, 2014; International Trade Centre, 
2012; Rainforest Alliance & SalvaNatura, 2010; Starbucks Coffee Company, 2012; Utz Certified, 2015). 
Standard Environment Social Farm Management Coffee Quality Ethics Premium      
Fair Trade 
International 
Focus on medium-term improvement of soil and forests. 
Prohibited chemicals- 'Red List'. Focus on chemical storage 
and training. Long-term goals on carbon sequestration. 
Focus on worker 
protection, workplace 
safety and employment 
relations. 
Focus on supply 
chain responsibility. 
Non-explicit 
quality standards. 
Focus on compliance to 
legislation. 
Guaranteed minimum 
price of $1.40/pound for 
Arabica plus a 
$0.20/pound social 
premium. 
     
Rainforest 
Alliance 
Focus on soil, biodiversity, water and forest protection. 
Prohibited chemicals and continuous reduction of 
agrochemicals. 
Focus on worker 
protection, employment 
relations and gender 
equality. 
Focus on 
sustainability 
management. 
Focus on 
traceability. 
Focus on compliance to 
legislation. 
None guaranteed.      
CAFE 
Practices 
Focus on soil and water protection. WHO prohibited 
pesticides, Type 1A and 1B. 
Focus on compliance with 
local labor laws and safe 
handling of pesticides.  
Recommended 
management plan, 
financial 
transparency. 
Non-explicit 
quality standards. 
Focus on 
compliance 
to 
legislation. 
None 
guaranteed. 
     
Utz Focus on medium-term water and energy management. 
Prohibited chemicals- WHO Type 1A and 1B, Stockholm 
Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, PAN's Dirty 
Dozen. Recommendations on soil, forest, waste 
management and biodiversity protection. 
Non-discrimination, 
worker rights and 
employment relations. 
Focus on 
sustainability 
management and 
system of internal 
control. 
Recommendation 
to meet industry 
standards. 
Compliance with 
International Labor 
Organization Conventions. 
None guaranteed.      
Organic 
(IFOAM) 
Focus on soil, water and biodiversity protection 
and nutrient recycling. Strict chemical restrictions 
but vary by specific certification. 
Worker protection 
standards, but weak in 
overall social 
protection and gender 
equality. 
Few management 
standards. 
Non-explicit quality 
standards. 
No ethics standards. Fair Trade + 
Organic double 
certifications 
guarantees + 
$0.20/pound over 
Fair Trade 
minimum price. 
     
Harvested by 
Women 
Prohibited pesticides- 'Red Label' of WHO Type 1A 
or 1B. Waste management policies. 
Focus on women's 
rights 
Traceability of 
price premium, if 
there is one. 
None None None guaranteed.      
Introduction 
25 | P a g e  
 
Farmers’ Organizations 
Farmers’ organization refers to any organized group of agricultural producers. This includes different 
types, such as cooperatives, collectives, or associations (Penrose-Buckley, 2007; Young, Sherman, & 
Rose, 1981). Farmers’ organizations are producer owned and controlled business which are engaged 
in collective marketing activities (Penrose-Buckley, 2007). Because farmers’ organizations are 
member-owned, they must provide benefits to their members while maintaining themselves as a 
profitable business. Farmers’ organizations provide important services to their members such as 
advisory services, group purchase of inputs, the mobilization of resources for local development, and 
a forum in which farmers and governments interact (Wennink, Nederlof, & Heemskerk, 2008; Young 
et al., 1981). 
Participation in farmers’ organizations is vital for small-holder access to certifications (Muradian & 
Pelupessy, 2005) and an important strategy in improving the empowerment, a livelihoods, and 
access to services of small-scale farmers (Bacon, 2008; Ton, Bijman, & Oorthuizen, 2007; Wennink & 
Heemskerk, 2006). In Costa Rica farmers’ organizations are classified as associations (Gobierno de 
Costa Rica, 1970), cooperatives (Gobierno de Costa Rica, 1968) and consortia (Gobierno de Costa 
Rica, 1999). Each type of organization has its own distinct legal status. Consortia are second-level 
cooperatives whose members are cooperatives, not individuals. 
A cooperative is one type of farmers’ organization.  There is no universally-accepted definition of 
cooperative and the structure and organizational models can vary (Chaddad & Cook, 2004). The 
International Co-operative Alliance defines a cooperative as ‘an autonomous association of persons 
united voluntarily to meet their common economic, social and cultural needs and aspirations through 
a jointly owned and democratically-controlled enterprise’ (International Co-operative Alliance, 2015). 
Costa Rican cooperatives and consortia provide important services to members to facilitate access to 
certifications (Faure, Le Coq, et al., 2012). Fair Trade in particular has been found to strengthen 
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producers’ organizations (Luetchford, 2008; Ronchi, 2002; Ruben & Zuñiga, 2011), although some 
studies show inconclusive results (Elder et al., 2012). 
There is little data neither on the role of producers’ organizations in the management of other 
certifications nor on the effect of these certifications on the organizations. One study from Mexico 
found that CAFE Practices certification threatened the existence of a producer cooperative and failed 
to build human capital in staff and members (Renard, 2010). Mutersbaugh (2002) cites a case, also in 
Mexico, of organic certification weakening a peasant organization’s ability to advocate for its 
members.  
Problem Statement 
There is abundant literature on voluntary coffee certifications. However this literature focuses on 
Fair Trade and organic certifications and virtually overlooks other certifications, such as CAFE 
Practices, Rainforest Alliance and Utz. Research regarding the financial impact of certifications is 
contradictory, with some studies finding a positive effect on producer income and other studies 
finding little to no effect. Social impacts are also variable, with some studies suggesting that 
certifications build social capital within certified farmers’ organizations and others finding that 
certifications have destroyed social capital. Little attention is paid to non-financial benefits of 
certifications for cooperatives and farmers. 
This thesis explores the role of farmers’ organizations in the management of voluntary coffee 
certifications and the effect on these certifications on small farmers and their organizations. It 
focuses on the social dynamics between farmers and their cooperatives. 
Chapter 2 presents the methods used to collect and analyze data. Chapter 3 provides background 
information on the area of study: Costa Rica’s coffee cooperative sector. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 are 
based on articles submitted for publication. As these three chapters draw on data collected from the 
same periods of field work and each chapter can stand alone, there is some repetition in the 
methods of the three chapters. 
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Chapter 4 of this thesis addresses the following questions in response to the lack of academic 
literature regarding the role of farmers’ organizations in the management of voluntary coffee 
certifications and the discrepancies in the literature about financial incentives for certified coffee: 
 What is the role of cooperatives in the management of voluntary coffee certifications 
 including Fair Trade, CAFE Practices, Rainforest Alliance, organic and Utz? 
 What factors influence the decisions that cooperatives make regarding the management of 
certifications? 
 What financial and non-financial incentives are offered to cooperatives and their members to 
encourage participation in voluntary certifications? 
To further address the question of non-financial benefits of certifications, Chapter 5 looks at how 
advisory services change with certification and how that affects the larger discourse surrounding the 
sustainability of farming practices. The following research questions are targeted: 
 How do a cooperative’s advisory services change with certification? 
 How do outside stakeholders involved in certifications influence cooperative services? 
 What are the changes at the cooperative and farm level with the implementation of 
certifications? 
Chapter 6 considers the social context of Costa Rican coffee cooperatives to better understand the 
effect of national context on certifications’ efficacy in inducing changes in the environmental, 
financial and social sustainability of cooperatives. It addresses the following research questions: 
 How does the social capital of the members and the organization affect the management of 
voluntary certifications? 
 What is the potential for certifications to build social capital in cooperatives? 
The results of the three empirical chapters are synthesized in Chapter 7, allowing for a deeper 
discussion of the issues and their policy and theoretical implications.  
Chapter 1 
Page | 28 
 
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis with a summary of the implications of this work on management of 
certifications. The results will be useful to improve the efficacy of certifications in increasing the 
environmental, social and financial sustainability of the livelihoods of small farmer and farmers’ 
organizations in all parts of the world. 
1
One quintal equals 100 pounds or 60 kg. 
2
 Fair Trade can be seen listed variously as Fairtrade (to denote Fairtrade International), Fair Trade USA (to denote the 
American Fair Trade Certification) and fair trade to denote the concept of fair commerce, but not the certification. This 
manuscript uses ‘Fair Trade’ to denote both Fairtrade International and Fair Trade USA, though the majority of Fair Trade 
certification in Costa Rica is through Fairtrade International. 
3
4C certification, while popular on a global scale, is not popular among Costa Rican cooperatives and is not dealt with in this 
manuscript.
 Chapter 2: Methods 
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Abstract 
This research consists of a mixed methods approach to data collection. Case studies were conducted 
in four representative cooperatives. Data collection consisted of quantitative surveys of members to 
assess levels of social capital; semi-structured interviews with members regarding farming methods; 
qualitative interviews with cooperative administrators; focus group discussions with members; and a 
review of internal documents. 
Results were analyzed by a cross-case thematic analysis of the four case studies. A timeline analysis 
was also undertaken to determine the evolution of cooperative services, changes in farming practices 
and the factors which influence these changes. 
Résumé 
Ce travail mobilise une méthode mixte de collecte de données. Des études de cas ont été menées sur 
quatre coopératives représentatives. Le collecte de données a consisté en des enquêtes quantitatives 
auprès des membres, réalisés dans le but d'évaluer les niveaux de capital social ; des entretiens semi-
structurés avec des membres, à propos des pratiques agricoles ; des entretiens qualitatifs avec les 
administrateurs des coopératives ; des discussions de groupes avec les membres et  ; l'examen de 
documents internes. 
Les résultats ont été obtenus par une analyse thématique croisée des quatre études de cas. Une 
analyse chronologique a également été réalisée pour déterminer l'évolution des services fournis par 
les coopératives, les changements dans les pratiques agricoles et les facteurs qui influencent ces 
changements. 
Resumen 
Esta investigación consiste en un método mixto para la recolección de datos. Se llevaron a cabo 
estudios de caso en cuatro cooperativas representativas. La recolección de datos consistió en 
encuestas cuantitativas de los miembros para evaluar los niveles de capital social; entrevistas semi-
estructuradas a los miembros con respecto a los métodos de cultivo; entrevistas cualitativas con los 
Methods 
31 | P a g e  
 
administradores de la cooperativas; grupos de discusión con los asociados; y una revisión de los 
documentos internos. 
Los resultados fueron analizados empleando un análisis temático cruzado de casos de los cuatro 
estudios de caso. También se realizó un análisis de línea de tiempo para determinar la evolución de 
los servicios cooperativos, los cambios en las prácticas agrícolas y los factores que influyen en estos 
cambios. 
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Study Design 
This thesis relies on a mixed-methods approach to data collection to answer the research questions 
outlined in the previous chapter. It uses a combination of quantitative surveys and qualitative case 
studies, interviews and focus group discussions. It also includes a review of the internal documents of 
case study cooperatives, including training records, newsletters and the minutes from annual 
assemblies. 
Research Phases 
The first phase of research included a literature review, background reading and auditing classes 
related to the research. The literature review included current research on voluntary certifications, 
social capital, collective action, agricultural cooperatives and advisory services. Background reading 
included text and grey literature regarding the coffee industry in Costa Rica, economics, sociology 
and case study research. Classes were audited in organizational analysis, qualitative survey methods 
and socio-economics. 
Phase two was conducted in Costa Rica in March through August 2013. Twenty of the twenty-two 
coffee cooperatives were visited to collect basic information on the size of the cooperative (See Table 
2), the quality of coffee produced and certification management (type of certification, area and 
number of members certified, premiums paid to farmers, auditing costs etc). This data was collected 
in the form of a semi-structured interview (N. Sibelet, M. Mutel, P. Arragon, & M. Luye, 2013), using 
the interview script as a guide, but pursuing further information when applicable. The interview 
guide can be found in Appendix 2. In all cooperatives the person most involved in certifications was 
interviewed. In most cases this was the general manager of the cooperative, but in some cases the 
manager indicated a sales manager or agronomist who worked more closely with certifications. 
Additional interviews and email communications were conducted with other stakeholders, including 
managers at certification bodies such as Rainforest Alliance, the Women’s Coffee Alliance, Starbuck’s 
Farmer Support Center; consortia of cooperatives such as Consortium of Coffee Cooperatives of 
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Guanacaste and Montes de Oro (Coocafe), Sustainable Coffee Initiative (Suscof), CafeCoop; 
governmental organizations such as National Coffee Institute (Icafe), Ministry of Agriculture and 
Livestock (MAG), and various corporate buyers of certified coffee. 
In Phase 3, interview data were processed and interpreted according the thematic analysis method 
described in Sibelet, M. Mutel, P. Arragon, and M. Luye (2013). A list of relevant analyzing 
dimensions was made based on the interview questions (number of members, volume and quality of 
harvest, number and type of certifications, individual or collective management of certifications, 
motivations to pursue certifications etc.). ‘Number of certifications’ and ‘type of certifications’ were 
determined to be the most important variables to use in order to study and predict the extent to 
which cooperatives will participate in certifications. Cooperatives were organized by these variables 
and patterns emerged regarding the secondary variables of number of members, quality of harvest, 
motivations to pursue certifications, etc. A typology of Costa Rican coffee cooperatives was created, 
as detailed in Chapter 4.  From this typology, four cooperatives were chosen for further study. 
Cooperatives were chosen for a diversity of Type (as defined in the typology), geographical location 
and certification type (Fair Trade, CAFE Practices, Rainforest Alliance etc.). 
In Phase 4, conducted in April through September 2014, case studies were conducted in the four 
selected cooperatives. The case study method was chosen for its usefulness in answering ‘how’ 
questions (Yin, 2009). The case study method was deemed particularly useful in answering the 
research questions: How do a cooperative’s advisory services change with certification? How do 
outside stakeholders influence the way cooperatives provide services? How does the social capital of 
the members and the organization affect the management of voluntary certifications? 
Approximately one month was spent in each case study cooperative, living in a village within the 
jurisdiction of each cooperative or in the home of a cooperative member. During this time I 
conducted interviews with the administrators of the cooperatives regarding the evolution of farming 
practices; advisory services such as group training, site visits and field days; collaborations with other 
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stakeholders; and their perceptions about certifications. I also conducted social capital surveys (See 
Appendix 1) and interviews about farming practices (use of herbicides, soil analysis, shade trees etc., 
See Table 2). I reviewed internal documents as available (ex., training records and minutes from 
general assemblies) and attended cooperative events when possible (group training, farm visits and 
general assemblies). A Masters student from the University of Copenhagen, Eva Kraus, conducted in-
depth interviews about farming practices with coffee producers in CoopeLlanoBonito and 
CoopeTarrazu. The data collected was used in her thesis (Kraus, 2015) and also appears in Chapter 5. 
A fifth cooperative was identified as an interesting case from the point of view of social capital. A 
mini-case study consisting of interviews with two board members and the manager was conducted in 
this cooperative and is included in Chapter 6.  
The social capital survey used in Chapter 6  is based on the World Bank Social Capital Survey 
(Grootaert, 2004) and can be found in its entirety (translated into English) in Appendix 1. The 120 
social capital surveys were divided among the five case study cooperatives based on the number of 
members in each cooperative. An attempt was made to interview 2% of the members of each of the 
five cooperatives, but only 1.4% of the membership of CoopeTarrazu was surveyed, due to the large 
size of the cooperative (2900 members), the large geographical area of the cooperative and time 
constraints.  
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Table 2 :  Summary of interviews and surveys conducted. 
Case Study 
Cooperative Administrators Interviewed 
Social Capital 
Surveys by 
author 
Percent of 
membership 
surveyed 
Farming 
Practices 
Interviews by 
author 
Farming 
practices 
interviews by 
research 
assistant 
CoopePilangosta Manager, Sales manager 19 11 11 0 
CooproNaranjo Sales Manager, 4 
agronomists 
43 2 20 0 
CoopeLlanoBonito Manager, Agronomist, Board 
Member 
13 2 0 25 
CoopeTarrazu Program Manager, Field 
Manager, Sales Manager 
43 1.4 0 25 
CoopeMontaña Manager, 2 board members 2 3.7 0 0 
Total 16 120  31 50 
 
Two focus groups with members of CoopeLlano Bonito (one of the selected cooperative) were 
conducted to triangulate and verify results. A focus group/feedback session with managers at 
CooproNaranjo (one of the selected cooperative) was conducted to disseminate results and clarify 
timeline events. 
Data Analysis 
The results of the census of the twenty cooperatives were analyzed to find similarities and 
differences in the management and participation in certifications and to create a typology of 
cooperatives in relation to certifications. First, the relevant dimensions of analysis were determined 
to be the number of certifications in which the cooperative participate and the extent to which they 
participate (the percentage of the total harvest sold in each certification). Next the cooperatives 
were grouped by these relevant dimensions. The relationship between the relevant dimensions and 
the subordinate dimensions (number of members, size of harvest, motivations for certification) was 
analyzed and four types were developed. In the final stage of analysis, the four types were 
characterized and described. These descriptions can be found in the Methods section of Chapter 4. 
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A cross-case thematic analysis of the four separate case studies (and, for Chapter 6, the mini-case 
study) was conducted (Sibelet et al., 2013). In this analysis several important themes of general 
interest were identified regarding organizational management. These themes include organizational 
culture, engagement and partnerships with stakeholders, structures of incentives and payments, 
advisory services and engagement in certifications. The outputs of this analysis were used to 
construct Tables 2 and 3 in Chapter 5 and Table 15 in Chapter 6.  
The four case study cooperatives were further analyzed using a time line analysis to determine 
changes in services provided to members and farming practices and the factors which influenced 
those changes. The timeline analysis used data from the farming practices interviews from the four 
cooperatives, the dates of implementation of certifications in each cooperative, the evolution of 
services in the cooperatives and partnerships and programs with stakeholders. Chapter 5 describes 
the results of the timeline analysis.
 Chapter 3: Costa Rica’s Coffee 
Cooperative Sector  
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Abstract 
Costa Rica provides an interesting setting to broaden the study of voluntary certifications. 
Governmental regulation ensures that producers are paid a minimum share of the added 
value of the coffee chain and that coffee quality meets export standards. The supply chain 
within Costa Rica is short: producers sell directly to private or cooperative-owned mills. This 
eliminates middlemen who would buy coffee at the farm gate at below national market 
prices. 
Cooperatives play an important role in Costa Rica’s coffee industry. This chapter provides an 
overview of the cooperatives by region. Each region produces a different quality of coffee in 
function with the elevation.  
Résumé 
Le Costa Rica offre un cadre intéressant permettant d'élargir l'étude de la certification volontaire. La 
réglementation gouvernementale s’assure que les producteurs reçoivent une part minimum de la 
valeur ajoutée de la filière du café, et que la qualité du produit soit conforme aux normes 
d'exportation. La chaîne d'approvisionnement au Costa Rica est courte : les producteurs vendent 
directement aux moulins privés ou aux moulins appartenant aux coopératives. Il n’y a donc pas 
d’intermédiaires qui achètent du café à la ferme en-dessous du prix du marché national. 
Les coopératives jouent un rôle important dans le secteur du café du Costa Rica. Ce chapitre donne 
un aperçu des coopératives par région. Chaque région produit une qualité différente de café, en 
fonction de l'altitude. 
Resumen 
Costa Rica ofrece un escenario interesante para ampliar el estudio de las certificaciones voluntarias. 
La regulación gubernamental asegura que los productores reciben  un porcentaje mínimo del valor 
añadido de la cadena del café y que la calidad del café cumple con los estándares de exportación. La 
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cadena de suministro dentro de Costa Rica es corto: los productores venden directamente a las 
fábricas privadas o las cooperativas. Esto elimina los intermediarios que iba a comprar un café en la 
puerta de la granja a precios por debajo del mercado nacional. 
Las cooperativas desempeñan un papel importante en la industria del café en Costa Rica. En este 
capítulo se proporciona una visión general de las cooperativas por región. Cada región produce una 
calidad diferente de café en función de la altitud. 
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The Coffee Industry in Costa Rica 
In Costa Rica, coffee production is the principal source of income for 50,000 farmers. Ninety-two 
percent of these farmers have fewer than five hectares of land. These small and medium-holder 
farmers account for 40% of Costa Rica’s annual harvest (Icafe, 2013b). Coffee production in Costa 
Rica is highly technified and input-intensive (Rice, 2015). 
Classifications of Coffee Quality in Costa Rica 
The quality and price of coffee is largely dependent on the elevation at which it was produced 
(Bosselmann et al., 2009). Coffee quality in Costa Rica is classified as Strictly Hard Bean (SHB), Good 
Hard Bean (GHB), Hard Bean (HB), Medium Hard Bean (MHB), Medium Grown Atlantic (MGA), Low 
Grown Atlantic (LGA) and Pacific (P) (Castro, 2013); the first four of which are the most commonly 
produced in the cooperatives studied. See Table 3 for a summary of the coffee qualities found in 
regions with cooperatives.  
SHB is mainly grown between 1200 and 1700 meters above sea level (masl) in the Central Valley and 
Tarrazú, with some production in Coto Brus. SHB is valued for the hardness of the bean and its high 
acidity, body and aroma. GHB is produced between 1000 and 1200 masl, mainly in the West Valley. It 
is also known for the hardness of the bean and high acidity. Some lots have excellent aroma. HB is 
produced between 800 and 1200 masl in Guanacaste and parts of the West Valley. It has good body 
and aroma, but lower acidity than the previous varieties. MHB is produced at 400-1200 masl in Coto 
Brus and has medium hardness, body and aroma (Castro, 2013). 
Table 3: Classifications of coffee quality found in regions with cooperatives. 
Classification Elevation (meters above sea 
level) 
Main Regions of Production 
Strictly Hard Bean (SHB) 1200-1700 Central Valley, Tarrazú, Trés 
Rios 
Good Hard Bean (GHB) 1000-1200 West Valley 
Hard Bean (HB) 800-1200 Guanacaste, West Valley 
Medium Hard Bean (MHB) 400-1200 Coto Brus 
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Costa Rica’s coffee industry is carefully regulated by the National Coffee Institute (Icafe). 
Relationships between producers and mills were clarified in the Law of Relations of 1933. The law is a 
result of many conflicts between producers and millers which began at the end of the 19th century. 
Before the law, the coffee industry was characterized by usurious lending practices on the part of the 
mills and below-market-prices paid to producers (N. L. Babin, 2012). This legislation increased the 
transparency of transactions between producers and millers and protected producers from the 
predatory practices that were complained about in the past (Castro, 2013). The law also created the 
Board of Sales (Junta de Liquidaciones) which fixed the final price paid to producers. Even though this 
law was not well-enforced, it represented an important step in the changing relationship between 
producers and millers (Castro, 2013).  
In 1948 the Oficina del Café (later Icafe) was created as an institution semi-autonomous from the 
state. Its five-member board of directors represented producers, millers, roasters and exporters. Its 
mission was to apply the Law of 1933 (Castro, 2013). 
The next step in regulating the relationship between producers, millers and exporters was Law 2762 
which was passed in 1961 (Icafe, 1961). It clarified the legal price paid to producers. The law also 
prevented pre-harvest contract sales of coffee as well as price-to-be-fixed contracts in an attempt to 
protect producers from below-market prices (Castro, 2013). Addendums to the law require that the 
harvest is sold directly to the mill, effectively outlawing the existence of coyotes, or middlemen who 
buy coffee cherries directly from farmers at below-market prices (Icafe, 1961). 
Addendums to this law also regulate the quality of export coffee. The law stipulates amount of 
unripe coffee beans a mill can accept (2%), the minimum profit that mills can retain, and outlaws the 
production of the species robusta and certain inferior cultivars of arabica (Icafe, 1961).  
Producers deliver their harvest to either private or cooperative-owned mills. Mills may export the 
green coffee directly, sell the coffee to an exporter, or sell the coffee to a roaster for domestic 
consumption (Icafe, 2013b). See Figure 1. 
Chapter 3 
Page | 42 
 
 
Figure 1: Structure of the Costa Rican Coffee Industry. Adapted from Icafe (2013b). 
At the time of the harvest, farmers receive payment for the cherries delivered to the mill. The price 
the mills pay to farmers is posted at the collection sites, or receivers (Castro, 2013). At cooperative 
mills this is called an adelanto, or an advance, because the mill has not yet been paid by the buyer. 
However, from the point of view of the farmer, this payment comes at the end of the production 
season (Luetchford, 2008). Cooperatives will pay up to two more ‘adjustments’ throughout the 
season to distribute profits to the members. Private mills do not pay adjustments (Castro, 2013). 
Farmers’ organizations in Costa Rica’s coffee industry 
Collective action has a long history in the coffee industry in Costa Rica. The first recorded meeting of 
coffee producers organizing to defend their interests is in 1903 in the region of Tres Ríos. In the 
following forty years producers in other regions of the country met to ‘free themselves from the 
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tyranny of the mills’ (Castro, 2013). Farmers’ organizations in Costa Rica are classified into 
associations, cooperatives and consortia, each of which are governed by different legislation (Faure, 
Le Coq, & Rodriguez, 2011). The Ley de Asociaciones 218 governs associations and the Ley del 
Cooperativismo 4179 governs cooperatives  (Gobierno de Costa Rica, 1968). Costa Rica’s first 
cooperative mill was CoopeVictoria in Grecia, West Valley. CoopeVictoria was formed in 1943 when 
the Costa Rican government seized the private mill of the German Niehaus family and allowed the 
producers in the area to form a cooperative (Castro, 2013). The 1960s saw an increase in the 
development of the coffee cooperative sector. Cooperatives opened nearly every year between 1958 
and 1972 in all coffee-growing regions of the country (Castro, 2013). The 1960s also saw the creation 
of the Federation of Cooperatives of Coffee Growers (FEDECOOP) which was created to increase 
cooperatives’ agency in exportation (N. L. Babin, 2012). Cooperatives purchase ripe coffee cherries 
from members and provide services such as milling, commercialization, credit, training, advisory 
services. 
Today approximately 40% of exports are processed by cooperative-owned mills (Icafe, 2013b). The 
policies that support the cooperative sector have been credited with preserving small-holder 
agriculture and easing rural unrest (N. L. Babin, 2012). Cooperatives are an important vehicle for 
communicating new information to producers and providing access to services, such as marketing, 
credit and access to affordable inputs (Luetchford, 2008). Members of cooperatives are more likely 
to employ new agricultural practices than small non-affiliated producers and cooperatives are more 
likely than private mills to employ an agronomist to give agricultural advice to members (Castro, 
2013). 
Costa Rican Cooperatives and Regions 
Costa Rica is divided into eight coffee-growing regions, six of which have active cooperatives. 
Cooperatives are found in the Central and West Valleys (Valle Central and Valle Occidental), Trés 
Rios, Tarrazú, Guanacaste and Coto Brus (Brunca). No cooperatives are located in Orosi or Turrialba 
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(See Figure 2). Cooperatives are diverse and for example vary greatly in size from CoopeSantaElena in 
Monteverde with 25 members to CoopeTarrazu in Tarrazú with 2900 members. 
 
 
Figure 2: Map of coffee producing areas in Costa Rica and location of coffee cooperatives. Red stars indicate cooperatives 
which were visited for this study. Purple stars indicate cooperatives which were not visited. Source, (Icafe, 2013b). 
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Central Valley, West Valley and Trés Rios Cooperatives 
Coffee production began at the end of the eighteenth century in the Central Valley and at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century in the West Valley. These were the first areas of coffee 
production in Costa Rica and they enjoy close proximity to the capital (Icafe, 2013b). Together the 
two regions harvested 37% of the country’s coffee in the 2013/2014 season (Icafe, 2014). 
Cooperatives in the Central Valley are CoopeAlejuela and CoopeLibertad. Cooperatives in the West 
Valley are CoopeVictoria, CoopeMontaña, CooproNaranjo, CoopePalmares and CoopeAtenas. 
CoopeUnion is located in Trés Rios.  
Tarrazú Cooperatives 
Coffee production began in the Tarrazú (Los Santos) region at the time when the last cultivable land 
in the Central and West Valleys had already been claimed (Icafe, 2013b). Tarrazu is an important 
region for coffee production in Costa Rica, and produced 40% of the national harvest in the 
2013/2014 harvest season (Icafe, 2014). The Tarrazú region has three coffee cooperatives, 
CoopeLlano Bonito, CoopeTarrazú and CoopeDota, which are located in the highest elevations of the 
region. Coffee production is important to the economy of the region and there is a lot of competition 
from private micro-mills. The Tarrazú region (along with the West Valley) produces some of the 
highest quality coffee in Costa Rica.  
Guanacaste Cooperatives 
The Guanacaste region is composed of the cantons of Guanacaste, Puntarenas and Alajuela and is 
located in the north of the country. Most of the production in this area is between 600 and 1000 
meters above sea level, with the exception of the Monteverde area which ranges from 600 to 1350 
meters above sea level (Icafe, 2013b). This region produced less that 2% of the Costa Rica’s 
2013/2014 harvest (Icafe, 2014). 
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Guanacaste cooperatives are CoopePilangosta, CoopeCerro Azul, Coope Santa Elena, CoopEl Dos, 
CoopeMontes de Oro, and CoopeSarapiquí. Due to its remote location and financial instability, 
CoopeMontes de Oro was not visited for this study. 
Coto Brus (Brunca) Cooperatives 
Coffee production moved into Coto Brus in the 1960s. The Coto Brus region produced 16% of the 
Costa Rican coffee harvest in 2013/2014 (Icafe, 2014). The coffee plantations in this region are more 
fragmented than in the historic centers of production like the Central Valley. This has resulted in 
smaller farm size and fewer large estates in this region (N. Babin, 2014). 
There is a cluster of three cooperatives in Coto Brus near the Panamanian border: CoopeSan Vito, 
CoopeSabalito and CoopePueblos. CoopeAgri is located farther north in San Isidro de El General. 
CoopeAngeles is also located in this area but was not visited due to the remote location and the lack 
of viable contact information. It is not included in the data in this document. All are cooperatives of 
small-scale farmers located over 250 km from the capital.  
Because of the diversity of the described above, cooperatives in the different regions choose to 
pursue different certifications based on the quality and amount of coffee produced, as well as on 
their individual marketing strategies. The factors which determine the extent of participation of 
different types of cooperatives are further discussed in Chapter 4. The choices that cooperatives 
make regarding the management of certifications and the market incentives which influence these 
choices have implications for the promotion of sustainable farming practices (Chapter 5) and on the 
equality and solidarity within the cooperative (Chapter 6).  The frequency of certifications is 
summarized in Figure 3, which is based on the results of the census of cooperatives.  
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Figure 3 : Cooperatives' participation in certifications by region. Source: Author’s data.
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Abstract 
To better understand how certifications function in the social and political milieu of Costa Rican 
coffee cooperatives, we must first understand the role that cooperatives play in the management of 
voluntary certifications and what factors cooperative administrators consider when making decisions 
regarding their participation in certifications. The information presented in this chapter will be 
further analyzed in subsequent chapter to better understand effects of certifications at the 
cooperative level and how management decisions are influenced by the social context of the 
cooperative sector.  
A census of twenty cooperatives from all coffee-producing regions was conducted to gather basic 
information regarding participation in and management of certifications. Cooperatives were then 
grouped by participation in certifications, and four different types of cooperatives emerged. Four 
cooperatives of different types were selected for case studies to further explore the role of 
cooperatives in the management of certifications. 
Our research examines the role cooperatives play in helping smallholder farmers access coffee 
certifications and addresses the discrepancy in the literature about financial incentives paid to 
farmers and cooperatives. Costa Rican cooperatives participate in a variety of certifications, with 
many holding two or more certifications. Price incentives and demand for certified coffee often 
fluctuate with the global coffee market. There are no significant or consistent financial incentives for 
farmers to pursue certification. Multiple certifications may lower auditing and implementation costs, 
but cooperatives rarely receive the full premium for multiply-certified coffee. Low market demand 
for certified coffee, weak price incentives and high auditing and management costs encourage 
cooperatives to certify only a portion of their members. This strategy rewards compliant farmers 
rather than inducing widespread change to farming practices among the entire membership. 
Cooperatives may provide in-kind support to farmers such as the provision of equipment or plant 
material or offer specialized training to help members comply with certification. Though financial 
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incentives are weak, certifications offer non-financial benefits to both farmers and cooperatives, 
including better management and more resilient cooperatives.  
Résumé 
Pour mieux comprendre comment les certifications fonctionnent dans le contexte social et politique 
des coopératives de café du Costa Rica, nous devons d'abord comprendre le rôle que jouent les 
coopératives dans la gestion des certifications volontaires, et quels facteurs les administrateurs des 
coopératives considèrent lorsqu'ils prennent les décisions concernant leur participation aux 
certifications. L’information présentée dans ce chapitre sera analysée dans le chapitre suivant  afin 
de mieux comprendre les effets des certifications au niveau de la coopérative, ainsi que l’influence 
du contexte social sur les décisions de gestion du secteur coopératif.  
Un recensement de vingt coopératives issues de toutes les régions productrices de café a été réalisé 
afin de recueillir des informations de base concernant la participation à la certification ainsi que sa 
gestion. Les coopératives ont ensuite été regroupées en fonction de la participation à des 
certifications, et quatre différents types de coopératives ont été identifiés. Quatre coopératives de 
différents types ont été sélectionnés pour réaliser des études de cas visant à explorer le rôle des 
coopératives dans la gestion des certifications. 
Notre recherche examine le rôle que jouent les coopératives dans le soutien de l’accès des petits 
producteurs à la certification et  il aborde  les divergences dans la littérature à propos des incitations 
financières payées aux agriculteurs et aux coopératives. Les coopératives costaricaines participent à 
plusieurs types de certifications, beaucoup d’entre elles ayant deux certifications ou plus. Le prix et la 
demande pour le café certifié fluctuent souvent avec le marché mondial du café. Il n'y a pas 
d’incitation financière significative pour les agriculteurs à poursuivre la certification. L’utilisation de 
multiples certifications peut abaisser les coûts d’audit et de mise en œuvre, mais les coopératives 
reçoivent rarement la totalité de la prime pour  la combinaison de plusieurs certifications. Les 
coopératives sont encouragées à certifier seulement une partie de leurs membres du fait de la faible 
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demande pour du café certifié, de la faiblesse des motivations économiques et des coûts élevés 
d'audit et de gestion. Cette stratégie récompense les agriculteurs conformes au lieu de provoquer  un 
changement général des pratiques agricoles de l’ensemble des membres. Les coopératives peuvent 
fournir un soutien en nature aux agriculteurs, tels que de l'équipement et du matériel végétal, ou 
offrir une formation spécialisée visant à  aider les membres à se conformer à la certification. Bien que 
les motivations financières soient faibles, les certifications offrent des avantages non-financiers aux 
agriculteurs et aux coopératives, incluant une meilleure gestion, et des coopératives plus résilients. 
Resumen 
Para entender mejor cómo las certificaciones funcionan en el medio social y política de las 
cooperativas de café de Costa Rica, primero tenemos que entender el papel que desempeñan las 
cooperativas en la gestión de certificaciones voluntarias y los factores que los administradores de 
cooperativas consideran al tomar decisiones con respecto a su participación en las certificaciones. La 
información presentada en este capítulo se examinará en profundidad en el capítulo posterior para 
comprender mejor los efectos de las certificaciones a nivel de cooperativas y cómo las decisiones de 
gestión se ven influidas por el contexto social del sector cooperativo. 
Un censo de veinte cooperativas de todas las regiones productoras de café se llevó a cabo para 
recopilar información básica relacionada a la participación en la gestión y de las certificaciones. Las 
cooperativas fueron agrupadas según su participación en las certificaciones, emergiendo cuatro tipos 
diferentes de cooperativas. Se seleccionaron cuatro cooperativas de diferentes tipos de casos de 
estudio para explorar aún más el papel de las cooperativas en la gestión de certificaciones. 
Nuestra investigación examina el papel que las cooperativas desempeñan en ayudar a los pequeños 
agricultores a acceder a certificaciones de café y se dirige a la discrepancia en la literatura acerca de 
los incentivos financieros pagados a los agricultores y cooperativas. Las cooperativas de Costa Rica 
participan en una gran variedad de certificaciones, muchas de ellas con dos o más certificaciones. Los 
incentivos de precio y la demanda de café certificado suelen fluctuar con el mercado mundial del 
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café. No existen incentivos financieros significativos ni consistentes para que los agricultores 
busquen la certificación. La participación en múltiples certificaciones pueden reducir los costos de 
implementación y auditoría, pero rara vez las cooperativas reciben el total de la prima por el café 
múltiplemente certificado. La baja demanda para el café certificado, los débiles incentivos de precios 
y altos costos de auditoría y gestión animan a las cooperativas para certificar sólo una parte de sus 
asociados. Esta estrategia es más una recompensa a los agricultores que cumplen en lugar de inducir 
un cambio generalizado de las prácticas agrícolas entre todos los miembros. Las cooperativas pueden 
proporcionar apoyo en especie a los agricultores, tales como la provisión de equipo o material 
vegetal u ofrecer una formación especializada para ayudar a los miembros quienes cumplen con la 
certificación. Aunque los incentivos financieros son débiles, las certificaciones ofrecen beneficios no 
financieros a los agricultores y a las cooperativas, incluidas una mejor gestión de las cooperativas y 
mayor capacidad de recuperación. 
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Introduction 
Voluntary coffee certifications, such as Fair Trade and Rainforest Alliance, have attempted to de-
commoditize coffee and mitigate the effects of the crisis of coffee prices (Muradian & Pelupessy, 
2005). Certifications were created with the broad goal of creating a segment of the specialty coffee 
market (Daviron & Ponte, 2005) in which social, economic and/or environmental production 
practices are verified and incentivized (Rice, 2015), however the distribution of financial incentives 
along the value chain is not always transparent (Daviron & Vagneron, 2011).  
Coffee certifications, in particular Fair Trade, have been found to be an effective tool in improving 
the livelihoods of producers (Bacon, Mendez, Gomez, Stuart, & Flores, 2008) while other authors 
highlight modest effects on producer income, particularly during times of economic crisis (Lyon, 
2007; Raynolds, 2002; Ruben, Fort, & Zuñiga-Arias, 2009). Notwithstanding this evidence on the 
positive impact on producers’ wellbeing, coffee certifications receive criticism in the popular press 
for not significantly affecting farmer livelihoods. Some studies highlight the meager economic 
benefits associated with certifications while ignoring the non-economic benefits that certifications 
offer to farmers and their organizations (Omidvar & Giannakas, 2015). Other studies find that 
environmental change at the farm level is limited by self-selection of compliant farmers (Kirumba & 
Pinard, 2010). 
Intersectoral partnerships for certified coffee often favor estates over small-holder farmers (Bitzer, 
Francken, & Glasbergen, 2008). Without the assistance of farmers’ organizations, small-holders 
cannot access certifications or their benefits (Wollni & Zeller, 2007). It has been argued that the 
certification strategies of cooperatives have little effect on the gross margins to its members 
(Beuchelt & Zeller, 2013), yet other studies have shown that certifications, particularly Fair Trade, 
strengthen cooperatives (Bacon, 2005; Ronchi, 2002; Ruben et al., 2009). For these reasons it is 
important to have a better understanding of what factors cooperatives consider when making 
decisions about certifications and which strategies they use to manage them. 
Chapter 4  
Page | 54 
 
Despite the research available on the effect of certifications on producer livelihoods, little work is 
directed toward the role cooperatives play in the process of certification, with the exception of Fair 
Trade  (Ronchi, 2002; Valkila & Nygren, 2010) and to a lesser extent, certified organic (Mutersbaugh, 
2002). Farmers’ organizations are not only intermediaries between different certification agencies 
and the producers, they represent the actors who participate fully in decisions relative to 
certification such as which certifications to pursue, how many and which members to certify and how 
to distribute the profits, if any, from selling certified products (Faure, Le Coq, et al., 2012). The 
dynamics of the global market for certified coffee and the certification standards themselves 
influence how farmers’ organizations manage certifications. This research examines the influence 
and implications certifications have on these management decisions, using a case study of Costa Rica. 
The Costa Rican Coffee Sector 
Costa Rica has a long history of collective action in the coffee industry, starting in 1903 when farmers 
first organized themselves to defend their interests against large exporters (Castro, 2013). Many 
cooperatives entered into the certified coffee market with Fair Trade certification, which was first 
available in Costa Rica in 1988 (Luetchford, 2008). Costa Rica is an important producer of certified 
coffee and its production of standard-compliant coffee approaches 30% of the country’s total 
production (Potts et al., 2014).  
Unlike many of its Latin American neighbors, coffee production in Costa Rica is dominated by small-
holder farmers. Ninety-two percent of the nation’s coffee farmers have farms of less than 5 hectares.  
The harvest from farms of less than 5 hectares represents 40.5% of the nation’s total harvest (Icafe, 
2014). Costa Rica is Central America’s fourth-largest coffee producer, after Honduras, Nicaragua and 
Guatemala (International Coffee Organization, 2015). The majority of coffee production in Costa Rica 
is under at least one species of shade tree (Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas y Censos, 2007) and is 
heavily-dependent on agrochemical inputs (Rice, 1999). 
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In Costa Rica, farmers’ organizations are classified into associations, cooperatives and consortia of 
cooperatives, each classification enjoying a distinct legal status (Faure et al., 2011). Cooperatives of 
small farmers own 10% of the coffee mills in Costa Rica and process 40% of the coffee produced in 
Costa Rica (Icafe, 2013a). Cooperatives are firms owned by their members and distribute profits to 
their members at the end of every year (Gobierno de Costa Rica, 1968). Consortia are second-level 
cooperatives, or groups of cooperatives. Cooperatives (Faure, Le Coq, et al., 2012) and consortia 
(Ronchi, 2002) are the most important modes in which small farmers in Costa Rica access coffee 
certifications1. In this article we will consider only cooperatives and consortia of cooperatives 
because of their importance in the certification process.  
Costa Rica’s coffee sector is regulated by the government through the semi-autonomous Costa Rican 
Coffee Institute (Icafe). The quality and reputation of Costa Rican coffee is carefully protected by 
Icafe, which prohibits the production of the species  robusta (Castro, 2013) and certain cultivars of 
arabica (Icafe, 2013b) and prohibits mills from accepting deliveries with greater than 2% unripe 
cherries (Icafe, 1961). Costa Rica also regulates quality by retaining 2% of the lowest quality coffee 
from the export market (Varangis, 2003). Icafe protects producers by limiting the amount mills can 
charge for their services and requiring that mills receive deliveries directly from producers (Icafe, 
1961), effectively outlawing coyotes, or middlemen who buy coffee at the farmgate at below-market 
prices.  
For these reasons Costa Rica is an appropriate country in which to study how small farmer 
cooperatives manage voluntary coffee certifications and to examine how the dynamics of the 
industry affect these cooperatives. 
Voluntary Coffee Certifications and Global Production 
There are numerous voluntary coffee certifications currently available to producers and consumers. 
The most important in terms of volume is 4C, which accounts for 22% of global coffee production 
(Potts et al., 2014). The goal of 4C certification, which focuses on environmental and social criteria, is 
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the mainstreaming of sustainable coffee. Therefore the certification standards are less strict than 
those for other certifications (4C Association, 2012), which accounts for the large supply of certified 
product. 
 Utz certified coffee accounts for 9% of global production (Potts et al., 2014). Standards are based on 
EurepGap criteria and focus on social and environmental aspects of farming practices (Utz Certified, 
2015). Traceability is also an important aspect of Utz certification, which originally emerged as an 
industry-led initiative (Raynolds et al., 2007). 
CAFE (Coffee and Farmer Equity) Practices is the verified sourcing program of the Starbucks 
Corporation and accounts for 6% of global production (Potts et al., 2014). Standards focus on 
traceability and origin, issues at the heart of the company’s mission to provide ‘the finest coffee’ 
(Raynolds, 2009) but also include requirements in social responsibility and environmental leadership 
(Starbucks Coffee Company, 2012). 
Fair Trade, which accounts for 5% of global production (Potts et al., 2014), is the only certification 
which requires that producers are organized in a democratic organization and the only certification 
program with a minimum price. The certification also includes a $0.20/pound social premium. 
Members are required to vote annually on how this social premium will be distributed. The 
certification focuses on environmental and social standards (Fairtrade International, 2014). 
Rainforest Alliance-compliant coffee accounts for 3% of global production (Potts et al., 2014). 
Rainforest Alliance is the certification program of the Sustainable Agriculture Network (SAN). 
Standards focus on wildlife conservation and workers’ welfare and are based on the principle of 
integrated pest management and the reduced use of agrochemicals (Rainforest Alliance & 
SalvaNatura, 2010).  
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Organic-compliant production comprises 3% of the world’s coffee production (Potts et al., 2014). 
Organic certification is mainly focused on small farms. Standards strictly regulate the use of 
agrochemicals (Raynolds et al., 2007). 
Nespresso AAA is the quality and sustainability program of Nestlé and accounts for 3% of global 
standard-compliant production (Potts et al., 2014). The standards are based on the SAN standards of 
Rainforest Alliance, but with fewer social requirements and higher quality (organoleptic) standards 
(Soto & Le Coq, 2011). 
While the market for certified coffee is growing, so is the gap between the production of standard-
compliant coffee and the sales of certified coffee.  Sales of certified coffee accounted for only 8% of 
global exports in 2009, less than half of the global supply of standard-compliant coffee (Potts, Van 
Der Meer, & Daitchman, 2010). The insufficient demand for certified coffee means that standard-
compliant coffee must often be sold on the conventional market (Sick, 2008). Low demand limits the 
number of cooperatives that can participate in certifications (Muradian & Pelupessy, 2005), 
undermining potential upgrades to the sustainability of farms and cooperatives. 
In 2012 sales of certified-compliant coffee rose to 12% of global exports and production of certified-
compliant coffee reached 49% of global exports (Potts et al., 2014). Production of standard-
compliant coffee is dominated by Latin America, with Brazil producing 40% of the world supply, 
followed by Colombia (17%), Vietnam (15%), Peru (6%) and Honduras (3%). Costa Rica produces 1% 
of the world’s supply of standard-compliant coffee (Potts et al., 2014).  
This research attempts to clarify the role of cooperatives in the certification process and the 
dynamics of financial and non-financial incentives for producers and cooperatives. Section 3.1 
examines the strategies and methods that Costa Rican coffee cooperatives use to implement and the 
factors that cooperatives consider when developing these strategies. Section 3.2 addresses the 
financial incentives paid to small farmer cooperatives and how these incentives fluctuate with 
changes in the world price of coffee and with different certifications. Section 3.3 addresses whether 
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the certifications provide a direct financial incentive to members or in-kind contributions. We 
conclude with some perspectives on certifications in the global market. 
Materials and Methods  
This study is based on field data collected in two phases in 2013 and 2014 with follow-up 
communications with participants in 2015. Data focus on the management of certifications at the 
cooperative level. Phase one consisted of semi-structured interviews (N. Sibelet et al., 2013) with 
twenty-one managers, eight agronomist/technicians, two bookkeepers and eight board members of 
twenty of the twenty-two coffee cooperatives in Costa Rica. The remaining two cooperatives were 
not visited because of geographical remoteness. Interviews collected both quantitative (number of 
members, amount of coffee processed in the past harvest, amount of certified coffee produced and 
sold, number of members and area of land included in various certifications, auditing fees, premiums 
and differentials received for certified coffee in current and past years, etc.) and qualitative data 
(strategy of the cooperative, method of managing certifications, reasons for pursuing certifications, 
product separation and traceability, strategies for paying farmers etc.). The data in this paper also 
include a review of cooperative assembly minutes, newsletters and policy documents. Pricing data is 
from examples given by cooperative managers and not from an analysis of contracts. We analyzed 
managerial practices and decision making processes. Data from the twenty cooperatives were 
compiled and analyzed based on the size of the cooperatives, the class of coffee produced and the 
geographical location of the cooperative. Data is not available for all cooperatives for all harvests. As 
not all cooperatives participate in all certifications, pricing data for certifications are not applicable to 
all cooperatives. 
Phase two consisted of an analysis of both qualitative and quantitative data from case studies (Yin, 
2009) of four cooperatives. Data were collected at farm level at Cooperatives numbers 1, 3, 6 and 19 
as part of a larger study on certifications. The four case-study cooperatives were chosen for their 
diversity of type (according to a typology developed in Phase one and described below), geographical 
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diversity and diversity of certifications (See Table 3). A stratified sample of one hundred twenty 
members from the four cooperatives was surveyed about their perceptions of the management of 
the cooperative, certifications and incentives. Members were also asked about their participation in 
activities of the cooperative and their farming practices. Their opinions are reflected in this work as 
direct quotes. Interviews were conducted in Spanish, the first language of the interviewees, and 
quotes were translated by the first author. Two focus groups were held at Cooperative 1, each with 
twenty farmers participating, to determine the farmers’ knowledge about and interest in 
certifications and to confirm conclusions from the individual interviews. Interview data were 
processed and interpreted according the thematic analysis method described in Sibelet et al. (2013). 
Table 3: Summary of case study cooperatives. 
Case Study Coop Region Size Type Certifications 
Coop 1 Tarrazú Small 2 Fair Trade, CAFE Practices 
Coop 3 Guanacaste Small 1 Fair Trade, Organic 
Coop 6 West Valley Large 4 CAFE Practices, Utz, Rainforest 
Alliance, AAA 
Coop 19 Tarrazú Large 4 CAFE Practices, Fair Trade, Rainforest 
Alliance, Harvested by Women 
 
The results and conclusions generated were triangulated by interviews with leaders of consortia of 
cooperatives (Suscof, Coocafe and Cafecoop), certifying agencies, non-governmental organizations, 
governmental organizations and buyers of certified coffee. Data focuses on the management of 
certifications at the cooperative level.  
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Results and Discussion 
Implementation of Certifications by Costa Rican Coffee Cooperatives 
A Typology of Cooperatives 
Costa Rican coffee cooperatives can be divided into small, medium and large cooperatives (See Table 
4). This division is based on the quantity of green coffee processed by the cooperative, the number of 
members and the total surface area of the members’ farms. Using this division, Costa Rica has twelve 
small coffee cooperatives, six medium and four large.   
Table 4: Categorization of Costa Rican coffee cooperatives by size of harvest, number of members and total surface area. 
 
Categorization of Coffee Cooperatives in Costa Rica by Size 
  Small  Med  Large  
Quantity of Harvest in 1000s of Kg* <1150 1150-2300 >2300 
Number of Members <800 800-1400 >1400 
Total surface area (ha) of members’ farms <1500 1500-4,000 >4000 
Number of coops in category 12 6 4 
*Based on 2012/2013 harvest 
  Source: Authors' research 
   
The majority of coffee cooperatives in Costa Rica (82%) have at least one coffee certification.  
Twenty-seven percent of the cooperatives have one certification, 23% have two, and 32% have three 
or more certifications. Fair Trade is the most popular certification in Costa Rica with 63% of the 
cooperatives participating and is mostly found among the small and medium cooperatives (See 
Figure 4).  
CAFE Practices certification is held by 36% of the cooperatives and certification is well-distributed 
among small, medium and large cooperatives. However all of the eight cooperatives which 
participate in CAFE Practices (with one exception) are in areas of high elevation, that is to say they 
are producers of high-value coffee.  
Small Farmer Cooperatives and Voluntary Coffee Certifications: Rewarding Progressive Farmers or 
Engendering Widespread Sustainability in Costa Rica? 
61 | P a g e  
 
Rainforest Alliance and Utz certifications are both held by 23% of the cooperatives. These 
certifications are also concentrated among large and medium-sized cooperatives located at high 
elevations. Four cooperatives (18%) have organic certification. In Costa Rica organic certification is 
held only by small cooperatives which are located at low to mid elevations2. 
Fewer than 10% of the cooperatives in Costa Rica participate in other certifications such as Nepresso 
AAA, 4C and Harvested by Women, which made its first sales of certified coffee in 2013 and does not 
yet appear in world statistics of certified coffee (for more information see (International Trade 
Centre, 2012)). These less-popular certifications are mainly held by large cooperatives. 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of certifications among the different sizes of cooperatives. 
Costa Rican coffee cooperatives do not participate in certifications to the same extent. We 
categorized the twenty-two cooperatives based on the certifications in which they participate and 
the extent of their participation (percentage of total harvest sold in each certification). As we can see 
from Table 5, some patterns emerge in size, elevation and motivations for certifying.  
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Type 1 cooperatives are dependent on the consortium Coocafe for their participation in Fair Trade 
certification. They are all small cooperatives located in marginal coffee growing areas. These 
cooperatives may need Fair Trade to add value to their product for which demand is low (Kessari, 
2011). Five of the six cooperatives in this group have had Fair Trade certification since it was first 
offered in Costa Rica. However, four of the cooperatives are certified but not active in Fair Trade due 
to financial difficulties. Those cooperatives in the group which currently actively participate in Fair 
Trade (N=2) sell at least 30% of their harvest with Fair Trade certification. Three of the four Costa 
Rican cooperatives which participate in organic certification are in this group.   
Type 1 cooperatives pursue certifications for economic reasons, with the certification premium being 
the most important reason which was cited by 100% of the cooperatives in this group. One 
cooperative in this group added that entering new markets is also an important motivation.  
Type 2 cooperatives have a medium to high dependence on certifications and sell 15-70% of their 
harvest as certified. They are small to medium in size and all but one are at mid elevations. All of the 
cooperatives in this group participate in Fair Trade and two currently participate in other 
certifications (CAFE Practices, organic, and Utz). Three of the four cooperatives in this group entered 
Fair Trade certification during the coffee crisis between 1999 and 2004, over ten years after it was 
first available in Costa Rica. The premium associated with certifications (Fair Trade in particular) is 
also very important to Type 2 cooperatives and was cited by 100% of the respondents. Unlike Type 1 
cooperatives, Type 2 cooperatives recount many secondary reasons for adopting certifications. These 
motivations often include indirect benefits to members. Seventy-five percent of the cooperatives in 
this group cited these types of benefits, such as improving cultivation and pesticide handling 
practices, or access to more training for members. The agronomist at a small Type 2 cooperative 
stated that the biggest benefit of certifications ‘is to protect the farmer. In the past the farmers 
stirred pesticides with their hands and did not wear personal protective equipment.’ Others (50%) 
cited entering new markets or client requests as an important motivation.  
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Type 3 is composed of small, medium and large cooperatives with very little participation in 
certifications. These cooperatives are located at mid to high elevations and generally find that, 
because their coffee is in high demand due to its quality and distinctive characteristics, they do not 
need to participate in certifications. The manager of one Type 3 cooperative says, ‘Certifications are 
not worth the trouble.’  
Type 4 cooperatives are engaged in multiple certifications, but sell a small percentage of their total 
harvest in any one certification. They are medium (50%) to large (50%) in size and produce high 
quality coffee at high elevations. All cooperatives in this group participate in at least three 
certifications; all six are certified in CAFE Practices, five in Rainforest Alliance, four in Fair Trade, and 
three in Utz. These cooperatives find that the high demand for their coffee helps them compete in 
CAFE Practices and Rainforest Alliance and often become certified at the request of an existing buyer. 
A manager at Cooperative 6, a large Type 4 cooperative, said, ‘We began with Rainforest Alliance 
because an important buyer…requested it and would only buy certified coffee.’ Four of the six Type 4 
cooperatives pursue Fair Trade certification alongside other certifications. These cooperatives, which 
have more resources in terms of skilled employees and access to credit than Type 1 and 2 
cooperatives, choose to manage the certification themselves, rather than through a consortium such 
as Coocafe. This allows them to focus on buyers who are looking for high quality Fair Trade coffee or 
buyers who are looking for double certifications, for example Fair Trade-CAFE Practices. Other 
cooperatives in this group find that other certifications or even conventional coffee are more 
lucrative options. A manager at Cooperative 6 stated ‘Fair Trade is a good tool for strengthening 
small cooperatives in Guanacaste [the low-altitude coffee-growing areas], but cooperatives with high 
quality coffee do not need it.’  
Type 4 cooperatives were the only type to list environmental motivations for pursuing certifications. 
Five of the six cooperatives see certifications as opportunity to increase the environmental 
sustainability of the cooperative. A manager at Cooperative 19 explains, ‘The certifications encourage 
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sustainability, the application of their criteria in our programs of work has helped to improve these 
aspects in the farms and in the communities…we have improved the environmental conditions of our 
farms and the operation of our coffee mill [to a point where their operation has] almost no 
environmental impact.’ Two of the six cooperatives have ambitious sustainability programs which 
predate their participation in certifications. They emphasize that the sustainability programs are not 
a result of certifications, but certifications help them achieve the goals of these programs by 
providing incentives to pursue alternative energy sources and increasing the environmental 
efficiency of the mill. Certification premiums are also an important motivation cited by 83% of the 
cooperatives.  
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Table 5: Typology of Costa Rican coffee cooperatives. 
Characteristics 
Type 1                              
Small/Marginal Coocafe 
Dependent 
Type 2                                  
Medium dependence 
on Fair Trade 
Type 3                              
Low to no participation 
in certifications 
Type 4                     
Diversified 
Certifications 
Size Small Small/medium Small to large Medium/large 
Elevation Low to mid Mid to high Mid to High  High 
Certifications Fair Trade or FT/Organic 
Fair Trade, may try 
other certifications, 
but they often find 
they cannot maintain 
them because of lack 
of demand or 
personnel 
One or fewer 
certifications. 
Three or more 
certifications 
Amount of 
certified coffee 
sold 
Financially-dependent on 
Coocafe. Those currently 
exporting sell at least 30% 
in Fair Trade. 
Medium dependence 
on certification. Sell 
15-60% of the harvest 
in Fair Trade. 
<5% of harvest sold 
with certification 
< 30% of total 
harvest sold in any 
one certification. 
Reasons to 
certify 
Premium 
Financial but also to 
provide more services 
to members. 
Little interest in 
certifications. 
Request of 
important buyers 
and environmental 
reasons. 
Number of 
cooperatives 6 4 6 6 
Source: Authors’ research 
Not All Certified Coffee Finds a Market 
Demand for certified coffee is low compared to supply. In Table 6 we can see that cooperatives can 
satisfy demand for certified coffee sales by certifying an average of only 5% of their members for 
Rainforest Alliance or 3% for Utz. Even though cooperatives may certify only a small percentage of 
their members, they may still find themselves with more certified coffee than potential buyers (See 
Table 4). The average of certified production to certified sales ranges from 30% with Fair Trade to 
75% with organic. Fair Trade is the most extreme example because 100% of the cooperatives’ farms 
must be certified, regardless of the demand for certified product.  
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Table 6: Certified coffee sold as percentage of certification-compliant coffee produced and as percentage of total harvest. 
Certifications  
Average % of 
members  
certified 
Average percentage of 
certification-compliant 
production sold with 
certification 
Average percentage of 
total harvest sold with 
certification 
Fair Trade  100* 30 30 
CAFE Practices  33 55 15 
Rainforest Alliance  5 58 9 
Utz  3 53 4 
Organic  53 NA 3 
*Fair Trade does not allow individual certification 
   NB: Data are from the 2012/13 
harvest 
    Source: Authors' research 
 
    Costa Rican coffee cooperatives do a better-than-average job of matching certified production to 
certified sales by focusing on more selective certifications like CAFE Practices and Rainforest Alliance. 
Globally 25% of certification-compliant production is sold as certified coffee (Potts et al., 2014). A 
large part of the oversupply on the global level is due to the oversupply of 4C certified coffee, due to 
its low barriers to entry. When 4C certification is excluded from global averages, the proportion of 
production to sales becomes 56%, closer to Costa Rica’s proportion of 53% for Utz, 55% for CAFE 
Practices and 58% for Rainforest Alliance. 
Barriers to certifications 
Cooperatives in Costa Rica are well-positioned to comply with certification standards because many 
of the requirements coincide with Costa Rican environmental and social laws and coffee sector 
regulations. With training (and a financial incentive to do so) Costa Rican farmers normally are able 
to comply with the certification requirements.  
Because the majority of Costa Rican coffee farms have at least one species of shade tree (Instituto 
Nacional de Estadisticas y Censos, 2007) and because of technicalities in the certification standards 
which allow for the possibility of farms with minimal amounts of shade to be certified (Soto & Le Coq, 
2011), planting shade trees in not considered a barrier to certification in Costa Rica. 
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Organic certification, however, remains a challenge and the majority of the members of Costa Rican 
cooperatives feel it is very difficult to implement. Coffee production in Costa Rica is input-intensive, 
and the transition to organic production results in a reduction in yield of about 50% (Kilian, Jones, 
Pratt, & Villalobos, 2006; Soto & Le Coq, 2011). In countries with lower average productivity in 
conventional production, such as Guatemala, where organic is on average 23% less productive than 
conventional or in Nicaragua, where the conversion to organic results in an average reduction in yield 
of 29%, organic production is more attractive (Soto & Le Coq, 2011). 
However, Costa Rica does have a relative disadvantage when competing on the global certified-
coffee market because high costs of production (Varangis, 2003). A mid-elevation Type 2 cooperative 
decided to discontinue its CAFE Practices certification because of this disadvantage. The cooperative 
was able to meet the requirements and flavor profile demanded by Starbucks. However, after one 
year with the certification this cooperative realized that there was no market for its coffee. A 
corporate buyer for Starbucks explains that, while the company does buy the class of coffee 
produced in this area, they often buy it from other countries where the final sale price is lower than 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) price.  
‘We have a use for those coffees, but it is a matter of price. I have access to the same quality 
coffee at -$0.10 [per pound below the NYSE price] from Brazil….Their cost of production [in 
Brazil] is far far less than any country in Central America. It is very difficult for these countries 
to compete with…Brazil. That’s the reality that many cooperatives [in Costa Rica] face.’ 
Therefore, because of the high cost of production in Costa Rica, Fair Trade and organic certifications 
are often needed to add value to low elevation coffee, which is otherwise overpriced on the global 
market. Low elevation cooperatives produce high quality coffee (in terms of low percentage of 
diseased or unripe beans) in accordance with the strict Icafe standards. However low altitude coffee 
has different organoleptic qualities and is less sought-after on the world market. 
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Other certifications are effectively only available to the producers of high altitude coffee because 
buyers are willing to pay a premium for the quality and distinctive flavor profile. 
Nevertheless, cooperatives with highly-demanded coffee may still have to limit their participation in 
certifications because of the strain certifications can put on the human resources of the cooperative. 
Small and medium-size cooperatives may not have enough employees to manage certifications, in 
particular agronomists, who must be available for farm visits, trainings and recordkeeping. As the 
sole agronomists at Cooperative 1 said, ‘Two certifications is a lot [of work], three certifications would 
kill me.’  
The management costs of certifications may be substantial and include the implementation of an 
internal control system if one does not already exist, auditing costs, hiring of new employees, 
additional time spent in meetings and trainings and possible upgrades to the mill. Cooperatives often 
reserve a portion of the certification premium, if there is one, to cover the additional cost they must 
bear. Auditing costs per hectare vary greatly in function with the number of members certified and 
the size of the farmers’ organization (Soto & Le Coq, 2011) and by the number of certifications that 
the organization holds. Cooperatives with multiple certifications may be able to receive a discount 
from auditors if the auditor is licensed to audit for multiple certifications.  The agronomist from 
Cooperative 1, a small cooperative with two certifications explains,  
‘The audit can be made for two certifications [at the same time] with the visit of the same 
inspector who takes data at the field level, at the mill and the office level. In other words, one 
inspector visits the farms and the mill and we get a slightly reduced cost and the 
arrangements are made for two certifications.’  
Table 7 outlines the auditing costs incurred by cooperatives in 2013, but other, less easily 
quantifiable costs, can be substantial. These direct and indirect costs can be a significant barrier to 
the adoption of certifications, but as found in previous studies (Carlsen, Hansen, & Lund, 2012; Ton 
et al., 2007), cooperatives were not able to precisely quantify  these costs.  
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Table 7: Average auditing costs incurred by cooperatives. 
Certifications  
Average 
annual audit 
costs per 
cooperative 
in US$* 
Average 
annual audit 
costs per 
certified 
member, US$ 
Fair Trade  4500 10 
CAFE Practices  3900 47 
Rainforest Alliance  4500 163 
Utz  2600 131 
Organic  1500 150 
*Data are from 2013 
  
Deciding who to certify 
Collective certification is a requirement of Fair Trade, but all other certifications allow cooperatives 
to certify a portion of their members. Despite this, some cooperatives still choose collective 
certifications because they feel that is it in line with the tenets of cooperativism: all members should 
be equal with equal payment and access to services. For this reason two cooperatives choose to 
certify all of their members in CAFE Practices certification even though both cooperatives sold less 
than 25% of their total harvest with the CAFE Practices certification in 2012/2013. The agronomist at 
Cooperative 1 clarifies, ‘The message that we want to give to the producers is that everyone is equal.’ 
This means extra work for the technical staff in terms of farm visits and trainings for all members 
rather than just for a select few. However, this approach has greater potential to change farming 
practices, because cooperatives use the certification standards to improve the farming practices of 
all members, rather than as a reward for a small number of producers who already comply with the 
standards. 
Collective certifications, however, are exceptional. Due to the limited demand for certified coffee and 
the difficulty of getting all members of a cooperative to comply with all of the certification guidelines, 
most cooperatives decide to certify only a portion of their members, often fewer than 5%. All 
cooperatives in Costa Rica with Rainforest Alliance and Utz certifications and 75% of cooperatives 
with CAFE Practices currently certify only individual farmers.  
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Certifying individual members is a strategy to reduce the costs of internal monitoring and external 
auditing. Individual certifications also reduce the strain on the technical staff, since certifications 
require agronomists and other technicians to visit farms more frequently to assist members in the 
implementation of new farming practices. In the case of individual certification the cooperative 
maintains ownership of the certification and manages all paperwork associated with it. This service is 
essential for small farmers’ access to certifications. A member of cooperative 6 with five hectares 
certified in Rainforest Alliance explains ‘Without the cooperative it wouldn’t be worth the trouble to 
pursue certifications as a private farm. The coop takes care of all the certification paperwork.’ The 
certified members can sell certified coffee exclusively through the cooperative and are responsible 
for farm-level record keeping.    
Cooperatives make the certifications available to all members, but in reality it is the farmers who 
attend most of the cooperatives’ trainings and already comply with the majority of the rules of 
certification (do not use pesticides prohibited by certification, produce their crop under shade and 
have the facilities to store pesticides) who are aware of and participate in individual certifications. 
Cooperatives often approach the members they feel are the best candidates for certification. One 
certified member of Cooperative 19 said that the agronomists from the cooperative ‘looked for me 
[to participate in Rainforest Alliance certification] because I had a lot of shade trees.’ Kirumba and 
Pinard (2010) observed the same strategy in Kenya, noting that individual certifications focus on 
rewarding progressive farmers rather than on uplifting weak farmers. 
In addition to compliance with certification guidelines, cooperatives may give priority to larger farms 
or to farmers who have been loyal to the cooperative in the past, in other words, to farmers who do 
not side-sell to other mills.  
Most uncertified members are unaware of the opportunities for certification in their cooperative. 
Eleven percent of uncertified farmers who are members of a cooperative which offers Rainforest 
Alliance certification (N=18) responded that they had knowledge of the certification. Even certified 
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members of cooperatives are often unfamiliar with certification. Seventeen percent of the farmers 
interviewed from cooperatives with collective CAFE Practices certification (N=41) were aware of the 
certification. Fair Trade enjoys more recognition among certified farmers, presumably because 
farmers must vote at assemblies on the how the certification premium will be distributed. Fifty-one 
percent of the members of Fair Trade-certified cooperatives (N=39) had heard of Fair Trade 
certification. While this lack of awareness of the opportunities and the tenets of certification 
compromises the producers’ ability to make informed decisions about improving the sustainability of 
their farming systems, it also mitigates concerns about resentment or dismantling of solidarity 
between certified and uncertified producers. The decision between individual and collective 
certification remains a critical issue for cooperatives. On one hand, collective certification appeals to 
cooperatives with a strong ideology of equality. One the other hand, the strain that certifications put 
on the human resources of the cooperatives often makes individual certifications the only viable 
option. 
Accessing Certifications Through Consortia 
While cooperatives offer small-holder farmers access to certifications, cooperatives themselves may 
find that they cannot access certifications without technical assistance. There are three consortia, or 
second-level cooperatives, in Costa Rica (Coocafe, Suscof and Cafecoop) which help member 
cooperatives access certifications and/or market their coffee. Consortia are important to help small, 
resource-poor cooperatives access certification and to lower certification costs (Vandorpe, 2014) and 
it is on this premise that Coocafe was created. 
Nine Type 1 and 2 cooperatives access Fair Trade through Coocafe. Coocafe builds capacity within 
the cooperatives, exports coffee and offers financing. Many member cooperatives would not have 
survived the coffee crisis without the help of Coocafe (Ronchi, 2002). The manager of Cooperative 
17, a small cooperative facing financial trouble explains, ‘We exist by the grace of Coocafe…They do 
not like to see member cooperatives fail.’  
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The biggest barrier to Fair Trade certification for the small cooperatives is the lack of human 
resources. A manager at the Coocafe consortium explains, ‘They may have one person acting as the 
manager and the agronomist.’ As the owner of the Fair Trade certification for nine disparate and 
geographically distant cooperatives, Coocafe takes on the risk of ensuring that members of all nine 
cooperatives comply with the certification standards. If an external auditor found a certified farmer 
at one cooperative committed a major infraction (for example the use of child labor), Coocafe, and 
consequently all nine member cooperatives, would lose its Fair Trade certification. This, as also noted 
by Mutersbaugh (2002), makes certified cooperatives dependent on the compliance of farmers in 
distant regions. Because of the high stakes of compliance, Coocafe offers mock-audits for member 
cooperatives before the third-party audits. The cooperative managers and former managers who 
were instrumental in the formation of Coocafe in 1988 agree that, were it not for the support of 
Coocafe, the small cooperatives would not have been able to access Fair Trade certification. 
Nevertheless, as instrumental as Coocafe has been in helping small cooperatives access certifications, 
the costs can be high. Coocafe charges a high price for the services that they provide to member 
cooperatives (Sick, 2008) and has been accused of charging exorbitant interest rates for credit (N. L. 
Babin, 2012). The administrator at a small cooperative explains that the cost of exporting through 
Coocafe reduces the premium gained from the Fair Trade sales. He says, ‘We pay $1 per quintal (100 
pounds) of coffee exported through Coocafe. It was discussed at the last meeting that this costs is too 
high.’ 
Type 4 cooperatives, if they choose to pursue Fair Trade certification, pursue it independently of 
Coocafe. These cooperatives are producers of high quality coffee and feel that they do not need 
Coocafe’s assistance to find buyers. Unlike Type 1 and 2 cooperatives, Type 4 cooperatives are able 
to access financing from banks and therefore do not need the financing provided by Coocafe. 
Unlike Coocafe which deals mainly with Fair Trade and serves Type 1 and 2 cooperatives, the 
consortia Suscof and Cafecoop focus on multiple certifications and Type 2 and 4 cooperatives. The 
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role of Suscof has evolved over the years from its initial focus on providing training to cooperative 
managers to access Utz certification. Suscof is now involved mainly in the marketing of both certified 
and uncertified coffee. Cafecoop focuses on marketing certified and uncertified coffee and not on 
access to certifications. 
Financial Incentives for Cooperatives 
Make-up of the Final Sale Price 
The final price of green Arabica coffee is made up of three components: the base price, the 
differential and the certification premium (if any). The division between the differential and the 
certification premium is somewhat subjective.  
The base price is the price of Arabica on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). The base price of a 
contract may correlate to the NYSE price at any point between the time of initiation of the contract 
and the date on which the coffee is delivered, depending on the stipulations of the individual 
contract. For Fair Trade certified coffee, the seller is guaranteed a minimum base price of 
US$1.40/pound for washed Arabica coffee. No other certifications have a guaranteed minimum 
price.  
The second component of the final sale price is the differential. The differential is based on the 
country’s reputation related to the quality of the coffee and its availability in the market. Some 
countries, such as Brazil and Honduras, may have negative differentials for certain grades of coffee. 
In other words the final sale price may be lower than the base price because the differential is 
subtracted from the base price. According to the cooperative managers interviewed, price 
differentials for Costa Rican coffee range from $0.10-$0.50/pound depending on coffee grade. 
The third component of the final sale price is the certification premium. This component is not 
relevant for conventional coffee. Fair Trade clearly stipulates that a US$0.20/pound social 
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(certification) premium must be paid by the buyer. The premium for other certifications is not 
stipulated in their certification guidelines and was found to vary depending on the contract.  
Most Costa Rican coffee cooperatives renegotiate contracts with buyers every year. This is in part 
due to the fluctuation of the market which makes cooperatives reluctant to commit to a price which 
may be higher the following year and in part to the reluctance of buyers to lock themselves into 
contracts with small farmer cooperatives whose board of directors and marketing strategies may 
change from year to year. The few cooperatives that negotiate multi-year contracts are large 
cooperatives with the financial reserves to withstand market fluctuations and harvest volumes high 
enough to assure buyers that they will be able to fill future contracts. For those cooperatives with 
multi-year contracts, fluctuations in the NYSE price are lower. 
The payment of certification premiums to cooperatives is quite variable. Beuchelt and Zeller (2013) 
find that the financial advantage of certified coffee is most apparent when world coffee prices are 
low. Our study confirms their findings for Fair Trade organic and Utz certifications. For Rainforest 
Alliance the certification premium seems to be stable. There is evidence that for CAFE Practices 
certification may augment the fluctuations in the world market price. 
Fair Trade, organic and Utz prices vary with market fluctuations 
In general, the importance of certifications on the world market varies with the world supply of 
coffee. When the world price of coffee is low, buyers are more willing to pay certification premiums. 
A corporate coffee buyer wrote in an email, 
 ‘When the market is at $2.00 [per pound] or above, quality is THE issue and certifications 
come second. When we are at a market of $1.16 buyers focus on certifications and NOT 
primarily on quality. So it’s a tough game [for cooperatives] to play, as offer and demand 
don’t tend to agree with one another.’ 
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Cooperative administrators confirm the difficulty of balancing the supply and demand of certified 
coffee. The sales manager at Cooperative 6, a Type 4 cooperative, elaborates, ‘Certifications are an 
important strategy in times of low coffee prices…With high prices any coffee is worth a lot of money, 
[and certifications] lose their interest.’  
Fair Trade, organic and Utz certifications follow this pattern of premiums which fluctuate inversely 
with the NYSE price. In Table 8 we see average data compiled from the sales contracts of four 
cooperatives for three harvest years. In harvest year 2012/13, the NYSE price was below the Fair 
Trade minimum and cooperatives benefitted from both the minimum price and the $0.20/pound 
certification premium. An administrator at cooperative 1 emphasizes, “Fair Trade functions perfectly 
when the NYSE price is below the Fair Trade [minimum] price.”  
However, when the NYSE price is above the Fair Trade minimum price, as we see in harvest years 
2011/12 and 2013/14, the base price received by the cooperatives is below the NYSE price, making 
the average final sale price equal to conventional in 2011/12 and $0.08 higher than conventional in 
2013/14. In these cases the cooperatives report that buyers will not pay both the full NYSE price and 
the certification premium. The final sale price was no higher than that of conventional because 
buyers ‘took the Fair Trade premium from the higher NYSE price,’ according to the manager at 
Cooperative 1. 
The manager of Cooperative 2, a Type 4 cooperative, confirms this. 
‘When the New York Stock Exchange price is low (let’s say less than $1.40/pound for 
example), the buyers almost always pay both the quality differential and the $0.20/pound 
Fair Trade premium. In this case they always respect the minimum price of $1.40/pound. The 
problem is when the NYSE price is at a very high level (let’s say, for example $2.00/pound or 
more). In this case, the problem is the total differential (the sum of the quality differential plus 
the Fair Trade premium). What they do is lower this total differential so that if the quality 
differential is $0.35 and the Fair Trade premium is $0.20/pound they will be reluctant to pay 
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this total differential of $0.55/pound, but in the end they offer a total differential of $0.40 or 
$0.45 per pound.’ 
Therefore, while the contracts include the required $0.20/pound certification premium, it is not 
reflected in the final sale price.  
The resilience that the Fair Trade minimum price offers, however, should not be discounted. 
Particularly for small cooperatives this economic buffer can be important. The former manager of 
Cooperative 3, a small Type 1 cooperative and a founding member of Coocafe says ‘Fair Trade gave 
us the possibility to survive when the price of coffee was low.’  
Table 8: Breakdown of final sale price of conventional and Fair Trade coffee paid to cooperatives 2011/12-2013/14. 
Harvest 
Year Coffee Type 
Average 
Base Price 
US$/lb 
Average 
Differential 
US$/lb 
Average 
Certification 
Premium 
US$/lb 
Average 
Final Sale 
Price 
2011/12a Fair Trade 1.50 0.30 0.20 2.00 
 
Conventional 1.70 0.30 0 2.00 
2012/13b Fair Trade 1.40 0.25 0.20 1.85 
 
Conventional 1.13 0.25 0 1.38 
2013/14b Fair Trade 2.03 0.20 0.20 2.43 
  Conventional 2.10 0.25 0 2.35 
Source: Interviews with cooperative administrators.  
  a Data from one cooperative 
   b Average data from three cooperatives. 
    
A Type 4 coop, however, was able to obtain the full NYSE price and the $0.20/pound certification 
premium in 2013/14, though the selling manager stated that it was a struggle to get the buyer to pay 
the full amount. ‘They didn’t want to pay it, but they did.’ This is a large cooperative with an annual 
production of 85,000 quintals of high-altitude coffee and is in a better position to negotiate with 
buyers than are smaller cooperatives which produce low-altitude coffee.  
The certification premium for organic coffee was found to fluctuate with the market in much the 
same way as the Fair Trade final sale price. This phenomenon has been noted in previous studies 
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(Kilian et al., 2006). We compared the certification premium for organic coffee (as compared to the 
conventional price offered at the same mill) by harvest year and found that it fell as the average 
export price of Costa Rican coffee increased (See Figure 5). The manager of Cooperative 3 explains 
how the financial incentives for organic certification vary with the world price of coffee: “This year 
[2013/14, high NYSE price] we didn’t sell any coffee with organic certification because the premiums 
were very low… If the premiums are higher next year we will sell again with organic certification.” In 
this case the farmers continue using organic production practices but receive the price for 
conventional coffee. Because of the transition period from conventional production to organic 
certification, cooperatives must maintain the certification every year even if they do not sell any 
product under the certification. Organic coffee production is normally less profitable than 
conventional production because of higher labor and input costs which are usually not offset by the 
premium, (Beuchelt & Zeller, 2011). However, since the premium fluctuates more or less inversely to 
the NYSE price, organic farmers should experience a more consistent sale price from year to year, 
offering a buffer from market lows. 
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Figure 5 : Average export price of Costa Rican coffee and average organic premium offered by Costa Rican mills. Source: 
(Icafe, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013b, 2014a, 2014b) 
As with organic coffee, cooperatives report that they may not sell Utz certified coffee when the 
world price is high because both the premium and the demand are lower.  A manager at Cooperative 
6 explains, ‘We didn’t sell any coffee in Utz this year [2013/14] but we still hold the certification. We 
were not gaining anything from the certification and the premium was very low. There were hardly 
any buyers. [When the NYSE price is high] they can get cheaper coffee from Nicaragua.’  
Confirming previous studies (Kilian, Pratt, Jones, & Villalobos, 2004), we found that the lowest 
certification premiums were paid for Utz. The five cooperatives that participate in Utz report a small 
premium between $0.05-$0.10/pound. As we saw with Fair Trade certification, cooperatives may 
receive a higher price for Utz certified coffee than for conventional coffee, but it is often not as high 
as expected given the usual differentials received for the class of coffee sold. The manager at 
Cooperative 2 explains in an email, 
‘Utz certified almost always pay a better price for certified coffee, but almost never pays the 
total that they should for the quality differential plus the certification premium. There is a 
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better price, yes, but they never pay the total of the quality differential for Costa Rican and in 
the end the certification premium ends up being less than expected.’ 
Rainforest Alliance premiums remain relatively stable with market fluctuations 
Barham and Weber (2012) found that the Rainforest Alliance certification premiums that 
cooperatives paid to member farmers fluctuated between 2006 and 2008, dropping significantly with 
a small change in the local market price. Interviews with cooperative administrators in Costa Rica, 
however, showed evidence of relatively stable certification premiums. A manager at Cooperative 4, a 
Type 4 cooperative, explains, ‘The premium for Rainforest Alliance is $0.10/pound on top of the 
quality premium [differential] and does not vary with time.” This cooperative, nevertheless, had only 
two years’ experience with Rainforest Alliance certification. The premium paid to cooperatives for 
Rainforest Alliance certified coffee was found to vary between $0.00 and $0.20/ pound among the 
five cooperatives which hold the certification. A multiple-year study would be needed to determine 
the exact effect of market fluctuations on the Rainforest Alliance premium.  
CAFE Practices certification premiums may augment market fluctuations 
CAFE Practices is a private certification, so it is not surprising that it does not behave in the same way 
as third-party certifications. Indeed, according to a manager at Starbucks, the company prefers to call 
CAFE Practices a ‘verification’ rather than a certification. Starbuck’s goal of buying 100% of its coffee 
from certified sources (mostly from Starbuck’s own CAFE Practices program) by the year 2015 
(Starbucks Corporation, 2014) means that in times of low supply (high global prices) it may be forced 
to pay a competitive price to secure coffee with the desired origin, flavor profile and certifications. 
For this reason we see that cooperatives may receive a slightly higher average price for CAFE 
Practices certification than for conventional coffee in years of high global prices (2011/12 and 
2013/14) and slightly lower prices when there is an oversupply of coffee on the world market 
(2012/13) (see Table 9). Due to low participation in Nespresso AAA on the part of Costa Rican 
cooperatives we were unable to assess the price dynamics. However, since AAA, like CAFE Practices, 
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is a corporate certification which places a high emphasis on quality and origin, there is reason to 
believe that the two certifications would react in a similar manner. The fluctuation in the price of 
CAFE Practices, however, is quite small and a larger study would be needed to confirm the long-term 
price dynamics of corporate sourcing certifications. 
Table 9: Breakdown of final sale price of conventional and CAFE Practices coffee paid to cooperatives 2011/12-2013/14. 
Harvest 
Year Coffee Type 
Average 
Base Price 
US$/lb 
Average 
Differential 
US$/lb 
Average 
Certification 
Premium 
US$/lb 
Average 
Final Sale 
Price 
2011/12a 
CAFE 
Practices 1.70 0.32 0 2.02 
 
Conventional 1.70 0.30 0 2.00 
2012/13b 
CAFE 
Practices 1.20 0.22 .03 1.43 
 
Conventional 1.20 .33 0 1.53 
2013/14c 
CAFE 
Practices 2.30 .35 0 2.65 
  Conventional 2.30 .30 0 2.60 
Source: Interviews with cooperative administrators 
  a Average data from two cooperatives. 
   b Average data from three cooperatives. 
   c Data from one cooperative. 
   
When a certification premium amounts to a quality premium 
Several authors have argued that what is classified as a certification premium is actually related to 
the quality of coffee rather than to the manner in which the crop was produced (Kilian et al., 2006; 
Kilian et al., 2004; Ruben & Zuñiga, 2011). This means that producers must improve both the quality 
and the sustainability of their production without compensation for the more sustainable practices 
(Giovannucci, Byers, & Liu, 2008). We found this discrepancy in the cases of CAFE Practices and 
Rainforest Alliance certification. Cooperatives reported that only coffee with few defects from the 
peak harvest season can be used to fill contracts for these two certifications. Farmers further 
reported that they must pay workers more to harvest for Rainforest Alliance certification because 
the cooperative would accept only 100% ripe coffee cherries for these contracts, which is more time-
consuming to harvest. Workers are paid by volume harvested rather than by time worked, so it is not 
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clear whether or not workers are earning more on an hourly basis due to the painstaking harvesting 
process. 
While quality is an important issue in all certifications, cooperatives did not need to implement any 
special practices to comply with other certifications, such as Fair Trade or organic. Icafe carefully 
monitors the quality of export coffee, so the quality standards for conventional coffee are similar to 
those of certified coffee in Costa Rica. However, an upgrade in quality has been seen in Fair Trade 
coffee in Nicaragua, where there is less governmental intervention in quality controls (Pirotte, 
Pleyers, & Poncelet, 2006; Valkila & Nygren, 2010). 
Paying Certification Premiums to Members 
Although, as we have seen above, cooperatives may receive a financial incentive to pursue 
certifications, their costs are often substantial and incentives may not be passed on to their 
members. It is not unusual for cooperatives, particularly in the first years of certification, to retain 
some or all of the premium (Vandorpe, 2014) to cover the costs of audits, upgrades to the mill or the 
implementation of a system of internal control. 
A cooperative with strong competition from a private mill or one which prioritizes solidarity among 
the members may choose to distribute any certification premium to all members, rather than just 
individually certified members. This strategy would allow the cooperative to raise its buying price, 
attract more sellers and better compete with other mills. However, this strategy dilutes the financial 
interest of individual certification in the eyes of its members.  
Cooperatives which have a more entrepreneurial vision may distribute all or a portion of the 
premium to certified farmers. This payment is meant as an incentive to offset the costs of 
implementing new agricultural practices, and acknowledges the notion that ‘it is hard to be green 
when you are in the red’ (Vanclay, 2004). The sales manager at Cooperative 6 recognizes the 
importance of these economic incentives, ’It’s very nice to protect the environment, all of this is very 
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very important, but the producer needs money.’ The average certification premiums paid to certified 
members are summarized in Table 10. 
Table 10: Average certification premium paid to individually-certified members. 
Certifications 
Number of cooperatives 
which certify individual 
members 
Average premium paid 
to certified members 
(US$/lb) in 2013/14 
CAFE Practices 6 $0.08 
Rainforest Alliance 5 $0.09 
Utz 5 $0.04 
Organic 2 N/A 
   
 
The implementation of sustainable farming practices in order to comply with the rules of certification 
may represent a significant cost for the producers, and farmers may find changes difficult to maintain 
if the promised financial incentives are not forthcoming (Smith, 2007). Some of these requirements 
may include cutting weeds rather than spraying herbicides (which increases labor costs), building a 
shed to store pesticides, planting shade trees and renovating housing for seasonal workers. The 
premium paid to farmers for certification may or may not cover the expense of all of these changes. 
However, farmers may still volunteer to pursue a certification knowing that the costs will not be fully 
covered because of a desire to improve farm management and recordkeeping or because they think 
that the changes will result in higher yields. One farmer described the $0.10/pound premium that he 
receives for Rainforest Alliance certified coffee a ‘little gift’ from the cooperative acknowledging the 
effort he had made to implement the certification requirements on his farm. Another smallholder 
farmer from a neighboring cooperative says that the $0.10/pound premium that he receives for the 
same certification is essential in order to make the changes needed to comply with the strict 
environmental requirements of Rainforest Alliance. While he describes himself as having a strong 
environmental ethic, without the financial incentive provided by the cooperative, he would not be 
able to make these changes. ‘It’s not that I don’t want to [protect wildlife], it’s that I couldn’t [without 
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the premium].’ He repeatedly calls coffee production ’a struggle.’ ‘Conservation is very important’, he 
says, ’but the most important is that the kids eat.’  
Two out of four CAFE Practices-certified members at one Type 4 cooperative decided to discontinue 
their individual certifications after the 2012/13 harvest year when both the world price of coffee and 
the certification premium paid by the cooperative were very low. Farmers decided that the price 
incentives were too low to justify the agrochemical restrictions imposed by the certifications, 
particularly in a year with high disease pressure.  
Cooperatives with collective certifications distribute all or a portion of the premium to their 
members after the cooperative has recuperated its costs. This process is transparent to the 
members. The manager at Cooperative 1 says, ‘We must justify all of these expenditures, colon for 
colon, to the members.’ A large Type 3 cooperative allocates 100% of the $232,000 earned from the 
Fair Trade premium to environmental and social projects in the community rather than distributing 
the premium directly to farmers. The cooperative has decided that, because it has so many members 
(6000), community-wide programs make a larger impact than a direct payment of less than $40 to 
each member, a relatively insignificant amount in a country where rural incomes are comparatively 
high. The members vote on which projects to support at the annual assembly. The farmers may 
benefit directly from projects such as a watershed revitalization project which provided farmers with 
shade trees or the provision of disease-resistant coffee seedlings. These projects were funded with 
the proceeds of the Fair Trade premium in 2013 and 2014, respectively. One Type 4 cooperative pays 
100% of the Fair Trade premium to farmers, which amounted to a payment of $228 per member in 
the 2012/2013 harvest. This amount is insignificant, considering the average rural income in Costa 
Rica is US$862 per month (Censos, 2012). A direct payment of this amount has less effect on 
producer livelihoods in Costa Rica than it would in El Salvador, for example, where average rural 
income is US$361 per month (Melara, 2014). 
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Although the rules of Fair Trade state that at least $0.05 of the $0.20/pound premium must be 
allocated for improvements to the harvest, this presents a problem for some Costa Rican 
cooperatives, which feel that their most important role is to increase the profit of its members. 
Administrators at Cooperative 1 agree, ‘As a business we think it is better that this money goes 
directly to the producer.’  
All other Fair Trade cooperatives in Costa Rica pay members between 75% and 90% of the 
$0.20/pound Fair Trade premium with an average premium of $0.13 per pound for all coffee sold as 
Fair Trade. The remaining 10-25% of the premium from these contracts is used to support programs 
within the cooperative such as improvements to the mill, educational programs for improving coffee 
quality, subsidizing the sale of coffee seedlings, scholarships for the sons and daughters of members 
or programs for women. 
In most cases members receive a premium only for the portion of the harvest the cooperative is able 
to sell as certified. They receive the conventional price for the remainder of their harvest, even 
though it is standard-compliant.  We found two cases of cooperatives paying a premium to farmers 
even when none was received from buyers. In both cases, Type 4 cooperatives paid certified 
producers a premium for the entire harvest of certification-compliant coffee, rather than simply for 
the portion of the harvest the cooperative was able to sell with certification. This is only an option for 
Type 4 cooperatives with a limited number of certified producers, as smaller cooperatives would not 
have the financial resources to pay a premium when none was received from the buyers. 
Consumers have indicated a willingness to pay a premium for Fair Trade and ecological certifications 
(Arnot, Boxall, & Cash, 2006; Basu & Hicks, 2008), presumably assuming that the added cost was 
supporting the implementation of these programs. However, the distribution of this premium along 
the value chain is not regulated.  In an attempt to increase the amount of certified production, 
concessions have been made in the strictness of the standards. Price provisions to producers are 
most frequently the first standards to be relaxed (Daviron & Vagneron, 2011). Lack of transparency in 
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the price distribution favors buyers in price negotiations (Giovannucci et al., 2008). Willingness to pay 
on the part of the consumer coupled with relaxed standards on price premiums to producers creates 
the opportunity for middlemen such as exporters and roasters to charge higher prices without 
passing the profit on to producers (Vagneron & Roquigny, 2011; Valkila, Haaparanta, & Niemi, 2010). 
Even if cooperatives do not directly pass premiums on to their members, the members may still 
benefit. Cooperative 19, a large Type 4 cooperative uses the premium from Rainforest Alliance and 
Women’s Harvest and a portion (25%) of the premium from Fair Trade to fund its sustainability 
program and programs for women. The sustainability program includes environmental education 
programs for children, health fairs, a recycling program and programs for immigrants. Programs for 
women focus on women’s empowerment and financial independence. 
Certified farmers may also receive in-kind contributions to help them comply with certification 
standards, such as free shade tree seedlings, personal protective equipment for pesticide application 
or specialized training in lieu of financial incentives. 
Studies which document the lack of financial incentive for member farmers overlook the benefit that 
certifications have on subsidizing cooperatives. In the more remote coffee growing regions, 
cooperatives may be the only buyer of coffee. If cooperatives go out of business farmers would be 
unable to sell their harvest. These remote cooperatives are often important contributors to the local 
economy, as an administrator at Cooperative 1 explains, ‘Eighty-five percent of the local economy 
passes through the cooperative.’  
Compliance with certification standards can improve farm management. Recordkeeping and cost 
analysis is limited at both the cooperative and the farm level (Ton et al., 2007). The agronomist at 
Cooperative 1 says, ‘There is no culture of recordkeeping among the farmers. Not just here, in all of 
Latin America.’ Certifications have helped change this, particularly at the cooperative level. There is 
anecdotal evidence that improved recordkeeping has improved the profitability of farms, but without 
pre-certification records this is impossible to quantify. 
Chapter 4  
Page | 86 
 
Conclusion 
Financial incentives encourage cooperatives and, in some circumstances, farmers, to pursue 
certifications. Nevertheless, these incentives are often variable. Many times certification premiums 
amount to quality premiums. If cooperatives receive a certification premium, buyers may pay a lower 
quality premium, thereby negating any financial gains from certifications. Multiple certifications may 
lower auditing and implementation costs, but cooperatives rarely receive the full premium for 
multiply-certified coffee. 
Price incentives vary depending on the world price of coffee, the quality of coffee produced and the 
certification scheme. There are no clear and consistent financial incentives to pursue certification. 
Financial incentives for certifications such as Fair Trade, organic and Utz may diminish or disappear 
entirely when the world price of coffee is high. Our study found Rainforest Alliance premiums to be 
more consistent, but previous studies have observed fluctuation with the market. CAFE Practices 
fluctuate with the world price of coffee and may even augment market highs and lows. The demand 
for certified coffee also fluctuates with the world price.  
Cooperatives are able to satisfy market demand by certifying only a small portion of their members, 
reducing the farm-level impact because the cooperatives can select the most compliant farms. 
Because of an oversupply of certified coffee on the world market, consumer demand would have to 
increase considerably, prompting the certification of more farms, to have a significant positive 
impact at the farm level. 
Collective certifications of all members of a cooperative have the potential to induce the greatest 
change at the farm level, whereas the certification of individual farms rewards mainly progressive 
farmers. Low consumer demand, high auditing and certification costs and weak financial incentives 
encourage cooperative to certify individual members, undermining the potential for upgrades to the 
sustainability of all members’ farms. 
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Strict governmental regulation of the coffee industry facilitates compliance with certifications. 
However, high rural incomes such as those in Costa Rica mean that financial incentives are often 
insignificant. Cooperatives with many members and low percentages of certified coffee sales often 
choose to use certification premiums for programs which benefit the community, rather than a direct 
payment to the members. 
Certifications improve recordkeeping and management in the cooperative. Cooperatives, whether or 
not they offer direct financial incentives to members, offer many in-kind and indirect benefits related 
to certification and account for the expenditures of the premium in a transparent manner. The 
decision about the payment of direct financial incentives to members is based on competition from 
other mills, the financial situation of the cooperative and ideals of equality within the cooperative. 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
1
Certifications in this article refer to any program in which farmers or groups of farmers comply with a 
defined set of production practices in return for verified distinction in the marketplace. Some certifiers 
(Starbucks, Women’s Harvest, 4C) prefer to call their programs verifications rather than certifications, 
however for the purposes of this article both types of programs are considered together. 
2
Organic certification in Costa Rica is more popular among associations, rather than cooperatives. Several 
Costa Rican associations also participate in other certifications such as Fair Trade or CAFE Practices.  
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Abstract 
The previous chapter presented general data about how cooperatives manage certifications and 
incentivize farmers. Because of the structure of the certified coffee industry, incentives are often 
weak and thus farm level changes are likely to be small. However, in addition to financial incentives, 
cooperatives offer many advisory services to their members which are related to certifications. The 
purpose of this article is to explore possible reasons why impact studies may conclude that farm level 
changes are small, even if farmers are complying with certification standards. It also explores other 
non-financial effects of certifications at the cooperative level. 
Certifications oblige cooperatives to offer new services to support farmers. Cooperatives form 
collaborations with new stakeholders or reconfigure existing collaborations to provide extension 
services to their members. These services have helped to shape farmers’ attitudes about sustainable 
farming practices, though farm-level changes may be small. The main change at the cooperative level 
is the development of a new discourse on sustainability. Advisory activities addressing certification 
issues are directly linked with practices such as maintaining a farm record book to better manage 
farm resources or wearing a mask when applying pesticides. The increase in the number of shade 
trees on the farm is linked to cooperative services.  
The results are useful to improve the advisory services provided by cooperatives by better identifying 
the key issues to be addressed to fulfill the certifications’ requirements. 
We demonstrate that certifications change the intensity and scope of extension services and oblige 
cooperatives to engage with a more diverse network of stakeholders. 
Résumé 
Le chapitre précédent a présenté des données générales sur la façon dont les coopératives gèrent les 
certifications et incitent les agriculteurs. En raison de la structure de le secteur du café certifié, les 
incitations sont souvent faibles, et par conséquents les changements faibles au niveau des 
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exploitations. Cependant, en plus des incitations financières, les coopératives offrent de nombreux 
conseils agricoles services consultatifs à leurs membres en lien avec la certification. Le but de cet 
article est d'explorer pourquoi les études d'impact peuvent conclure que les changements au niveau 
des exploitations sont faibles, même si les agriculteurs sont conforment aux normes de la 
certification. Il explore également d'autres effets non financiers de la certification au niveau de la 
coopérative. 
La certification oblige les coopératives à offrir de nouveaux services visant à soutenir les agriculteurs. 
Ces coopératives mettent en place des collaborations avec de nouvelles parties prenantes, ou 
reconfigurent des collaborations existantes, dans le but de fournir des conseils agricoles à leurs 
membres. Ces services ont contribué à façonner l'attitude des agriculteurs vis-à-vis des pratiques 
agricoles durables, bien que les changements au niveau de l’exploitation agricole puissent être 
faibles. Le principal changement au niveau de la coopérative est le développement d'un nouveau 
discours sur la durabilité. Les activités de conseil traitant la certification sont directement liées à des 
pratiques telles que le maintien d'un registre agricole afin de mieux gérer les ressources de la ferme 
ou le port d’un masque lors de l'application des pesticides. L'augmentation du nombre d'arbres 
d'ombrage sur la ferme est liée aux services de la coopérative. 
Ces résultats sont utiles pour améliorer le conseil agricole fournis par les coopératives, en identifiant 
mieux les questions clés à aborder afin de répondre aux exigences des certifications. 
Nous démontrons que les certifications changent l'intensité et la portée du conseil agricole, et 
obligent les coopératives à collaborer avec un réseau plus diversifié de parties prenantes. 
Resumen 
El capítulo anterior presentó datos generales acerca de cómo las cooperativas logran las 
certificaciones e incentivar a los agricultores. Debido a la estructura actual de la industria del café 
certificado, los incentivos son a menudo débiles y por lo tanto los cambios de nivel de cafetal son 
propensos a ser mínimos. Sin embargo, además de los incentivos financieros, las cooperativas 
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ofrecen a sus miembros muchos servicios de asesoramiento que están relacionados con las 
certificaciones. El propósito de este artículo es explorar las posibles razones por las que los estudios 
de impacto pueden concluir que los cambios del nivel de las fincas son pequeños, incluso si los 
agricultores están cumpliendo con los estándares de certificación. También explora otros efectos no 
financieros de las certificaciones al nivel de la cooperativa. 
Las certificaciones obligan a cooperativas para ofrecer nuevos servicios de apoyo a los agricultores. 
Las cooperativas forman colaboraciones con nuevas partes interesadas o reconfigura las 
colaboraciones existentes para proporcionar servicios de extensión a sus miembros. Estos servicios 
han ayudado a dar forma a las actitudes de los agricultores sobre las prácticas agrícolas sostenibles, a 
pesar que los cambios a nivel de los cafetales puedan ser pequeños. El principal cambio en el nivel de 
cooperativa es el desarrollo de un nuevo discurso sobre la sostenibilidad. Las actividades de 
asesoramiento que abordan las cuestiones de certificación están directamente vinculadas con las 
prácticas tales como el mantenimiento de un libro de registro de explotación para gestionar mejor 
los recursos agrícolas o usar una máscara durante la aplicación de pesticidas. El aumento en el 
número de árboles de sombra en la granja está vinculado a los servicios de la cooperativa. 
Los resultados son útiles para mejorar los servicios de asesoramiento prestados por las cooperativas 
para identificar mejor las cuestiones clave que deben revisarse para cumplir con los requisitos de las 
certificaciones. 
Se demuestra que las certificaciones cambian la intensidad y el alcance de los servicios de extensión 
y obligan a las cooperativas de comprometerse con una red más amplia de las partes interesadas. 
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Introduction 
Voluntary certification schemes which verify sustainable production practices often require farmers 
to adapt their farming practices. Advisory services are essential to help farmers gain new knowledge, 
understand the requirements of certification standards, to comply with their demands (Hejnowicz, 
Rudd, & White, 2016) and help farmers transition to more sustainable practices (Ingram, 2008). A 
simple transfer of technology is not adequate to achieve more sustainable production; advisors and 
farmers must work together to construct knowledge (Klerkx & Jansen, 2010). Education in 
sustainable practices is also important to an organization, as it embeds social and environmental 
responsibility into the organization’s values (Klerkx, Villalobos, & Engler, 2012). Farmers’ 
organizations do not only create access to inputs and credit to their members, but are also important 
providers of advisory services (J. F. Le Coq, Faure, & Saenz, 2012). These services are vital for small 
farmers’ access to and compliance with private certifications, as the standards frequently change and 
can be difficult to navigate (Elder et al., 2013; Poulton, Dorward, & Kydd, 2010). 
Intermediary organizations that link various actors can expand the reach and impact of advisory 
services (Klerkx & Gildemacher, 2012). Howells (2006) defines an intermediary as ‘an organization or 
body that acts as an agent or broker in any aspect of the innovation process between two or more 
parties.’ Farmers’ organizations play such an intermediary role (J. F. Le Coq et al., 2012; Yang, Klerkx, 
& Leeuwis, 2014). Farmers’ organizations engage outside stakeholders with the expectation of 
improving farmers’ access to financial services, farm inputs and technological services (Gouët & Van 
Paassen, 2012). Farmers’ organizations articulate their members’ needs for technology, knowledge, 
funding and other services; directly provide services or compose networks to provide these services; 
and facilitate the interaction between other service providers and their members. Inter-
organizational collaborations can facilitate access to new resources or markets and enhance 
innovation processes. By acquiring new knowledge and resources from these collaborations, farmers’ 
organizations may decide to provide new services to their members.  
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The development of voluntary certifications requires the collaboration of multiple stakeholders 
(Alvarez, Pilbeam, & Wilding, 2010; Bitzer et al., 2008), although the exact role of different types of 
organizations is not clear. An institutional environment which includes environmental NGOs and 
consumer organizations may facilitate the implementation of voluntary standards (Klerkx et al., 
2012). Previous research has paid little attention to the collaborations of farmers’ organizations with 
other stakeholders in efforts to access certifications, the effect of these collaborations on the content 
and intensity of advisory services to farmers, and the effects of these new advisory services on 
farming practices. Our research aims to fill this gap. 
The objectives of this study are to i) examine the influence of coffee certifications on the advisory 
services which farmers’ organizations provide to their members and ii) the effect of these services on 
farming practices and on farmers’ perceptions of environmental sustainability. We look specifically at 
changes in the engagement with outside stakeholders and its influence on training and other 
services. Our research is based on case studies of first and second-level coffee cooperatives, which 
are the types of farmers’ organizations most involved in certifications in Costa Rica. 
Costa Rica and Voluntary Coffee Certifications 
Costa Rica presents an interesting setting to study the dynamics of voluntary coffee certifications and 
the role of small-farmer cooperatives. First, 92% of farmers cultivate less than five hectares of land 
(Icafe, 2013b) and 41% of the 2013/14 harvest was processed by small-farmer cooperatives, making 
this type of farmers’ organization an important part of the national coffee sector (Icafe, 2014). 
Second, the Costa Rican coffee sector participates in multiple voluntary coffee certifications. In 2012, 
32% of the national harvest was compliant with one or more certification standards (Potts et al., 
2014). Cooperatives are essential for small farmers to access these certifications (Faure, Le Coq, et 
al., 2012). Of Costa Rica’s 22 cooperatives, 82% have at least one certification and 55% have multiple 
certifications. The most popular certifications among Costa Rica’s cooperatives are Fair Trade (15 
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cooperatives participating), Starbucks’ CAFE Practices (8 cooperatives), Rainforest Alliance (5 
cooperatives), and Utz (5 cooperatives) (Snider, Faure, Gutiérrez, & Sibelet, Submitted for 
Publication). All certifications require farm-level practices such as recordkeeping or the reduction of 
agrochemicals (Raynolds et al., 2007). There are differences among the standards of the different 
certifications. For example, Fair Trade requires that members are organized democratically and 
receive training in safe handling of pesticides and soil and water management (Fairtrade 
International, 2014). In addition to sustainable agricultural practices, CAFE Practices requires high 
quality coffee and health and safety training for farm workers (Starbucks Coffee Company, 2012). 
Rainforest Alliance focuses on biodiversity and workers’ welfare (Rainforest Alliance & SalvaNatura, 
2010) while Utz focuses on farm management and traceability (Utz Certified, 2015). Costa Rican 
cooperatives select and manage certifications in different ways, depending on their ideologies, their 
commercial strategies, the quality of coffee they produce, market demand and price for certified 
coffee (Snider et al., Submitted for Publication). Some cooperatives certify all members of the 
cooperative (collective certification) to promote equality and good management practices among all 
members (Fair Trade allows only collective certifications). Responding to limited market demand, 
other cooperatives use individual certifications by involving a few farmers who already comply with 
the majority of the standards. These farmers may receive a small premium from the cooperative to 
incentivize their participation and acknowledge their efforts (Snider et al., Submitted for Publication). 
Some cooperatives may join a second-level cooperative, or consortium, to receive support in 
accessing certifications. One such consortium is  Coocafe, a group of nine Fair Trade cooperatives 
which has been important to accessing Fair Trade in Costa Rica (Ronchi, 2002).  
Coffee grown at higher elevations is generally of a higher quality and commands a higher market 
price (Bosselmann, 2012). In Costa Rica, cooperatives at lower elevations, such as those in 
Guanacaste, participate mainly in Fair Trade. Cooperatives at higher elevations, such as those in the 
West and Central Valleys and in Tarrazú, mainly participate in certification schemes managed by 
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private companies, namely Starbuck’s CAFE Practices, and in multi-stakeholder and NGO-initiated 
certification schemes such as Utz and Rainforest Alliance (Snider et al., Submitted for Publication). 
Conceptual Framework 
Relevant advisory services are considered vital to implement certifications and change agricultural 
practices (Elder et al., 2013; Ruben & Zuñiga, 2011) but the cost of these new services must be 
considered. Advice may be provided based on individual support or collective training and using 
different approaches ranging from a top-down approach of technicians training farmers to adopt 
external proposals, to a bottom-up approach that aims at strengthening the autonomous decision-
making process of farmers (Faure, Desjeux, & Gasselin, 2012). However, changing agricultural 
practices to achieve a more sustainable farming system is more than just a technical process; it is also 
a socio-cultural process and requires farmers to construct new knowledge. Facilitative advisory 
relationships are more effective in constructing knowledge than top-down methods, however their 
use is limited.  
Figure 6 summarizes the interaction between cooperatives, other stakeholders and farmers in 
relation to advisory services. Certification standards are a normative driver of  change at both the 
cooperative and the farm level (Klerkx et al., 2012). Cooperatives exist within and interact with the 
institutional environment which influences the cooperatives’ perceptions of sustainability and their 
design and implementation of new services for their members. Stakeholders such as NGOs, public 
entities or private companies provide services that may directly affect farmers’ perceptions and their 
farming practices, but changes at the farm level may also be influenced by other external coercive 
drivers, such as laws, governmental initiatives, actions of other actors not linked to certifications, 
etc.. The farmers’ organization itself provides its own intrinsic driver to improve sustainability 
practices and advisory services. The cooperative principles which guide farmers’ organizations 
articulate their duty to provide education, community development and corporate responsibility 
(Carrasco, 2007). 
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Considering this conceptual framework, our research questions are how do certifications influence 
the manner in which cooperatives provide advisory services to their members and how do these 
advisory services influence farming practices? 
Materials and Methods 
To achieve our research objectives we began with a general survey of coffee cooperatives in Costa 
Rica to better understand the state of voluntary certifications among the cooperatives. We 
interviewed administrators from 20 of Costa Rica’s 22 coffee cooperatives to collect data on the size 
of the cooperatives; the size and quality of the harvest; and their participation in certifications, 
including their management strategy (collective or individual certification of members). This data was 
used to construct a typology of Costa Rican coffee cooperatives based on their participation in 
certifications; number of certifications held and type of certification. When categorized in this way, 
Advisory services 
Other 
stakeholders 
Farmers’ 
Organizations 
Farmers & Farming 
Practices 
Certification 
Standards 
Laws, Regulations & 
other external events 
Sustainability Discourse 
Figure 6 Conceptual diagram of the relationships between farmers’ organizations and the change in 
farming practices. 
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patterns emerge regarding the size of the cooperative, the quality of coffee produced and the 
motivations for pursuing certification. Table 11 outlines the four distinct Types.  
From this typology, four cooperatives were chosen for their diversity of Type and geographical 
location. We used a multiple-case study design in which each cooperative is studied as a separate 
case within the same study. The case study design was chosen for its usefulness in answering ‘how’ 
questions (Yin, 2009). The case study method allowed us to explore the complex relationships of 
cooperatives and outside stakeholders. We used multiple case studies embedded in the context of 
cooperatives which participate in coffee certifications in Costa Rica because the evidence from 
multiple-case designs is more compelling and regarded as more robust than single-case designs (Yin, 
2009). Four case studies were chosen to maximize the data collected while accommodating the time 
constraints of the researchers.  
Table 11 : A typology of Costa Rican coffee cooperatives. 
Characteristics 
Type 1                              
Small/Marginal Coocafe 
Dependent 
Type 2                                  
Medium dependence on 
Fair Trade 
Type 3                              
Low to no participation 
in certifications 
Type 4                     
Diversified 
Certifications 
Size Small Small/medium Small to large Medium/large 
Elevation Low to mid Mid to high Mid to High  High 
Certifications Fair Trade or FT/Organic 
Fair Trade, may try other 
certifications, but they 
often find they cannot 
maintain them because of 
lack of market demand or 
personnel 
One or no 
certifications. 
Three or more 
certifications 
Amount of 
certified coffee 
sold 
Financially-dependent on 
Coocafe. Those currently 
exporting sell at least 30% 
in Fair Trade. 
Medium dependence on 
certification. Sell 15-60% 
of the harvest in Fair 
Trade. 
<5% of harvest sold 
with certification 
< 30% of total 
harvest sold in any 
one certification. 
Reasons to certify Premium 
Financial but also to 
provide more services to 
members. 
Little interest in 
certifications. 
Request of 
important buyers 
and environmental 
reasons. 
Number of 
cooperatives 6 4 6 6 
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Since the research objective was to analyze how participation in certifications influence the advisory 
services of coffee cooperatives, Type 3 cooperatives, which do not participate intensively in 
certifications, were not chosen for case studies. The case studies consisted of semi-structured 
interviews (N. Sibelet et al., 2013) with cooperative administrators to understand the history of 
certifications in the cooperatives, the history of the services provided to the members and the 
collaborations that the cooperatives formed in order to provide these services. We also reviewed the 
cooperatives’ training records when available, and observed events organized by the cooperatives, 
including group training, farm visits and annual assemblies. In addition, we interviewed five key 
stakeholders including NGOs, private companies and governmental organizations involved in 
providing advisory services to farmers. The case studies and interviews are summarized in Table 12. 
Table 12 Summary of case study cooperatives, certifications and interviews. 
Cooperative Type Elevation 
Certifications and 
management strategy: 
collective or individual (i) 
Year of first 
certification 
Approximate 
Number of 
Members 
Member 
Interviews 
Administrator 
interviews 
Coop 1 Type 1 Low Fair Trade (c) 1989 170 0 1 general manager 
Coop 2 Type 2 High Fair Trade (c), CAFE Practices 
(c) 
1999 640 25 1 general 
manager, 1 
agronomist 
Coop 3  Type 4 High CAFE Practices (i), Rainforest 
Alliance (i), Utz (i),  
1999 2100 0 1 sales manager, 4 
agronomists 
Coop 4 Type 4 High CAFE Practices (c), 
Rainforest Alliance (i), Fair 
Trade (c) 
2003 2900 26 1 program 
manager, 1 sales 
manager, 1 
manager of 
technical 
department 
 
Total     51 11 
 
A timeline from before certification until the present was created from the case study data. The lack 
of cooperative training records made quantifiable data analysis difficult in some cases. We therefore 
triangulate incomplete data with quotes from interviews. 
In order to address the second part of our objective, to determine the effect of the changes of 
services on the farming practices of members, we conducted semi-structured interviews (N. Sibelet 
et al., 2013) with cooperative members, resulting in interviews with 51 farmers from Cooperatives 2 
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and 4 using snowball sampling. Interview questions can be found in Appendix C. All members of the 
two cooperatives are certified in Fair Trade and CAFE Practices. Six of these farmers are also 
individually-certified by Rainforest Alliance through Cooperative 4. Farmers were asked about the 
evolution of their perceptions about environmental issues, changes to farming practices (including 
the planting of shade trees and live barriers, and the use of personal protective equipment, farm 
record books and inputs), use of the cooperative’s advisory services and other external events (new 
regulations, other environmental initiatives) which were influential in the evolution of their farming 
practices. To complement and triangulate information from the surveys we conducted two focus 
groups with members of Cooperative 2.  
Results and Discussion 
Changes at the cooperative level 
Interviews with the cooperative administrators emphasize the importance of changing the 
perceptions of and building capacity in the cooperative staff before the cooperatives could induce 
change at the farm level. The agronomist at Cooperative 2 explains, ‘First the cooperatives changed, 
then the farms.’ This capacity building is the most important for obtaining the first certification. Once 
the systems of internal control and traceability are implemented and initial changes have been made 
at both the cooperative and the farm levels, the following certifications are easier to obtain. The 
same agronomist goes on to clarify some of the changes in procedures, ‘100 percent traceability is 
important for Fair Trade certification. We have to document what training and talks we have hosted 
and who attended, make sure that all paperwork is in order and document farming practices.  
Cooperative administrators agree that certifications oblige them to change the advisory services they 
offer to their members, requiring more diversified topics than previously offered. The agronomist 
from Cooperative 2 elaborates, 
‘When the certifications came into play, there was a drastic change in behavior, because we 
had to consider other factors in extension and training which were absent in the former 
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system …Certifications forced us to diversify our trainings. Before certifications …we talked 
more about productivity, about how to maintain oneself as a producer. Now that the 
certifications are incorporated, the focus is more global.’ 
He specifically mentions a new requirement from Fair Trade to offer training on climate change 
adaptation and Fair Trade and CAFÉ Practice’s requirements of paying farm labors a minimum wage. 
We can compare this to a small cooperative in the Central Valley which does not hold any 
certifications and does not address environmental or social concerns in its group training. According 
to the manager, their training topics have not changed significantly in the past ten years, ‘We offer 
one training per month on coffee maintenance, fumigation or something similar. The National Coffee 
Institute (Icafe) provides these trainings because we do not have an agronomist.’  
These new advisory services put a strain on the technical department of cooperatives. Because of 
this strain on human resources and because the new topics required by certification are frequently 
out of the expertise of the cooperative staff, cooperatives form alliances with new stakeholders to 
learn or to obtain services for their members. Consortia such as Coocafe or Sustainable Coffee 
Project (Suscof) could be seen as alliances among cooperatives to assist staff to comply with the 
certifications’ requirements. Coocafe, for example, continues to build capacity in cooperative staff to 
help them keep abreast of changing standards, even in cooperatives which have been certified for 
over 20 years. 
Collaborations with NGOs are most frequently used to initiate the certification process or to provide 
more specialized training after the cooperative has met the basic requirements of certification. Public 
entities are most often used for providing group classroom-style training to members. Collaborations 
with private actors, such as chemical companies are sometimes reconfigured in order to comply with 
certification. The agronomist from Cooperative 2 clarifies, ‘[The private chemical companies] know 
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which certifications we have and which pesticides are prohibited and they adapt their talks 
accordingly.’ The services provided by different stakeholders are summarized in Table 13. 
These new collaborations were brought about by the need to meet certification standards, modify 
staff and members’ perceptions about sustainable farming practices, improve the traceability of 
product and modify services. However it takes time to adapt advisory services to the needs of 
certified members, as shown in Table 14. 
 
Table 13 Cooperatives' collaboration with other institutions and the types of services provided to cooperatives and to 
farmers. FT= Fair Trade, RA= Rainforest Alliance CP= CAFE Practices 
                                             
Type of  
Institution 
  Services       NGO Private Public Consortia 
Building Producer 
Capacity 
Earthwatch offered 
training for CP, 
funded by Starbucks 
Chemical companies provide 
training and recommend 
pesticides in compliance 
with certification 
regulations. Starbucks' 
Farmer Support Center 
offers advisory services. 
National Learning Institute 
(INA), Icafe, MAG, Tropical 
Agricultural Research and 
Higher Education Center 
(CATIE)-International 
Center for Research in 
Agricultural Development 
(CIRAD), Department of 
Labor, National Institute of 
Innovation and Technology 
Transfer in Agriculture 
(INTA). 
Coocafe offers group 
trainings to producers for FT.  
Building Cooperative 
Capacity 
Friedrich Ebert 
Foundation founded 
Agro Economic 
Consultancy (CAE) to 
build capacity in 
cooperatives to 
access FT 
    
Coocafe offers capacity 
building to cooperative staff.  
Suscof trained cooperative 
staff in sustainable coffee 
production for Utz. 
Provision of goods: 
shade trees, recycling, 
soil testing 
Clean our fields 
foundation provides 
recycling of pesticide 
containers for RA 
Costa Rican Institute of 
Electricity (ICE) provided 
seedling shade trees for 
reforestation for CP and FT. 
MAG offers free soil 
testing. 
Coocafe offers mock-audits 
for 
cooperativess/cooperative 
members for FT. Provided 
shade trees for reforestation 
project for FT. 
Financial Support   Starbucks funded 
development of soil analysis 
software and certified 
farmer training for CP. 
National Institute for 
Cooperative Support 
(INFOCOOP) provides 
financing to cooperatives. 
Coocafe offers financial 
support to member coops for 
FT. 
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Table 14 Summary of time-line series of four case study cooperatives from before certifications to ten years after 
certification. FT= Fair Trade, RA= Rainforest Alliance, CP= CAFE Practices. 
 
Before certification 
Around the time of 
certification (+/- 1 year) 1-5 years after certification 6-10 years after certification 
Cooperatives offer services 
to members including credit 
for inputs, group training on 
productivity and disease 
management, site visits, soil 
analysis. Occasionally 
collaborate with Icafe and/or 
MAG. 
First certification is FT for 
Type 1 and 2 coops or an 
individual certification of the 
cooperative farm or select 
member farms in Utz or RA 
in Type 4. Cooperative may 
join a consortium to access 
certifications (3/4 case study 
cooperatives). Cooperative 
makes cooperative-level 
changes (with the help of 
the consortium) such as 
upgrades to the mill (FT) and 
to the system of internal 
control/traceability for all 
certifications. Consortia 
offer training to cooperative 
administrators (ex. 
Sustainable production 
practices (Utz), internal 
control and traceability 
systems (Utz, FT)) and 
occasionally to members (ex. 
audit preparation for FT, 
sustainable production 
practices (FT)). 
Cooperative stops selling 
prohibited pesticides in supply 
store and exerts tighter control on 
members regarding pesticides. It 
may take several years to comply. 
Cooperative assists/encourages 
members to build pesticide 
storage shed and provides free 
signage to members. Cooperative 
intensifies training to include 
topics required by certification 
(soil and water protection, 
pesticide management and safety 
for all certs). Continue to use MAG 
and Icafe to offer trainings, but 
topics are more diverse (ex. soil 
management, use of recordbook). 
Collaborations with new 
governmental organizations are 
formed to provide training on new 
topics such as occupational health 
and safety.  Extra site visits and 
paperwork are usually handled by 
existing staff. Cooperative may 
pursue second certification. 
Cooperatives continue to adapt to 
changes in certification 
regulations including new training 
requirements, newly prohibited 
pesticides. New collaborations are 
formed with NGOs and 
universities to provide more 
specialized training (ex. soil 
analysis software for CP, 
adaptation to climate change or 
FT) and services (ex. recycling of 
pesticide containers for RA and 
provision of shade trees for RA or 
CP). 
Cooperatives offer more services to their members to help them comply with certification. Most of 
these services are educational, but may also be in the form of provision of materials and inputs, such 
as shade trees, compost, signage for pesticide storage sheds or personal protective equipment, while 
yet others provide tangible solutions to challenges, such as recycling services. Cooperatives who 
certify individual members mainly target their services and education to certified members. A 
cooperative agronomist justifies the cooperative’s decision to focus their limited resources on 
certified producers until more supplies become available, ‘We provide shade trees to [Rainforest 
Alliance and CAFE Practices] certified producers to help them increase their shade…Right now we only 
provide them to certified producers, but we would like to provide them to all members [eventually].’ 
These changes in advisory services are summarized in Table 15. 
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Table 15 Advisory services provided by the cooperatives, before and after certifications 
  Before Certifications After certifications 
Trainers Cooperative agronomist, private 
chemical company 
representatives, MAG, Icafe 
Cooperative agronomists, private chemical company 
representatives, MAG, Icafe. Sporadic engagement with 
other governmental organizations and NGOs, stronger 
engagements with higher education. As capacity is built in 
cooperative staff outside organizations may be used less. 
Group Trainings 
and field days  
Focused on productivity, 
classroom style. Mostly equal 
access for all members. 
Additional topics beginning with protection of water, 
reduction of agrochemicals, signage for pesticide storage 
sheds, personal protective equipment, soil protection, 
compost, recordkeeping , shade trees (in some cases) and 
more recently climate change. May focus on individually-
certified members. Mostly classroom style. Additional field 
days for certified members. 
Individual Farm 
visits 
Provided by cooperative 
agronomist or technician. Focus on 
productivity, equal but infrequent 
access for all members. 
Provided by cooperative agronomist or technician. Focus on 
productivity, compliance with certification standards and 
book keeping. Focus on certified members with more 
frequent visits per farm. 
 
 
While advisory services are more intensive and the subjects more diverse because of certifications, a 
review of the cooperative training records reveals that group trainings remain focused on lecture-
type talks or top-down demonstrations. However, these trainings seem to be effecting in convincing 
members to implement certain management practices. Based on interviews with farmers we found 
those who attended more training events were more likely to wear a mask when applying pesticides 
(see Figure 7). An individually-certified farmer who regularly attends trainings sponsored by the 
cooperative says ‘After the training I realized I should use it.’ Farmers who attend trainings are also 
more likely to keep a farm record book to record earnings, expenses and the application of inputs 
than are farmers who never attend group training events. A group training event convinced one 
farmer of the benefit of maintaining a record book, ‘I’m no longer certified but I still use the record 
book. It is a good practice.’ 
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Figure 7: Management practices in regard to participation in group trainings 
Since pre-certification training records are not available for any of the cooperatives, we cannot 
assess if the frequency of field day-type trainings (in which members visit the farm of another 
member) have increased. Nevertheless, field days are infrequent. Only cooperatives 3 and 4 offered 
field days to members in the past three years. According to training records, these field days involved 
14% and 9% of the cooperatives’ members, respectively. Icafe collaborated in the field days for both 
cooperatives, and various agrochemical companies made presentations about their products. 
Cooperative 4 offers field days annually, with one or two per year open to all members and one 
event specifically for Rainforest Alliance-certified members. They may use the event for individually-
certified members as an opportunity to distribute free shade trees or cuttings of plants to be used for 
live vegetative barriers as a means to help certified members comply with certification.  
Farmer-to-farmer trainings are not formally organized by any of the cooperatives, despite their 
proven effectiveness in Mexico in spreading knowledge about certified organic practices and in 
taking some pressure off of technical staff (Bray, Sanchez, & Murphy, 2002). Because changing 
agricultural practices is a social as well as a technical process (Vanclay, 2004), advisory activities 
should allow farmers to experiment with new practices, discuss and exchange experiences with other 
farmers to help them construct new paradigms about what constitutes a sustainable practice. 
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Changes in farming practices 
There is a consensus among the administrators of the cooperative administration that the 
environmental and sustainability training brought about by certifications has caused real changes in 
the farmers’ perceptions about how to manage their farms. A cooperative agronomist explained, 
‘There is no doubt that the perceptions of farmers have changed with certifications [in regard 
to] conservation of soil and water, the use of [personal protective] equipment, the manual 
control of pests and reduction of chemicals... They no longer think that the farm needs to be 
100% free of pests. A certain threshold is acceptable.’ 
The farmers themselves confirm that their opinions and awareness have changed because of the 
changing discourse in the cooperative. A member explained that the Fair Trade standard, which 
requires that all pesticides be locked in a dedicated shed, helped raise awareness about safe 
pesticide handling practices. ‘Before we kept our pesticides in the kitchen. Now we have a shed.’ 
Changing paradigms, however, takes time. Agronomists agree that there is a period of transition as 
farmers unlearn old practices and change their perceptions. Agrochemical use was the most 
frequently-cited practice in this regard. Cooperative agronomists explain in interviews: 
‘At first the farmers went to San José to get the [prohibited] pesticides. Now they realize they 
can manage without them.’ 
Though prohibitions of pesticides have drastically reduced the use of some of the most dangerous 
products, farmers who attend more training sessions are not more likely to use sustainable farming 
practices that compete with productivity. Members who attend more training sessions are likely to 
apply fungicides and fertilizers more frequently (See Figure 8). The rise in fungicides may be a result 
of both the epidemic of coffee rust (Hemileia vastatrix) at the time of the survey and the prohibition 
of some of the most effective but also most dangerous fungicides. Fungicides with lower toxicity may 
require more frequent applications.  The application of fungicides is a major predictor of yield and 
harvest quality in this region (Castro-Tanzi, Dietsch, Urena, Vindas, & Chandler, 2012). This puts 
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certified cooperatives in a difficult position, since certification standards promote a reduction in 
pesticide use, yet high quality is a prerequisite for participating in certified markets (Kilian et al., 
2004), particularly in CAFE Practices. A cooperative agronomist explains the dilemma, ‘More 
agrochemicals are needed to raise the quality of the coffee. However, the certifications require a 
reduction in agrochemicals, so the producer is left wondering how to produce a higher quality crop 
and also protect the environment.’  
Though certifications encourage a reduction in the dependence on agrochemicals, the wording in the 
standards is not explicit about the frequency of applications. For example from the CAFE Practices 
standards ‘Pesticides are only applied as a last resort (after cultural and physical controls have failed’ 
(Starbucks Coffee Company, 2012).  
Members who frequently attend training make fewer herbicide applications on their coffee 
plantation (See Figure 8). 
Though this could be seen as an increase in the environmental consciousness of the producers, it 
may be an attempt at raising productivity. Of the farmers who reduced the number of herbicide 
applications, 42% of them reported doing so because of a decrease in soil fertility, as compared to 
17% who did so for purely environmental reasons. Only 8% reported reducing herbicides applications 
in order to comply with a certification standard (specifically Rainforest Alliance). 
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Figure 8 Frequency of farming practices in regard to participation in group training. 
 The recommendation of fertilizers is also problematic for certified cooperatives. Farmers who attend 
more training make slightly more applications (Figure 8).  Nitrogen applications to coffee plantations 
in this region, even when they comply with official recommendations, exceed crop requirements 
(Castro-Tanzi et al., 2012). Certifications are not explicit on the use of fertilizers and generally refer to 
training. For example the Fair Trade standard states ‘Training must include measures to ensure the 
fertilizers are applied in amounts that respond to the nutrient need of the crop’ (Fairtrade 
International, 2014). Cooperatives continue to promote high rates of nitrogen fertilization because 
they feel that raising yields is the only way to make coffee farming profitable.  A cooperative 
manager tells us, ‘The only solution to the economic problems of coffee producers is to double the 
production on the same amount of land.’ Certified coffee does not always provide a solution. Farmers 
may not receive a higher price for certified coffee (Snider et al., Submitted for Publication), so they 
rely on high yield to recover production costs. In fact, 62% (N=37) of farmers responded they would 
have applied more fertilizer in the past year if the price of fertilizer had been lower. None of the 
certification standards specifically address optimizing fertilizer applications, making this an 
environmental hazard which certifications have little hope of mitigating. 
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In some cases the tangible services provided by the cooperative had more impact on farming 
practices than trainings. The use of shade trees in the coffee plantation is a farming practice 
encouraged by all of the certification standards. Shade increases coffee quality but lowers plant 
productivity (Vaast, Bertrand, Perriot, Guyot, & Genard, 2006). However, there were no differences 
in number of shade trees among farmers who never, occasionally or always attended group training 
(See Figure 3). Cooperative 2, which is certified in Fair Trade and CAFE Practices offered shade trees 
free of cost to all producers, and Cooperative 4, which holds the same certifications, did not. Fifty 
percent of the members in Cooperative 2 responded that they had increased the number of shade 
trees on their plantation in the last 20 years compared to only 30% of the members of Cooperative 4. 
Programs such as CAFE Practices and to a lesser extent Rainforest Alliance, which have explicit 
standards for maintaining a shade canopy in conjunction with high coffee quality standards have 
arguably the best potential to promote shade production, particularly if shade trees are provided 
free-of-cost to producers.  
Conclusions 
Certifications have the potential to induce more sustainable practices, but they put considerable 
strain on the technical department of cooperatives. Because the knowledge required to implement 
certifications is often initially beyond that of cooperative staff, certifications induce cooperatives to 
form new collaborations with other stakeholders and to play a much stronger role of intermediary 
than in the past. These collaborations increase the diversity of perspectives on sustainability issues 
that are discussed in cooperative meetings, creating a more holistic approach to coffee production 
and raising awareness about environmental issues. In this sense the certifications contribute to 
promoting more sustainable agricultural practices. The certifications also change the advisory 
services of the cooperatives. Advisory services were previously less intensive, contingent upon the 
training and perspective of one or more cooperative agronomists, and focused on production 
practices and disease management. Certified cooperatives have increased the diversity of themes 
discussed and offer trainings on climate change, integrated pest management, pesticide handling and 
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safety and soil management. Nevertheless, advisory methods rely mainly on a top-down approach, 
classroom trainings and individual field visits. Field days and farmer-to-farmer learning or discussion 
groups are not common in most cooperatives. While the cooperatives have shown a capacity to 
innovate in the formation of new alliances, there are few innovations in the methods in which 
advisory services are provided.  
We observed changes at farm level related to the certifications, but they cannot be attributed to 
certifications alone. Certifications are one influence on the sustainability of farming practices. Other 
influences are environmental laws, initiatives of other entities such as NGOs or private companies, 
indicating a shift in the paradigms of the society. Except decreasing the use of dangerous pesticides, 
the changes are modest at farm level for different reasons. On one hand change is slow when it 
requires the unlearning of previous opinions or practices. On the other hand many cooperatives 
focus their advisory activities and services on certified members who can easily comply with the 
certifications requirements which limit the scope of changes. Moreover, if members are individually 
certified, this may mean that some members have access to more services than others. Certifications 
are most effective in changing the practices that do not compete with coffee yield or quality. Without 
a premium to offset lower yields from practices such as shade production or reducing agrochemicals, 
they have little power to change these practices. 
Fair Trade has the greatest impact on the training services offered by cooperatives while CAFE 
Practices and Rainforest Alliance have greater impact on farming practices such as the use of shade 
trees. Rainforest Alliance also increases tangible services such as recycling services and the provision 
of shade trees. Utz has more effect on management practices such as the use of record books. 
Based on this research we can recommend greater support of farmers’ organizations in forming 
collaborations with outside stakeholders. These new collaborations should promote innovation in 
advisory methods and focus more on learning processes and exchange among members rather than 
simply knowledge transfer. In order to improve the sustainability of farming practices, more support 
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is needed for more tangible solutions such as the distribution of shade tree seedlings as well as 
farmer-to-farmer and field day-type trainings. Government policy should also support consortia, 
which are already effectively providing services to help cooperatives increase their sustainability
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Abstract 
We have seen in the previous chapter that voluntary certifications provide direct and indirect 
environmental and social benefits to cooperatives and their members. They contribute to changing 
paradigms about sustainable farming and promote a more holistic approach to coffee production. 
They do this in part by engaging other stakeholders in the sustainability discourse. This can be 
considered an expansion of the organization’s social capital. In this chapter we explore more deeply 
this less tangible effect of certification: the interaction between certification and social capital. 
Social capital, defined as trust, reciprocity, rules, norms, sanctions and networks, has many 
applications in the adoption and management of voluntary certifications. On an individual level, 
generalized trust in others has been shown to be an important predictor of an individual’s 
participation in voluntary environmental programs. On the organizational level, social capital, 
considered a public good, effects organizational learning, management and collective action. 
To better understand the link between social capital and voluntary certifications, we conducted case 
studies of five Costa Rican coffee cooperatives. We used a mixed-methods approach consisting of 
qualitative interviews with cooperative administrators and quantitative household surveys. Social 
capital of the cooperatives was assessed in six dimensions: groups and networks, trust and solidarity, 
collective action and cooperation, information and communication, social cohesion and inclusion and 
empowerment and political action. We applied this information to its effects on the management of 
sustainable coffee certifications. 
We found that the level of these six dimensions of social capital affected the manner in which 
cooperatives manage certifications, incentivize certified members and cooperate with outside 
organizations. On an individual level, generalized trust was found to have an important link with 
voluntary participation in Rainforest Alliance certification when no financial incentive was provided. 
Strategies for managing certifications have the potential to build social capital in cooperatives. 
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This research has important implications for the management of certifications and other similar 
voluntary environmental and social programs. It presents some important considerations for 
employing certification schemes in different national contexts.  
Résumé 
Nous avons vu dans le chapitre précédent que les certifications volontaires offrent des avantages 
environnementaux et sociaux, directs et indirects, aux coopératives et à leurs membres. Ces 
certifications contribuent à l'évolution du paradigme de l'agriculture durable, et à la promotion d'une 
approche plus globale de la production de café. Ce mécanisme à lieu par le biais de l'engagement 
d'autres parties prenantes dans le discours sur le développement durable. Cela peut être considéré 
comme une expansion du capital social de l'organisation. Dans ce chapitre, nous examinons plus 
profondément l’effet moins tangible de la certification sur le capital social. 
Le capital social est défini comme la confiance, la réciprocité, les règles, les normes, les sanctions et 
les réseaux. Il a de nombreuses implications dans la gestion et l'adoption des certifications 
volontaires. Sur le plan individuel, il a été démontré que la confiance généralisée envers les autres 
est un déterminant important de la participation d'un individu à des programmes environnementaux 
volontaires. Sur le plan organisationnel, le capital social, considéré comme un bien public, affecte 
l'apprentissage organisationnel, la gestion de la certification et l'action collective. 
Afin de mieux comprendre le lien entre le capital social et les certifications volontaires, nous avons 
mené des études de cas sur cinq coopératives de café au Costa Rica. Nous avons utilisé une 
méthodologie mixte constituée d'entretiens qualitatifs auprès des administrateurs de coopération et 
d’enquêtes quantitatives auprès des ménages. Le capital social des coopératives a été évalué à 
travers six dimensions: les groupes et les réseaux, la confiance et la solidarité, l'action collective et la 
coopération, l'information et la communication, la cohésion sociale et l'inclusion, et l'autonomisation 
et l'action politique. Nous avons analysé les effets du capital social sur la gestion des certifications de 
café durable. 
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Nous avons constaté que le niveau de ces six dimensions du capital social affecte la manière dont les 
coopératives gèrent les certifications, incitent les membres agréés et coopèrent avec des 
organisations extérieures. Sur le plan individuel, la confiance généralisée a un lien important avec la 
participation volontaire à la certification Rainforest Alliance, qui ne fournit aucune incitation 
financière. Les stratégies de gestion des certifications ont le potentiel de renforcer le capital social 
dans les coopératives. 
Ce travail a des implications importantes pour la gestion des certifications et des programmes 
volontaires environnementaux et sociaux qui sont similaires. Il présente certains déterminants 
importants pour la mise en place de systèmes de certification dans différents contextes nationaux. 
Resumen 
Hemos visto en el capítulo anterior que las certificaciones voluntarias proporcionan beneficios 
ambientales y sociales directos e indirectos para las cooperativas y sus miembros. Contribuyen a 
cambiar los paradigmas sobre la agricultura sostenible y promover un enfoque más integral para la 
producción de café. Esto lo hacen en parte, a partir de la participación de otras partes interesadas en 
el discurso de la sustentabilidad. Esto se puede considerar una ampliación del capital social de la 
organización. En este capítulo se explora más profundamente este efecto menos tangible de 
certificación: la interacción entre la certificación y el capital social. 
El capital social, definido como la confianza, la reciprocidad, las reglas, las normas, las sanciones y las 
redes, tiene muchas aplicaciones en la aprobación y la gestión de las certificaciones voluntarias. A 
nivel individual, la confianza generalizada en otros, ha demostrado ser un predictor importante de la 
participación de un individuo en programas ambientales voluntarios. A nivel de la organización se 
tiene, el capital social, considerado un bien público, los efectos de aprendizaje organizacional, la 
gestión y la acción colectiva. 
Para entender mejor la relación entre el capital social y las certificaciones voluntarias, llevamos a 
cabo estudios de caso de cinco cooperativas de café en Costa Rica. Se utilizó un enfoque de métodos 
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mixtos que consiste en entrevistas cualitativas con los administradores de las cooperativas y 
encuestas cuantitativas de hogares. El capital social de las cooperativas se evaluó en seis 
dimensiones: grupos y redes, la confianza y la solidaridad, la acción colectiva y la cooperación, la 
información y la comunicación, la cohesión social y la inclusión y el empoderamiento y la acción 
política. Aplicamos esta información a sus efectos sobre la gestión de certificaciones de café 
sostenible. 
Se encontró que el nivel de estas seis dimensiones del capital social afecta la manera en la que las 
cooperativas logran certificaciones, incentivar a los miembros certificados y cooperan con 
organizaciones externas. A nivel individual, se encontró una confianza generalizada de tener un 
vínculo importante con la participación voluntaria en la certificación de Rainforest Alliance, cuando 
no se proporcionó ningún incentivo financiero. Estrategias para la gestión de certificaciones tienen el 
potencial de aumentar el capital social en las cooperativas. 
Esta investigación tiene implicaciones importantes para la gestión de la certificación y de los similares 
programas voluntarias ambientales y sociales. Presenta algunas consideraciones importantes para el 
empleo de los sistemas de certificación en diferentes contextos nacionales. 
 
 
 Introduction 
Giovannucci and Ponte (2005) indicate that, in the right environment, voluntary certifications can 
create a virtuous cycle of empowerment in farmers’ organizations. Conversely, group cohesion can 
be lost if certifications are poorly managed. Empirical evidence reports a wide variation in the 
effectiveness of certifications in improving livelihoods and protecting the environment. The evidence 
ranges from positive effects on livelihoods (Bacon, 2005) and the environment (A. Blackman & 
Naranjo, 2012) to negative effects on farmer income or equality (Cramer et al., 2014; Fraser et al., 
2013; Getz, 2008; González & Nigh, 2005). The effectiveness of certifications depends largely on the 
national context (Elder et al., 2013).  
Approximately 30% of the coffee produced in Costa Rica is standard-compliant (Potts et al., 2014). 
The low labor to land ratio in Costa Rica in the late 1800s along with the country’s land tenure 
policies resulted in a coffee industry that was dominated by small and medium-sized farms which 
relied heavily on family labor (Luetchford, 2008; Williams, 1994).  
In Costa Rica the coffee sector was the only agricultural sector that emerged from structural 
adjustment of the 1980s still dominated by small-holder production (N. L. Babin, 2012). State 
regulation helped maintain small-holder production by limiting the amount of profit that mills could 
retain for their services and setting minimum farm-gate prices (N. L. Babin, 2012; Vunderink, 1990). 
Other cooperative sectors, such as the dairy and the black bean sectors, do not enjoy similar high 
levels of social capital. The milk cooperatives in Costa Rica also are able to protect the interest of 
producers by influencing policy. This, however, is accomplished partly through cronyism within the 
government ministries (Maître D'Hôtel & Bosc, 2011). The black bean sector in Costa Rica is not able 
to protect the interest of producers due to the lack of human capital within the cooperative sector 
and lack of vertical connections to policy networks (Maître D'Hôtel & Bosc, 2011).  
Costa Rica’s small coffee cooperatives have largely overcome the problems of low human capital in 
cooperative administration and lack of agency with the formation of second-level cooperatives, in 
particular the Consortium of Cooperatives of Coffee Producers of  Guanacaste and Montes de Oro 
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(Coocafe), which was created to help small cooperatives access Fair Trade certification (Luetchford, 
2008). 
The majority of the literature on certifications in Costa Rica describe a positive effect on farmer 
livelihoods in which incentives at the cooperative level are distributed in a transparent manner and 
the interests of small farmers are protected (Luetchford, 2008; Ronchi, 2002; Ruben et al., 2009). 
Analyses of the environmental effects of certifications in Costa Rica have shown small but 
measureable improvements in the sustainability of farming practices (A. Blackman & Naranjo, 2012; 
Quispe, 2007; Sibelet, Laffourcade, & Gutiérrez, 2015; Snider, Kraus, Sibelet, Bosselmann, & Faure, 
Manuscript submitted for publication). Studies on financial incentives for voluntary certifications in 
Costa Rica find that the effects on income are positive, although they are often insignificant (N. 
Babin, 2014). Nevertheless the Costa Rican coffee industry is not without corruption, and at least one 
case study found that cronyism in a cooperative and exorbitant interest rates charged by second-
level cooperatives reduced farmers’ financial benefit from Fair Trade (N. L. Babin, 2012). Because the 
overall analysis is that certifications are effective in Costa Rica and cooperatives are able to recover 
from an occasional lapse in transparency, it is valuable to examine the national context of Costa Rica 
to better understand which factors are important for certification efficacy.  
Social and organizational components are vital to consider when implementing programs which aim 
to improve the sustainability of communities (Pretty & Uphoff, 2002). Social capital has many 
applications in the management, adoption and acceptance of sustainability certifications. Social 
capital encompasses cooperation, social organization and human interaction and is measured by 
proxies such as trust, reciprocity, rules, norms, sanctions and networks (Svendsen & Svendsen, 2009). 
Analyzing the social capital of a region or a nation gives us insight into why people do what they do 
and into the manner in which they do it (Gross & Rayner, 1985) and on the effectiveness of its 
organizations (Kramer, 1999).  
Social capital has additional implications that are important to consider in the management of 
voluntary certifications. High levels of social capital can facilitate the conservation of natural 
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resources, but when levels are low state intervention may be required for effective natural resource 
protection (K. M. Sønderskov, 2009). The implementation of certifications requires education and 
training about new farming practices (Hatanaka, Bain, & Busch, 2005), and high levels of social capital 
have a positive effect on organizational learning (Chang, 2011), innovation (Carmona-Lavado, 
Cuevas-Rodríguez, & Cabello-Medina, 2010) and on the diffusion of information on sustainable 
agricultural practices (Compagnone & Hellec, 2015).  
Certifications can build (Bacon, 2010) or destroy social capital (Elder et al., 2012; Getz, 2008). They 
also have the potential to improve the environmental and social sustainability of participants (Bacon, 
2008). Though research shows differential effects of certifications in different national contexts, 
there is little research on which aspects national context may be important to predict the efficacy of 
certifications. This research attempts to begin to fill this gap. Because of the balance of social capital 
within a community is important for the effectiveness of collective action (Agnitsch, Flora, & Ryan, 
2006) and the social capital of an organization influences that organization’s effectiveness (Cohen & 
Prusak, 2001), we focus on these two aspects of social analysis.  
The objective of this study is to better understand the link between social capital and voluntary 
certifications. We accomplish this by studying how social capital is manifested in Costa Rican coffee 
cooperatives and how these manifestations affect the management of certifications. We examine the 
interactions between the social capital of the membership and the social capital of the organization 
to better understand how cooperative institutions affect the membership and vice versa. 
We use these results to discuss how the potential for voluntary certifications to build social capital 
can be increased to enhance both development and environmental protection and how national 
contexts affect this process. 
Classifying social capital to predict collective action 
Social capital can be classified into bonding and bridging social capital (Svendsen & Svendsen, 2009). 
Bonding social capital (sometimes called group (Gross & Rayner, 1985) or relational embeddedness 
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(Carmona-Lavado et al., 2010)) refers to networks of members within the same group or category, 
and bridging social capital refers to social links and trust of people from outside groups. By visualizing 
the balance between the two classifications of social capital on a two-by-two graph, we can better 
understand the interactions between the two (See Figure 9). A deficit of one form of social capital 
can be compensated by the other (Agnitsch et al., 2006). The advantage of classifying these social 
units into the bridging/bonding framework is that by understanding the dynamics of social processes 
we can apply them to other societies (Gross & Rayner, 1985) and predict levels of collective action in 
a group or community (Flora, Flora, & Gasteyer, 2015). Organizations with high levels of bonding 
social capital are close-knit and solidary. Bonding social capital increases within a group with the 
frequency and diversity of interactions with other members (Caulkins, 2009). 
Bridging social capital is manifested as generalized trust in others, vertical social networks, inclusion 
and membership in cooperative associations (Svendsen & Svendsen, 2009). Bridging social capital 
mitigates group boundaries and lowers individual autonomy (Caulkins, 2009).  
Groups are not homogenous in their composition and contain a mix of individuals which may belong 
to the four different quadrants seen in Figure 9, though one quadrant may be more prevalent. 
Organizations and individuals are also not static within one quadrant, and the balance of bridging and 
bonding social capital may change due to internal and external forces. Social organization is 
dependent on the interaction among groups and individuals in the four quadrants represented in 
Figure 9 (Caulkins, 2009). 
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Figure 9 : Balance between bridging and bonding social capital in societies and the implications on social engagement. 
Adapted from various authors (Bitzer et al., 2008; Caulkins, 2009; Flora et al., 2015; Gross and Rayner, 1985). 
Gender inclusion is an important component of the Fair Trade standard (Ruben & Zuñiga, 2011) but 
cooperatives have had mixed results regarding the inclusion and empowerment of women (Bacon, 
2010; Lyon, 2008). Women are often excluded from development programs due in part to the 
traditional values of some cultures and to unequal opportunities inherent in the program design 
(Gutiérrez-Montes, Emery, & Fernandez-Baca, 2012). Women also generally develop lower levels of 
bridging social capital than men (Collado, 2007; Gotschi, Njuki, & Delve, 2009). This combination of 
factors compounds the exclusion of women from conservation programs. However if women are 
included in leadership positions in mixed-gender groups their levels of social capital match those of 
men (Gotschi et al., 2009). Furthermore, women’s presence in groups increases the collaboration, 
solidarity and conflict resolution and may direct the group toward a more regenerative rather than 
reactive approach to natural resource management (Westermann, Ashby, & Pretty, 2005).  
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Voluntary Certifications in Costa Rica 
Costa Rican cooperatives actively participate in certifications. The most popular certifications within 
the cooperatives are Fair Trade, Rainforest Alliance, Starbuck’s Coffee and Farmer Equity (CAFE) 
Practices, Utz and organic, while fewer than ten percent of Costa Rica’s 22 coffee cooperatives 
participate certifications such as 4C, Nespresso AAA and Harvested by Women (Snider et al., 
Submitted for Publication). Cooperatives are essential for small farmers to access the benefits of 
certifications (Faure, Le Coq, et al., 2012), and cooperatives may choose to certify all (collective 
certification) or only a portion (individual certification) of their members (Snider et al., Submitted for 
Publication). Costa Rica has a strong cooperative sector that was created to increase economic 
efficiency, but also to pursue social reform and embeddedness (Luetchford, 2008). The cooperative 
movement in Costa Rica’s coffee sector began in the early 1900s with a collective action of small 
producers who wanted to ‘free themselves from the tyranny of the private mills,’ (Castro, 2013), 
giving small-scale farmers important access to export markets (Maître D'Hôtel & Bosc, 2011). 
The standards for certifications are similar, but focus on promoting different aspects of sustainability 
(Raynolds et al., 2007). Fair Trade and Rainforest Alliance standards emphasize social and 
environmental themes, while Utz focuses on traceability and good agricultural practices (Raynolds et 
al., 2007). CAFE Practices and Nespresso AAA are private standards which focus on quality and 
environmental management (Alvarez et al., 2010). Harvested by Women focuses on gender inclusion 
and employment relationships (International Trade Centre, 2012) while organic certification 
emphasizes environmental regulation (Raynolds et al., 2007). 
Materials and Methods 
Snider et al. (Submitted for Publication) describes a typology of Costa Rican coffee cooperatives 
based on their participation in certifications. We used this typology to choose five cooperatives for 
further study. Cooperatives were chosen for a diversity of type, geographical diversity and diversity 
of certifications (see Table 16). Case studies were conducted using a mixed-methods approach which 
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consisted of semi-structured interviews (N. Sibelet et al., 2013) with cooperative administrators to 
assess the organizational levels of social capital and quantitative surveys of members to assess 
individual levels of social capital. Table 16 summarizes the interviews and surveys conducted at the 
five cooperatives.  
Table 16: Summary of data collection at six Costa Rican coffee cooperatives. 
Coop 
number Type Region 
Approximate 
number of 
members Certifications 
Qualitative 
interviews of 
administrators 
Quantitative 
surveys of 
members 
Percentage 
of total 
membership 
surveyed 
Percentage 
of female 
members 
in coop 
Percentage 
of female 
members 
surveyed 
1 1 Guanacaste 170 Fair Trade, organic 1 manager 19 11 11 10 
2 4 West 
Valley 
2100 Rainforest Alliance, Utz, 
CAFE Practices, 
Nespresso AAA 
1 manager, 3 
agronomists 
43 2 45 37.5 
3 2 Tarrazú 650 Fair Trade, CAFE 
Practices 
1 manager, 1 
agronomist 
13 2 30 23 
4 4 Tarrazú 2900 Fair Trade, CAFE 
Practices, Rainforest 
Alliance, Harvested by 
Women 
3 managers 43 1,4 32 28 
5 3 West 
Valley 
50 none 1 manager 2 4 unknown N/A 
Total interviews/surveys 
  
11 120 
    
Organizational social capital 
Qualitative interviews with cooperative administrators covered topics such as strategies for 
managing certifications, partnerships with other organizations, cooperative programs, services and 
policies.  
Jones and Woolcock (2007) outline six dimensions of social capital: groups and networks, trust and 
solidarity, collective action and cooperation, information and communication, social cohesion and 
inclusion and empowerment and political action. Each of these dimensions has both bridging and 
bonding components. Each cooperative was given a rating between + + (very high levels of social 
capital) and −  −   (very low levels of social capital) in each of the six dimensions. These ratings are 
based on the observed indicators as interpreted by the authors (see Table 17).  
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Social capital of cooperative membership 
One hundred twenty quantitative surveys were conducted based on snowball sampling of members 
of the five case study cooperatives in proportion to the number of members in the cooperative and 
the percentage of female members in each cooperative. The survey was adapted from the core 
questions of the World Bank Social Capital Survey (Grootaert, 2004) and was conducted in Spanish, 
the mother tongue of all interviewees. Participants were asked questions pertaining to the six 
dimensions adapted from Jones and Woolcock (2007). The survey questions were divided into those 
measuring bridging and those measuring bonding social capital. Answers were recorded either as a 
yes or no answer, an absolute number (for example, the number of groups to which the individual 
belongs), or on a Likert scale (for example, ‘How much do you trust the cooperative’s 
administration?’ 0= to a very small extent, 1= to a small extent, 2= neither great nor small extent, 3= 
to a great extent, 4= to a very great extent). Two focus group discussions were held with cooperative 
members to crosscheck and discuss results. 
We created an index to graphically depict the responses of cooperative members on a 2X2 
graph and to analyze which patterns emerge within the cooperatives. We applied the 
following formula to each response to obtain a number between 0 and 1:  
                            
         
 
This formula is used to normalize values measured on different scales to a common scale 
between 0 and 1. This enables us to 1) compare values 2) measure how far the achievement 
of the indicator is from the optimum (the maximum value = 1) and  3) integrate the different 
values into two single combined multidimensional indexes (one to measure bonding, the 
other to measure bridging).  
An average score for bridging social capital (y axis) and bonding social capital (x axis) was calculated 
for each respondent and plotted in Figure 2. An elliptical regression was plotted for the data from 
Cooperatives 1-4 (Cooperative 5 was excluded because of small sample size) using a computer 
algebra system (the software Maple). 
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Results and Discussion 
Social Capital in Cooperatives and the Effects on the Management of Certifications 
Social capital at the cooperative level 
Based on the interviews and surveys implemented, it can be said that the social capital in Costa Rican 
cooperatives affects how they manage certifications, including who benefits from certifications and 
how changes in farming practices are incentivized (see Table 17). Costa Rican coffee cooperatives 
have a long experience of mutually beneficial relationships with buyers, slowly building trust 
between the actors. A corporate buyer from Starbucks said in an interview, ‘To be honest, I’ve never 
had a problem with [cooperatives from] Costa Rica. They always honor their contracts.’ Though levels 
of generalized trust are in the mid-range compared to other countries in Latin America 
(Latinobarómetro, 2015b), high levels of governmental regulation of the coffee industry compensate 
for lack of generalized trust. Interpersonal trust, when it is lacking, is replaced by institutional trust 
(Frey & Jegen, 1999). 
Cooperative 1 is a small cooperative in a marginal coffee-growing area. It has recently dismissed 
administrators and members of the board because of corruption. Nevertheless, the cooperative was 
able to eject the corrupt individuals and, by dealing with the dismissals in a transparent manner and 
by frankly communicating the financial situation, rebuild trust among the members. As a result of 
this effort, 47% of the members surveyed responded that trust in the administration has increased 
since the corrupt individuals were removed. 
The small number of members and geographic isolation of the communities are a challenge for 
Cooperative 1. The vast majority of members do not have regular internet access, so cooperative 
employees communicate with members by placing flyers on their doors. While this puts considerable 
strain on the human resources of the cooperative it also increases face-to-face communication. The 
manager at Cooperative 1 says ‘I know [a certain member] can't read, so I call him [instead of putting 
a note on his door] when there is a training.’ 
National Contexts Matter: Social Capital and Voluntary Coffee Certifications in Costa Rica 
125 | P a g e  
  
Cooperative 1 (as well as Cooperative 3) is able to increase its agency by membership in a 
consortium. Small cooperatives find they have more political influence through their participation in 
the consortium Coocafe. The former manager of Coopeldos is quoted in Luetchford (2008), ‘it is not 
the same to attend a meeting as a representative of the 500 members of one cooperative as it is to go 
with the support of the 3,000 members of Coocafe’. The agency and the human capital that 
Cooperative 1 gets from its membership in Coocafe make its participation in certifications possible. 
Cooperative 2 is a large, diversified cooperative which makes good use of its networks to provide 
training and other services to members. Because of its medium-high levels of bonding social capital, 
the cooperative maintains many social policies such as investing profits in local communities and in 
schools. However, the large size of the cooperative makes communication difficult and not all 
members can attend assemblies or access certifications. 
The high bridging social capital is manifested in the way the cooperative rewards high-performing 
members with access to certifications. The cooperative certifies only enough members, often 
members of the board, to satisfy the demand for certified coffee. This allows the cooperative to 
provide a small financial incentive and specialized training to certified farmers. Large farms are given 
priority for certification and other members are often unaware of the opportunities for certification. 
However, the cooperative strives to be inclusive in other ways by promoting the membership of 
women and by offering training for day laborers. 
Cooperatives 3 and 4 (the two cooperatives in Tarrazú), show the highest levels of bonding social 
capital and group identity among the cooperatives in this study. The older members of Cooperative 3 
remember the struggle and collaboration that was needed to form the cooperative in the 1970s. A 
founding member of the cooperative remembers the significance to the members, ‘Before the 
cooperative we had to ride six hours on horseback to deliver our coffee.’ However this strong feeling 
of solidarity sometimes results in the exclusion of outsiders. The same member says, ‘A manager 
must be from the village. Outsiders cannot understand our problems.’ Founding members normally 
have a stronger bonding connection to their cooperative (Wollni & Zeller, 2007). 
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Luetchford (2008) characterizes Costa Rican coffee cooperatives as a protective mother which takes 
care of its children, or ‘mama cooperativa.’ This relationship is particularly apparent in Cooperative 3 
who refers to ‘our cooperative family’ in its internal documents. This serves to embed the 
cooperative into the economic and social life of the community. A long-time member of the 
cooperative explains why she is a member, ‘They are part of the community. They pay attention to 
the community.’ High levels of bonding social capital and a strong sense of community prompt the 
cooperative to certify all members despite the lack of demand for certified coffee and the strain that 
this puts on the human resources of the cooperative. The cooperative agronomist explains the 
decision, ‘In that way everyone has the same access to training.’ The decision to certify all members 
is based on the management’s desire for equality rather than on economics; the cooperative could 
save on auditing and management costs by certifying only enough farms to fulfill demand. 
Cooperative 4 also places a strong emphasis on the equality and solidarity of members. It pays all 
members the same price for their coffee, regardless of the elevation at which it was produced or the 
certifications. A manager explains, ‘Coffee farms are handed down from generation to generation. 
We don’t want to punish someone for being born at a low elevation,’ exemplifying the close-knit 
community typical of groups with high bonding social capital. 
The high levels of bonding social capital in Cooperative 4 are balanced by somewhat higher levels of 
bridging social capital than observed in Cooperative 3. The cooperative allows individual members to 
pursue Rainforest Alliance certification for their farms (the cooperative manages and owns the 
certification). However the cooperative’s ideology of equality does not allow it to pay these members 
a differential price for the certification. The cooperative instead offers in-kind support in the form of 
specialized trainings, equipment and plant material. 
Cooperative 5 has low levels of all six dimensions of social capital. The members are weakly united 
producers of high quality coffee. Unlike most cooperatives, it does not provide any services to its 
members beyond basic processing of the harvest and is untethered by loyalties to outside 
organizations. A member of the board describes the coop as ‘a black sheep’ and says that other 
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cooperatives in the area ‘consider us as a threat.’ Administrators of Cooperative 5 consider the 
cooperative’s existence tenuous because they have not been able to leverage the funding from state 
institutions such as INFOCOOP (National Institute of Cooperative Support), a public institution that 
offers credit and support to cooperatives. ‘The large cooperatives dominate these organizations,’ 
explains the cooperative manager. The organizational culture of Cooperative 5 is individualistic, 
competitive and entrepreneurial. 
Perhaps the most limiting factor in Cooperative 5’s access to certifications is the lack of 
empowerment and political action. Small cooperatives often need the support of consortia to access 
certifications (Ronchi, 2002; Snider et al., Submitted for Publication), but Cooperative 5 has shown an 
unwillingness/inability to work with other organizations and cooperatives. Empowerment and 
political action is the dimension that allows individuals and organizations mobilize the social capital 
that they have through negotiation and influence on the institutions which affect them (Jones & 
Woolcock, 2009) and is one of the most important factors in activating the social capital inherent in 
communities (Krishna, 2002).  
Cooperatives with the highest levels of bonding social capital and therefore, the highest sense of 
group solidarity, choose to pay all members equally, regardless of quality or certifications. If they 
offer incentives to certified farmers they offer it as in-kind contributions of plant material, training or 
equipment.  
Cooperatives with the highest levels of bridging social capital participate to a limited extent in several 
certifications and offer these certifications to a few members who are able to meet the standards. 
The balance of bridging and bonding social capital is essential to prevent this selective participation 
from causing high levels of inequality among the members.  
Corruption in the administration does not have to be lethal to the trust in a cooperative if it is dealt 
with quickly and in a transparent manner. Two cooperatives in this study were able to recover from 
corruption by drawing on the social capital in the organization. 
   Table 17: Summary of observed indicators of six dimensions of social capital at fibe cooperatives and how it is manifested in the  
management of certifications. 
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Figure 10: Levels of bridging and bonding social capital of the membership of four Costa Rican coffee cooperatives. 
Bridging and Bonding Social Capital in Costa Rican Cooperatives 
The results of the quantitative surveys of members of Cooperatives 1-5 are shown in Figure 10 
(Cooperative 5 does not have an elliptical regression because of small sample size). The goal of this 
analysis is to describe the social capital of the social unit of the cooperative membership. Therefore, 
we look at the general pattern of the data points. The elliptical regression shows that the differences 
between individuals are greater than the difference between the cooperatives. We see very little 
difference among the cooperatives, with the majority of the responses falling in the lower middle 
portion of Quadrant C. This is indicative of medium-high levels of bridging social capital and high 
levels of bonding social capital. Bonding social capital is normally higher than bridging social capital in 
Latin America (Fukuyama, 2001), and membership in the cooperative gives individuals agency and 
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access to outside information that they would not normally have. Institutional trust also 
compensates when generalized trust is low (Frey & Jegen, 1999), further helping to balance the 
memberships’ high levels of bonding social capital with their lower levels of bridging social capital. 
Incongruities between the social capital of membership and organization 
We observed several cases of incongruity between the social capital of the cooperative membership 
and the social capital of the organization. We attribute this to the strong influence of the social 
capital and ideologies of administrators of the cooperative on the policies and management of the 
cooperative. Administrators can use policies to promote a sense of group identity (Cohen & Prusak, 
2001), as we observed in Cooperatives 3 and 4, which put a strong emphasis on equality within the 
cooperative. However it is not clear from the results in Figure 2 that these policies have had a great 
effect on the social capital of its membership. 
Cooperative 3 has the strongest ideology about equality and this is reflected in its management of 
certifications: all certifications are managed as collective certifications. A cooperative administrator 
says, ‘The message we want to give to the producers is that everyone is equal,’ demonstrating a 
feeling of collectivism in the cooperative policy. However this feeling is less strong among the 
members. Thirty-one percent of the members said that the cooperative’s policy of paying all 
members equally with no financial rewards for higher quality caused ‘a little bit of tension’ among 
the members. Because of the effect that a small group of administrators has on organizational 
culture, we find that the social capital of the administration is not always perfectly aligned with that 
of the members.  
Cooperative 4 also has a strong organizational ideology of equality, reflected by its policy of paying 
the same price to all members, regardless of elevations and certifications. A manager acknowledges 
the members do not completely share this ideology, ‘The payment of a differential for quality is a 
difficult theme. The farmers want it, but we choose not to pay for it. It is a social economy.’  
An unintended consequence of a cooperative’s policy of equal payment may be a reduction in overall 
quality. We also see a high number of micro-mills opening in the Tarrazú area where Cooperatives 3 
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and 4 are located which are started by farmers who feel they produce a high quality coffee and 
would like to be compensated for it. A small-holder farmer in Tarrazú told us ‘I sell my highest quality 
coffee to the micro-mill where they pay a good price for it and the rest I sell to the cooperative.’ A 
large cooperative in the West Valley with a policy of equal pricing also encountered this problem. The 
result was the creation of Cooperative 5. The manager at Cooperative 5 elaborates, ‘we felt we had a 
really high quality product, but they [the administration of the large cooperative] wouldn’t process it 
separately [and offer a higher price] so we started our own cooperative.’ Eventually the large 
cooperative changed its one-price policy and now offers a premium to individually-certified 
members. 
The board members of Cooperative 5 are members of several professional organizations, exhibiting 
high levels of personal bridging social capital. However, the cooperative has not been able to take 
advantage of the bridging capital of its members and is left isolated. Though the sample size of the 
survey of the membership of Cooperative 5 is very small (two members equal to 4% of the 
membership), the indices for these two members fall within the average of the members of other 
cooperatives. The observed indicators of organizational social capital, however, place the 
cooperative in Quadrant A. 
Generalized Trust and Voluntary Participation in Certification 
Generalized trust (the belief that most people can be trusted) is an important component of social 
capital. Generalized trust  has been linked to participation in collective action and voluntary 
programs (Anheier & Kendall, 2002; Paxton, 2007), in particular environmental programs (Lubell, 
2004; Sønderskov, 2008; Yandle, Hajj, & Raciborski, 2011). Individuals with high social capital 
voluntarily participate in collective environmental activities, confident that others will do the same 
(Pretty, 2003). Generalized trust is needed for fundamental changes in sustainability programs 
because, as stated by Cohen and Prusak (2001), ‘Force can only compel compliance, and compliance 
is not enough. Commitment is required, and commitment cannot exist without trust.’ 
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Working in the Tarrazú region, the same geographical area as Cooperatives 3 and 4, Hopfensitz and 
Miquel-Florensa (2013) found that cooperative members with Rainforest Alliance certification 
contribute significantly more to the public good in laboratory behavior experiments than uncertified 
members. The researchers correlate the results of their laboratory experiment (higher public goods 
contributions) with the real-world behavior of the participants (membership in the voluntary 
Rainforest Alliance certification program). Because of the specific guidelines on the fair treatment 
and good working conditions for workers and protection of common pool resources such as water 
and biodiversity (Rainforest Alliance & SalvaNatura, 2010), participation in Rainforest Alliance 
certification can be considered a contribution to the public good. 
Other studies have found a positive correlation between generalized trust and higher public goods 
contributions in experimental games (Anderson, Mellor, & Milyo, 2004), and so generalized trust and 
public goods contributions can both be linked with participation in voluntary certifications.  
Our findings confirm this. In Cooperative 4, a large cooperative with 2900 members, 120 of whom 
have voluntarily complied with Rainforest Alliance certification, we see higher levels of generalized 
trust in certified (45%) than uncertified (25%) members (see Table 18.) Rainforest Alliance 
certification has extensive regulations protecting the environment (Raynolds et al., 2007). Farmers’ 
main motivation to participate in Rainforest Alliance certification is to improve the environmental 
sustainability of their farm (Quispe, 2007). Therefore we conclude that participation in Rainforest 
Alliance certification is correlated with higher levels of trust in much the same way as participation in 
other voluntary environmental programs (Kim Mannemar  Sønderskov, 2009). 
In Cooperative 2, also a large cooperative with 2100 members, only six of whom have Utz 
certification, we see no significant difference between generalized trust of certified and uncertified 
members. Utz is also considered a sustainable coffee certification because it has both environmental 
and social standards, although both sets of standards are less stringent than Rainforest Alliance. The 
main emphases of Utz certification are on recordkeeping and traceability (Raynolds et al., 2007).  
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Our study contributes to the evidence that Rainforest Alliance-certified farmers have higher levels of 
trust which compel them to contribute to the public good, in this case by voluntarily protecting 
natural resources. Hopfensitz and Miquel-Florensa (2013) conclude that the norms and sanctions 
associated with Rainforest Alliance certification strengthen trust among the participants. However, 
since most participants have been certified for fewer than five years, evidence is weak that 
participation in this program has built these high levels of trust. We argue, in accordance with 
Nannestad (2007), that causality runs from trust to voluntarism. Rainforest Alliance certification was 
not randomly assigned to members; participants either volunteered for the certification or were 
asked by cooperative administrators to participate because of natural resource protection practices 
already in place on their farm and because of their history of loyalty to the cooperative. The 
manifestations of generalized trust displayed by these individuals indirectly played a role in their 
participation. One certified members said that the agronomists from the cooperative ‘looked for me 
[to participate in the certification] because I had a lot of shade trees.’ Another certified member 
explains that he joined Rainforest Alliance because he values biodiversity on his farm, ‘My mentality 
is similar to that of the certification.’ The low (although rapidly growing) demand for Rainforest 
Alliance certified coffee (Potts et al., 2014) means that cooperatives such as Cooperative 4 can rely 
on members who have intrinsic motivations to uphold the norms of certification and the cooperative 
does not have to resort to direct economic incentives to induce participation (Flora et al., 2015). 
Cooperative 4 has a strong ideology of equality and they feel that it is important to pay all members 
the same price, regardless of certifications, elevation of the farm or quality. ‘We are all equal,’ the 
management has said many times in interviews.  They do acknowledge that compliance with 
certifications has significant costs to the producers and the cooperative provides free training, shade 
tree seedlings, cuttings of plants used for vegetative barriers, personal protective equipment and 
compost to help certified producers upgrade their farms to comply with the standards.  
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Table 18: Frequency of generalized trust among Rainforest Alliance certified members, Utz certified members and 
uncertified members of cooperatives. 
 
 
The reason that we see a difference in the generalized trust of certified members in one cooperative 
and not the other may have to do with financial incentives. Farmers’ primary motivation to 
participate in Utz certification is to earn a higher price (Quispe, 2007). Cooperative 2 feels that 
members should be financially rewarded for their participation in voluntary standards. ‘The producer 
needs money,’ says the sales manager. This premium is useful in incentivizing farmers to participate 
in the program and acknowledges the extra bookkeeping required for the certification.  
Pretty and Smith (2004) maintain that financially-compensated participation in environmental 
programs does not positively impact biodiversity nor cause lasting change in behavior. However, 
there is evidence that compensated participation, such as participation in payment for 
environmental services programs, increases social capital among the participants by forging bridging 
network connections (Pagiola, Arcenas, & Platais, 2005). Paid participation may be a way to increase 
participation in environmental programs in areas where social capital is low enough to inhibit 
participation.  
The difference observed between the two cooperatives may also be linked to the differences in the 
standards of the two certifications. While participation in Rainforest Alliance can be considered a 
contribution to the public good, farmers consider participation in Utz a business decision (Quispe, 
2007). 
Response Coop 4 Coop 2 
Rainforest 
Alliance 
certified (N=11) 
Uncertified 
members (N=32)  
Utz certified 
(N=6) 
Uncertified 
members 
(N=37)  
Generally speaking, one can trust 
most people 45% 25% 17% 24% 
One can't be too careful when 
dealing with others 55% 75% 83% 76% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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Social Capital and Certifications: A Virtuous Cycle? 
The general consensus on social capital is that it is easy to destroy but difficult to build (Colletta & 
Cullen, 2000; Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1994). However, Durston (1998) gives a more optimistic 
view of the potential to construct social capital, even in communities where it appears not to exist. 
These communities possess a latent social capital that can be activated with well-managed 
development programs. 
We see the potential for cooperatives to use certifications to increase social capital in four main 
areas: strengthening cooperatives and their embeddedness in the community and the local 
economy, increasing the cooperative’s external network connections, reinforcing norms by way of 
standards, and increasing inclusion. 
Strengthening Cooperatives’ Embeddedness 
Through globalization, traditional systems of economic exchange become disembedded from social 
relations as transactions become more open and less personal. This transformation lowers social 
capital (Colletta & Cullen, 2000). The social component inherent in the cooperative model makes 
cooperatives exemplary of economic embeddedness and can serve to counteract this transformation 
(Levi & Pellegrin-Rescia, 1997).  
Fair Trade and, to a lesser extent, organic certification, serve to re-embed agriculture and agricultural 
cooperatives into natural and social processes by creating alternative trading networks which 
transcend competition based solely on price and by creating stronger links between producers and 
consumers (L. Raynolds, 2000).  
We found a strong sense of community within the cooperatives. When asked why they joined their 
cooperative, members participating in a focus group discussion described how the cooperative is an 
integral part of their community. ‘[I joined the cooperative] to be part of something bigger.’ ‘I am the 
owner.’ ‘The cooperative is more stable. The others [private mills] disappear.’  
Costa Rican cooperatives, particularly those with high bonding social capital which engenders a 
strong sense of solidarity within the cooperative, often use certification premiums to support 
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community programs. Cooperative 4 uses the premiums earned from Fair Trade and Rainforest 
Alliance to fund their sustainability program. The program activities include health fairs and 
environmental education programs for children. 
Longevity, consistency and regularity of contact between farmers and advisors are essential for 
building the social capital needed to turn information about sustainable farming technique into 
usable knowledge (Fisher, 2013). We found an increase in interaction between cooperative 
administrators and members resulting from certifications. Certifications oblige cooperatives to offer 
more intense and diverse training to their members and increase the frequency of farm visits by 
agronomists and technicians.  
Nevertheless, most of the producers’ network links created by certifications are horizontal links 
within the cooperative. The vertical links created by certifications are mainly unidirectional, providing 
producer information to consumers. Farmers and cooperatives are unlikely to gain information about 
the consumers of certified products (Daviron & Ponte, 2005). 
We see potential for building multi-directional vertical links in community-focused direct trade, 
either in combination with or independent of certifications. Cooperative 4 engages in direct trade 
which has the potential to build social capital better than certifications alone. The cooperative 
processes small batches of coffee harvested from communities within the cooperative. The 
cooperative then finds a buyer interested in the specific quality and flavor profile of the coffee 
produced in this community. The buyer, often a gourmet coffee shop in Australia, the United States, 
or Japan, pays a premium for the product, often as much as twice the current price on the New York 
Stock Exchange, and a portion of the premium is invested by the cooperative into the community. 
The community holds a series of meetings, facilitated by employees of the cooperative, to vote on 
how this premium will be used. The funded projects benefit the entire community, such as improving 
roads, schools or public works. The members work collaboratively to implement the project, building 
bonding social capital by working together for a common cause. This bonding social capital is 
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important to avoid a patron-client relationship, or clientelism, in which outside entities determine 
community priorities (Flora et al., 2015).  
Direct trade can also build bridging social capital. Luetchford (2008) devotes considerable attention 
to the notion of the Fair Trade premium in the gift ideology and norms of reciprocity associated with 
it. Nevertheless, in Fair Trade (and other certifications which offer a premium) the gift is from a 
faceless consumer. Unlike certifications, direct trade gives producers some information about the 
buyer, at least the geographical location, which allows producers to put a face on the gift-giver. This 
creates relational embeddedness between the two communities and helps complete the circle of the 
social exchange (Levi & Pellegrin-Rescia, 1997; Smith, 2007). The balance of bridging and bonding 
social capital that is supported with direct trade is important for sustainable growth within the 
cooperative.  
Increasing Network Connections at the Cooperative Level  
Certifications also build social capital at the cooperative level in the form of network connections. 
Cooperatives are forced to expand their networks by making links with other organizations, such as 
other cooperatives or consortia, NGOs which facilitate the certifications process, or governmental 
organizations which provide training to members or administrators (Snider et al., Manuscript 
submitted for publication). Associations with middle-level actors such as NGOs and certification 
bodies are important for building social capital at an organizational level (Durston, 1998). Conversely, 
weak vertical connections and a lack of supportive NGOs can undermine the organizational 
communication and capacity building necessary to benefit from certifications (Pirotte et al., 2006). 
We observed a training program funded by Starbucks with the goal of building farmer capacity in 
cooperatives which participate in CAFE Practices certification, specifically in the areas of fertilizer 
optimization, soil protection, shade tree management and recordkeeping. This program linked actors 
from four cooperatives (both administrators and members), the environmental NGO Earthwatch and 
the Tropical Agricultural Research and Higher Education Center (CATIE for its Spanish acronym) over 
a period of two years. Other examples of associations directly related to certifications are alliances 
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with local NGOs to recycle pesticide containers for compliance with Rainforest Alliance certification; 
a training given in conjunction with the Ministry of Agriculture, the cooperative, the National Coffee 
Institute (Icafe) and the National Climatological Institute for Rainforest Alliance and Utz-certified 
members; and an alliance between a cooperative and a local university to provide training related to 
Rainforest Alliance and CAFE Practices certifications.  
Reinforcing Norms and Rules to Strengthen Interpersonal Trust 
When certification standards are strictly-enforced and when free-riding is not possible, they have the 
potential to build social capital among participants by reinforcing norms, rules and sanctions 
(Hopfensitz & Miquel-Florensa, 2013). When individuals see that rules are honored and non-
compliant behavior is sanctioned, cooperation is fostered (Pretty, 2003). This process of building 
trust through compliance with norms may need an outsider to enforce compliance in communities 
where norms of reciprocity are weak or where federal legislation or sanctions are absent (Pappila, 
2013). In certifications the role of enforcement is filled by third-party auditors. 
In Costa Rica, strict governmental regulation means that certifications are not needed for compliance 
with quality norms. Sanctions imposed by cooperatives for other infractions of certification standards 
are usually minor. An administrator at Cooperative 4 tells us that in the case of members who do not 
comply with certification standards, ‘There is no punishment, only feedback.’ Cooperative 3 takes a 
slightly stronger approach, ‘If a member uses a prohibited pesticide he [or she] cannot sell to the 
cooperative for the rest of the harvest season.’ 
Certifications such as Rainforest Alliance and CAFE Practices have strict quality requirements and 
therefore are not accessible to all producers. These certifications can prompt a sense of pride and 
community. One Costa Rican cooperative uses its participation in CAFE Practices to build solidarity in 
the cooperative. A message to producers on the cooperative’s website states ‘The quality of our 
coffee [produced in this cooperative] fully complies with the high standards of Starbucks,’ 
(CooproNaranjo, 2013). 
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Increasing Inclusion 
Certifications, even if they provide little economic incentive, have the potential to increase women’s 
empowerment and sense of identity (Bacon, 2010). Countries where female empowerment is higher 
are more likely to pursue voluntary certifications (van Kooten, Nelson, & Vertinsky, 2005). However, 
certification alone is not enough to guarantee the participation and empowerment of women (Lyon, 
2008; Lyon, Bezaury, & Mutersbaugh, 2010). Based on our results, we suggest that certification 
programs and cooperative policies should be inclusive to all members of the community to build 
social capital in a sustainable way.  
We see a direct link between cooperative policy toward inclusion and the participation of women. 
The policies of Cooperative 1 do not encourage the participation of women because each household, 
rather than each member, has a vote in assemblies. The policies reflect the management’s view of 
the role of women in the cooperative. The former manager at Cooperative 1 expresses his opinion, 
‘Fair Trade didn’t change the role of women in the cooperative. Women have their own roles in the 
household and are busy with the kids. They are not too interested in coffee production.’ Female 
participation is low in this cooperative: eleven percent of the cooperative’s members are women. 
However, overall participation rates of women in coffee production are also low in this area of Costa 
Rica, and women are more likely to work in the fields than own their own farm. Only 6% of farms 
owned by women and 22% of women involved in labor in the coffee fields (Instituto Nacional de 
Estadisticas y Censos, 2007). 
Conversely, Cooperative 3 actively encourages the participation of women and offers a training 
called Leadership for Women in the Cooperative. This program began in 2006 with the participation 
of 70 of the cooperative’s 195 female members. Cooperative 3 also encourages the participation of 
women, particularly at the bi-annual assemblies. The cooperative agronomist explains the decision, 
‘The kids make noise and annoy the older members, but if we don’t allow the kids to come, the 
mothers have to stay home [to take care of them]. We voted a few years ago to [continue to] allow 
children at the assemblies.’  Thirty percent of the members of Cooperative 3 are women. Female 
ownership  of coffee farms is also higher in this region, however, with 21% of the coffee farms owned 
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by women and 9% of the female population of the region involved in labor in the coffee fields 
(Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas y Censos, 2007).  
Harvested by Women, while still a nascent certification scheme, attempts to build female 
participation and empowerment in the coffee industry (Camacho Sandoval, 2011; International Trade 
Centre, 2012). According to an administrator at the Alianza de Mujeres en Café (Women’s Coffee 
Alliance), they attempt to do this by increasing the human capital and the self-esteem of female 
coffee producers. Premiums earned from the certification fund capacity-building projects for women. 
Cooperative 4 participates in Harvested by Women and uses the certification premium for its 
Women’s Committee, which offers training on empowerment and income-generating projects for 
women. ‘We try to diminish the macho culture in the cooperative,’ a committee member tells us in an 
interview. The cooperative has 32% female members, higher than the rate of 21% female farmers in 
the area. 
Considering the National Context When Implementing Certification Schemes 
Despite the potential for cooperatives and certifications to build social capital, this process is not 
automatic, and several factors must be considered to realize this potential. The success of 
certification schemes in terms of the production of social capital, improvement of livelihoods and 
environmental impact are largely dependent on the nation context into which they are adopted 
(Elder et al., 2013). External interventions without grassroots support compromise cooperative 
movements (Enzama, 2013). Any social capital built in cooperative or certification movements can be 
destroyed by regimes that promote distrust, such as corrupt management (Chloupkova, 2003; Elder 
et al., 2013). When social capital is low, a vicious cycle can arise with the adoption of certifications. A 
privileged few rather than the entire community benefit from certifications and inequality is 
exacerbated (Fraser et al., 2013; Getz, 2008; González & Nigh, 2005).  
We consider the example of Uganda, where membership in farmers’ organizations is inhibited by low 
levels of interpersonal trust (Snider et al., 2014). Organizations that do exist are dependent on the 
support of NGOs and there are very few, if any, horizontal connections between groups. Participation 
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in these groups does build social capital, but it often strengthens bonding ties more than bridging ties 
(Snider et al., 2014). Organizations that are isolated with no connection between the groups do not 
transfer norms and behavior to other groups. This situation would not build, and could possibly 
reduce trust (Paxton, 2007). Caution should be taken when introducing certifications into this setting. 
An effort could be made before the introduction of certifications to create horizontal network 
connections between groups and develop second-level cooperatives, much like Coocafe in Costa Rica 
or Union of Cooperatives of Coffee Growers (COCOCA) in Burundi (Vandorpe, 2014), which build 
social and human capital within small cooperatives with the goal of helping these cooperatives 
access certifications.  
Due to state regulation in Costa Rica, certifications are not required for the equitable distribution of 
profits (Smith, 2007). There is transparency in the distribution of the certification premiums (Snider 
et al., Submitted for Publication) and transparency builds trust (Rawlins, 2008). 
We emphasize that building social capital is, at best, a slow process. Even the most optimistic 
contend that the construction of social capital is measured in years, if not decades (Colletta & Cullen, 
2000; Durston, 1998).  
Conclusions 
The levels of social capital in this study show only minor differences between the cooperatives, 
showing that moderately-high levels of both bridging and bonding social capital are common in 
coffee cooperatives in Costa Rica. Cooperatives have a strong sense of solidarity, reflecting high 
levels of bonding social capital. Members are able to benefit from the bridging network connections 
of the cooperative which helps them access new information and services from other organizations. 
In cooperatives where bonding social capital dominates, a high emphasis is put on the equality of 
members. These cooperatives choose to certify all members, regardless of the demand for certified 
coffee. If any incentive is given for participation in certifications, they are in-kind rather than 
monetary. In cooperatives where bridging social capital prevails, only select members access 
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certifications. However, in all cases in this study, levels of bonding social capital were high enough to 
prevent elite members from benefiting at the expense of the rest of the membership. In 
communities with low levels of bonding social capital, certifications may result in a non-egalitarian 
distribution of economic incentives. 
We found a positive correlation between voluntary participation in Rainforest Alliance certification 
and generalized trust. In this case, no monetary incentives were provided for participating in the 
program. No correlation was found between voluntary Utz certification and generalized trust when a 
small monetary incentive was given to certified individuals. Though sample sizes in this portion of the 
study are small, it presents some interesting information that warrants further investigation to better 
manage financial incentives for voluntary environmental programs.  
Inclusion in terms of gender is an important consideration in certification schemes. Efforts and 
policies to include women vary among the cooperatives and have an effect on women’s participation 
rates. Follow-up studies should examine if female participation leads to a virtuous cycle of inclusion 
and strengthening of social capital in the cooperative. 
Certifications have the potential but not the guarantee of building social capital within a cooperative. 
The national context into which the certification is being inserted must be considered. We observed 
positive examples in Costa Rican cooperatives where inequality is low and transparency is high. 
However other authors have documented cases of certifications destroying social capital in 
cooperatives in other countries. Because of the disparity in national contexts, we suggest a more 
regional approach to certification standards in which certification bodies foster and verify a certain 
level of transparency, democracy and accountability before the certification process begins. Capacity 
building of cooperative administration is recommended before certifications in cooperatives where 
human capital is low.  
Transparency, democracy and accountability within a cooperative are important for certifications to 
be effective. If these aspects are lacking, certifications may increase inequality and fail to achieve 
environmental goals.   
 Chapter 7: Synthesis  
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Abstract 
This chapter provides a synthesis of Chapters 4-6. I first look at how the national context of Costa 
Rica, including environmental and social regulation, regulation of the coffee industry, and support to 
the cooperatives sector, and how this context affects how certifications function. Data from this 
study is compared to literature from other countries. Next I look at how the level of social capital in a 
country may affect the uptake of certifications. The national context also affects the financial and 
non-financial benefits of certifications. 
The chapter ends with a discussion of the limits of the study and recommendations for policy and 
future research. 
Résumé 
Ce chapitre fournit une synthèse des chapitres 4-6. J’analyse d'abord comment le contexte national 
du Costa Rica affecte le fonctionnement des certifications, en particulier la réglementation 
environnementale et sociale, la réglementation du secteur du café, et le soutien au secteur des 
coopératives.  
Les données de cette étude sont comparées à des données produites dans d'autres pays. Ensuite, 
j’analyse comment le niveau de capital social dans un pays peut affecter l’adoption de la certification. 
Le contexte national influence également les avantages financiers et non-financiers des certifications. 
Le chapitre se termine par une discussion sur les limites de l'étude et des recommandations 
concernant les politiques publiques et de futures recherches. 
Resumen 
En este capítulo se ofrece una síntesis de los capítulos 4-6. Empiezo con una mirada a cómo es el 
contexto nacional de Costa Rica, incluyendo la regulación ambiental y social, la regulación de la 
industria del café, y el apoyo al sector de las cooperativas, y cómo este contexto afecta la forma en 
función de las certificaciones. Los datos de este estudio se comparan con la literatura de otros países. 
Luego, miro cómo el nivel de capital social en un país puede afectar a la captación de las 
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certificaciones. El contexto nacional también afecta a los beneficios financieros y no financieros de 
certificaciones. 
El capítulo termina con una discusión de los límites del estudio y recomendaciones para la política y 
la investigación futura. 
 Introduction 
This thesis was undertaken to better understand how cooperatives manage voluntary coffee 
certifications and the certifications’ effect on the sustainability of small holder livelihoods. Scientific 
literature describes discrepancies in the efficacy of certifications but does not fully address the range 
of certifications available, nor does it adequately analyze the fundamental role of farmers’ 
organizations in the certification process. In the preceding chapters I attempted to identify some 
aspects of Costa Rica’s national context which are important in influencing this efficacy, such as the 
policy environment and regulation of the coffee industry. I also looked at the interaction between 
this environment, the cooperatives and the other stakeholders’ influence the advisory services which 
support sustainable agriculture. Finally I looked at the role of social capital in the management of 
certifications and its effect on equality within the cooperative.  
I found that overall, certifications in Costa Rica function in a transparent manner and provide modest 
but real benefits to producers and their cooperatives. This is because of Costa Rica’s context of high 
regulation and enforcement of environmental and social laws, regulation of the coffee industry and 
strong support for farmers’ organizations.  
The synergy between cooperatives and certifications 
The view of organizations purely as economically rational actors is of limited use in general 
(Mintzberg, 1989) and even less applicable to member-owned cooperatives. Cooperatives are 
companies which must be economically viable, but as member-owned and –controlled entities they 
are compelled to offer certain benefits to their members and the community (Wennink et al., 2008). 
This offers an internal driver for cooperatives to adopt certifications (Klerkx et al., 2012). The 
cooperative values of self-help, self-responsibility, democracy, equality, equity and solidarity  
(International Co-operative Alliance, 2015) fit well with those of many certification schemes, 
particularly Fair Trade. 
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The structure of the coffee sector affects the efficacy and management of 
certifications 
As outlined in Chapter 3, the structure of Costa Rica’s coffee sector provides a unique political 
environment to study certifications. The political and social environments combine to affect the 
social capital of the coffee sector, as described in Chapter 5. Certifications also benefit from the 
sustainability discourse in Costa Rica, as discussed in Chapter 6. All of these factors combine to create 
a national context which affects the efficacy and management of certifications (See Figure 11). This 
helps us understand some of the management decisions made by cooperatives which were discussed 
in Chapter 4. 
At least three main characteristics of the coffee sector affect how certifications function in Costa 
Rica: environmental and social regulation and enforcement, Law 2762 which regulates coffee quality 
and relations between producers and millers, and a strong cooperative sector with institutional 
support. The following sections will look at each of these aspects more closely. 
Environmental and social regulation and enforcement 
Costa Rica is considered a leader in environmental legislation (Evans, 2010). Its laws also offer 
considerable social protection (Rosenberg, 1981). Because of the strict enforcement of 
environmental regulations, farmers and cooperatives are more prepared to comply with the 
environmental aspects of certifications.  At the cooperative level, Costa Rica passed a law requiring 
clean technology in mills in 1994 (Castro, 2013), which induced cooperatives to begin upgrades to 
their mills before many of them were certified. Costa Rican law has prohibited the use of lead 
arsenate on farms since 1990 (Castro, 2013) and lindane and DDT have been outlawed since 1998 
(Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería, 1998). These pesticides are also prohibited for all 
certifications and are not sold at the cooperatives’ supply stores, making the transition into 
certifications easier. Governmental policy that on one hand promotes certification but on the other 
promotes dependence on agrochemicals, such as Rwanda’s policy of subsidizing agrochemicals, can 
undermine the impact of certifications (Elder et al., 2013). Costa Rica’s environmental policy does 
offer some mixed messages, however. In 2014, in the effort to combat an outbreak of coffee rust 
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(Hemileia vastatrix), coffee cooperatives reported that Costa Rica’s Ministry of Agriculture 
distributed free fungicides to farmers. While these fungicides complied with certification standards 
(except for those of organic agriculture), and this was considered an emergency measure (unlike 
Rwanda’s permanent subsidy policy) this policy does not provide any incentive to explore cultural 
measures of disease prevention. 
The enforcement of Costa Rica’s legislation not only facilitates the adoption of standards, but 
contributes to the discourse of sustainability of which certifications are a part. Public awareness in 
Costa Rica about environmental issues such as deforestation, climate change and biodiversity is quite 
high, thanks the discourse on these topics on the academic, institutional, professional and mass 
media levels (J.-F. Le Coq, Froger, Pesche, Legrand, & Saenz, 2015). The institutional environment in 
Costa Rica is quite active in the sustainability discourse (Nygren, 1998), and environmental NGOs play 
an important role in education and governance of environmental issues (Tahkokallio & Nygren, 
2008).  
This sustainability discourse is apparent in Costa Rica, as one is constantly confronted with publicity 
from various sources which remind the public to plant trees, protect the water, etc. Farmers in the 
focus group discussions and interviews displayed an understanding of the environmental implications 
of farming practices. For example, when participants of a focus group were asked about the benefits 
of planting shade trees in the coffee fields they listed maintaining soil fertility, erosion control, 
wildlife habitat and carbon sequestration. Farmers also stated that they received information on 
farming practices from multiple sources including MAG, Icafe and INA. 
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Figure 11 : Effect of Costa Rica's National Context on Efficacy of Certifications 
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The regulation and enforcement of social laws also reduce farm level changes with certification. Fair 
Trade, Rainforest Alliance and CAFE Practices certifications require that producers pay the state-
required minimum wage to field workers. The minimum wage is generally respected in Costa Rica, so 
little change was seen when certifications were employed. The former manager at one of the 
Coocafe-founding cooperatives says ‘The wages of the workers did not increase [with Fair Trade] 
because they were already earning the minimum wage.’ This contrasts with a study of Uganda that 
found that wage laborers for Fair Trade certified organizations had lower wages than those for non-
Fair Trade certified organizations (Cramer et al., 2014) 
One could argue that Fair Trade certification is not intended for upper-middle-income (as defined by 
World Bank (2016)) countries like Costa Rica in which the state provides considerable oversight in 
environmental and social issues and the concrete changes prompted by certification are small. This 
would be overlooking the considerable progress that Fair Trade certification has induced in Costa 
Rica since the late 1980s, particularly in the small cooperatives in Guanacaste and Coto Brus 
(Luetchford, 2008). The different realities of cooperatives in the Valleys versus the cooperatives in 
Guanacaste and Coto Brus due to human resources and human capital were apparent from the 
interviews. The larger cooperatives in the Valleys have a larger staff and manage their own sales and 
exportation. The managers often have advanced degrees in business. The smaller cooperatives rely 
heavily on Coocafe for management of contracts and were sometimes unclear about the terms of the 
contracts, calling on managers at Coocafe when clarification was needed. Because of the small size of 
the cooperatives, the cooperative agronomist may also serve as manager.  
Fair Trade continues to provide funds for services needed by the Guanacaste and Coto Brus 
cooperatives. On the other hand, two of the cooperatives in the Valleys and Tarrazú have 
transitioned out of Fair Trade to focus more on CAFE Practices and Rainforest Alliance. Some 
cooperatives acknowledge that participation in Fair Trade is not beneficial to them. A manager for a 
Type 4 cooperative told me ‘We comply with much more than Fair Trade asks for, but the costs are 
too high compared to the sales.’ This cooperative participates heavily in CAFE Practices and 
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Rainforest Alliance as well as the direct sale of estate coffee, so the benefits of Fair Trade are less 
interesting. This suggests    that as capacity is developed within cooperatives, the cooperatives may 
move on to other certifications which are available to them (depending on their coffee quality, flavor 
profile, etc.), possibly discontinuing Fair Trade certification if market demand for the certification is 
low. In this way, cooperatives in other countries could move into Fair Trade certification to fill this 
void in supply. 
Law 2762: regulating coffee quality and relations between producers and millers 
The second aspect of Costa Rica’s coffee sector that facilitates access to certification is Law 2762 and 
its predecessors. This law and its addendums strictly regulate the quality of coffee delivered to mills. 
The law prohibits the production of robusta varieties of coffee and certain cultivars of arabica which 
are considered as a threat to Costa Rica’s reputation as a producer of high quality coffee. The 
amount of green, or unripe, coffee cherries is limited to 2%. The law also dictates that all coffee must 
be processed by a certified mill within 24 hours of harvest (Icafe, 1961). This enforcement prepares 
cooperatives for the standards of certification and offers an external coercive driver to implement 
best management practices (Klerkx et al., 2012). This can be contrasted with other coffee value 
chains, such as that of Tanzania. Smallholder farmers in Tanzania are responsible for pulping, 
washing, drying and sorting of coffee cherries after harvest.  Variations in this stage of processing 
strongly affect the quality of coffee and are responsible for a decline in the quality of Tanzanian 
coffee (Parrish, Luzadis, & Bentley, 2005). In the case of Tanzanian coffee, access to Fair Trade 
markets required an upgrade in coffee quality. The same was found in Nicaragua, where there is less 
governmental intervention in quality controls (Pirotte et al., 2006; Valkila & Nygren, 2010). 
In Costa Rica, all export-quality coffee meets Fair Trade standards. In fact, many of the small Fair 
Trade cooperatives do not have the capacity to separate the harvest based on quality, so the entire 
harvest is of uniform quality, whether it is for Fair Trade or conventional markets. Cooperatives with 
Utz certification also stated that there was no quality upgrade needed to access certification. Two of 
the farmers interviewed said that they needed to upgrade their harvesting practices for Rainforest 
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Alliance certification. They said that only 100% ripe coffee is accepted for this certification so they 
must pay harvesters a higher wage because the harvesting process is slower. One cooperative stated 
that CAFE Practices certification compelled them to more strictly enforce the Icafe regulation that 
mills cannot accept a delivery that contains more that 2% unripe beans. Overall, upgrades to the 
quality of the harvest were minor compared to those described in the literature from other countries 
(Parrish et al., 2005; Valkila & Nygren, 2010). 
Law 2862 also ensures an equitable distribution of profits which support small and medium-holder 
farmers. The distribution of the profits is transparent and the profit retained by mills is limited to 9% 
for the FOB price (Icafe, 1961). We can compare this to the Kenyan coffee sector, which is also 
dominated by small farmers organized in cooperatives (Sibelet & Montzieux, 2012). However, the 
supply chain is much longer in Kenya and rife with corruption (Mureithi, 2008; Sibelet & Montzieux, 
2012). In Kenya small holders sell either to the informal market, or to a cooperative. The harvest is 
then sold to a miller, who sells to a marketing agent who sells the harvest at the auction where it is 
sold to an exporter. Each level of the supply chain demands a share of the profit. The result is that 
the small holder in Kenya receives only 58% of the free on board sale price (Mureithi, 2008). This 
dilutes the financial incentives that farmers or cooperatives may receive for certifications because 
presumably each level of the supply chain would take a cut of any price premium as they do of the 
base price. In Costa Rica Icafe monitors all contracts. A manager of a small Type 2 cooperative says 
‘We could not make a contract that was below the NYSE price. Icafe would not accept the contract.’ 
Strong Cooperative Sector and Institutional Support 
The third factor that influences certifications is the considerable support that state and non-
governmental organizations offer to cooperatives and other farmers’ organizations which support 
small and medium-holder farmers. We can compare this with Tanzania. While there is organizational 
support for the Tanzanian coffee industry, it does not adequately provide access to certifications 
(Lazaro et al., 2008). There is some support from NGOs such as Solidaridad, but support seems 
limited to technical training of farmers and overlooks human capital development in the 
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cooperatives (Verkaart, 2009). For this reason, Utz certification in Tanzania is mainly found on large 
estates (Lazaro et al., 2008) and small holder cooperatives have problems with attrition of farmers 
from the program (Verkaart, 2009). This seems to be due to a lack of capital, particularly human and 
financial (Lazaro et al., 2008). In Costa Rica, cooperatives and supporting NGOs and state 
organizations (such as INA, Icafe, CATIE  and Earthwatch working through the cooperatives) fill this 
gap by providing capacity-building in cooperative staff and in members. When Fair Trade certification 
was first considered in Costa Rica, it was found that human capital was lacking in the cooperatives 
targeted for certification (small cooperatives in Guanacaste). The Agro-Economic Consultancy (CAE), 
in cooperation with a German NGO, began by building capacity in the cooperative staff which was 
essential in the formation of the Coocafe consortium (Luetchford, 2008). Coocafe continues to 
provide a myriad of services which build capacity in cooperative staff and members. ‘I just attended 
training at Coocafe. We learned how to complete the [Fair Trade] paperwork and upload our 
documents using Dropbox,’ a Type 1 cooperative employee explained. Coocafe staff also offer mock-
audits for cooperatives and cooperative members to help them prepare for FLO audits. Coocafe 
secures and manages contracts for the majority of the member cooperatives (two Type 2 
cooperatives which produce high quality coffee secure all or a portion of their own contracts which 
are then passed to Coocafe for export services). Consortia facilitate access to certifications in other 
countries as well. The Consortium des Coopératives des Caféculteurs (Cococa) in Burundi (Vandorpe, 
2014) and PRODECOOP in Nicaragua (Ruben & Zuñiga, 2011) have been helpful in facilitating access 
to  Fair Trade and, in some cases organic certification. An (unnamed) consortium of cooperatives in 
Guatemala gives member cooperative access to Utz certification (Renard, 2005).  
Support for cooperatives is not limited to consortium and NGO support. Governmental organizations 
such as Infocoop provide financing to cooperatives in need of credit. The manager of one struggling 
Type 1 cooperative says ‘We exist by the grace of Coocafe and Infocoop. They do not like to see 
member cooperatives fail.’ 
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Social Capital in Costa Rica 
The study of social capital is very relevant to farmers’ organizations and voluntary certification. 
Organizations which adhere to a set of norms can reduce the costs of monitoring and sanctioning 
members who exploit natural resources (Ostrom, 1990). Monitoring costs can be significant in 
certification, and non-compliant members raise the costs by necessitating re-auditing.  
Distrust can inhibit farmers’ participation in  organizations and can limit the organizations’ 
effectiveness in distributing profits and promoting sustainable practices (Snider et al., 2014)1. Distrust 
can also affect the equity of supply chain contracts (Sartorius & Kirsten, 2007). 
Putnam’s proxy uses participation in voluntary organizations as a proxy for social capital (Putnam et 
al., 1994). Based on Putnam’s proxy and the active participation in cooperatives and other producers’ 
organizations, we would expect to find high levels of bridging social capital in Costa Rica. However, 
Costa Rica has some of the lowest levels of generalized trust in Latin America. On average over the 
past 20 years, only 10.5% of Costa Ricans responded that, in general one can trust most people (See 
Table 19). This is below the Latin American average of 17% (NB: Table 19 does not include all Latin 
American countries, therefore the average is different). Only Brazil has a lower proportion of trust 
(7.4%) (Latinobarómetro, 2015a). About 20% of the respondents in the social capital survey detailed 
in Chapter 6 responded that, in general, one can trust others. However, unlike the Latino Barometer 
data, this was not a cross-section of the population. All respondents were from rural areas, which in 
Costa Rica have higher levels of generalized trust (Collado, 2007). All respondents are also 
participants in at least one voluntary organization (the cooperative) which, in itself is an indicator of 
bridging social capital (Putnam et al., 1994). 
I attribute this discrepancy (high participation in voluntary organizations yet low levels of 
interpersonal trust) to Costa Rica’s political environment of strong regulation and enforcement of 
laws described above. Legal enforcement compensates for low levels of interpersonal trust (Frey & 
Jegen, 1999). Interpersonal trust is replaced by institutional trust when people trust others to comply 
  
Table 19 Interpersonal trust in Latin American coffee-producing countries. Source (Latinobarómetro, 2015b). 
  
Country of Study 
 
Total Brazil Colombia 
Costa 
Rica 
El 
Salvador 
Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama 
One can trust the majority 
of people 
15,10% 7,40% 16,70% 10,50% 17,20% 16,00% 14,70% 16,00% 16,20% 22,40% 
One cannot be too careful 
when dealing with others 
82,00% 91,60% 82,50% 86,50% 77,70% 81,30% 79,20% 83,20% 81,40% 71,30% 
Don't know 3,00% 1,00% 0,80% 3,00% 5,10% 2,70% 6,10% 0,80% 2,40% 6,30% 
 
Table 20 Trust in judicial power in Latin American coffee-producing countries. Source (Latinobarómetro, 2015b). 
  
Country of Study 
How much confidence do 
you have in judicial 
power? 
Total Brazil Colombia 
Costa 
Rica 
El 
Salvador 
Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama 
A lot 7,30% 5,60% 4,30% 16,30% 5,80% 8,20% 4,90% 4,70% 11,90% 6,00% 
Somewhat 19,90% 26,10% 18,50% 27,20% 10,00% 14,90% 17,60% 19,20% 22,50% 22,50% 
A little 34,90% 38,50% 38,50% 26,00% 38,30% 41,70% 25,70% 35,80% 32,60% 35,70% 
Not at all 33,30% 25,40% 35,60% 27,40% 42,50% 28,20% 46,70% 38,00% 27,10% 29,50% 
No response 0,70% 0,20% 0,60% 0,40% 0,80% 0,70% 1,00% 0,20% 0,80% 1,40% 
Don't know 3,80% 4,20% 2,50% 2,70% 2,70% 6,30% 4,20% 2,10% 5,20% 4,90% 
N (9.650) (1.250) (1.200) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.200) (1.000) (1.000) 
 because of strict enforcement rather than because they are personally compelled to uphold the 
norms of society. Indeed, Costa Rica ranks above average (43.5% confidence [ a lot plus somewhat] in 
Costa Rica versus the Latin American average of 27.2% confidence) in confidence in judicial power 
(Latinobarómetro, 2015b) (Table 20). 
Unfortunately Afrobarometer does not collect the same data as Latino Barometer, so we cannot 
directly compare Latin America and Africa on these dimensions. However, generalized trust is 
generally considered to be low in Africa (Nunn & Wantchekon, 2011). The density of farmers’ 
organizations in Uganda also seems to contradict Putnam’s proxy. In this case, however, it seems to 
be from the external support of funding organizations which make participation rates artificially high 
(Snider et al., 2014). External support does not make up for the lack of trust in Uganda, as 
governmental regulation compensates for lack of trust in Costa Rica, and the institutions remain 
weak. Uganda’s cooperative sector largely succumbed to political interference and mismanagement 
in the 1980s (Bigirwa, 2005). Kenya’s cooperative sector is also rife with corruption and 
mismanagement (Sibelet & Montzieux, 2012) and corruption and distrust in the cooperative sector 
has been documented in Rwanda (Elder et al., 2012) and Tanzania (Bibby, 2006). 
Environmental problems such as deforestation are exacerbated by weak institutions in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Bhattarai & Hammig, 2001). Certifications would seem to be a good strategy to promote 
natural resource management, since they can act as a form of governance when state enforcement 
of laws or when the laws themselves are weak (Auld, 2010). 
Nevertheless there has been slow uptake of certifications in Africa. In 2010, 82% of Fair Trade-
certified organizations were located in Latin America, compared to only 12% in Africa (Auld, 2010). In 
Africa, only Ethiopia has managed to capture a significant share of the certified organic coffee market 
(Potts et al., 2014). Tanzania is the only African country that produces a significant amount of Fair 
Trade compliant coffee (43% of national production) (Potts et al., 2014). Normal rules of incentives 
on which certifications are based do not apply in fragile or corrupt states (Karsenty & Ongolo, 2012). 
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Organizational and management issues are obstacles to certification (Luetchford, 2008; Vandorpe, 
2014). When social capital is low, cooperatives have difficulty managing certifications and trust can 
be further destroyed, causing a vicious cycle of lost social capital (Fraser et al., 2013; Getz, 2008; 
González & Nigh, 2005). 
The national context of Costa Rica, though not without its problems of corruption and mistrust, 
provides an environment conducive to certifications. The benefits that cooperatives realize from 
certifications are both financial and non-financial. The two types are discussed below.  
Financial benefits of certification 
Certification premiums are variable and poorly incentivize farmers 
Cooperatives list various reasons to pursue certifications, including complying with the request of an 
important buyer or entering new markets (See Chapter 4). Financial motivations are the most 
important consideration, particularly for Fair Trade certification. Nevertheless, researchers have 
criticized certifications as financially unviable due to low demand (Sick, 2008) because standard-
compliant coffee must be sold as conventional. It is true that the supply of standard-compliant coffee 
far outweighs the demand. Globally 25% of certification-compliant production is sold as certified 
coffee (Potts et al., 2014). Costa Rican coffee cooperatives do a better-than-average job of matching 
certified production to certified sales by focusing on more selective certifications like CAFE Practices 
and Rainforest Alliance. A large part of the oversupply on the global level is due to the oversupply of 
4C certified coffee, due to its low barriers to entry. When 4C certification is excluded from global 
averages, the proportion of production to sales becomes 56%, closer to Costa Rica’s proportion of 
53% for Utz, 55% for CAFE Practices and 58% for Rainforest Alliance. 
Many have criticized Fair Trade for not having a significant impact on household earnings (Beuchelt & 
Zeller, 2011; Johannessen & Wilhite, 2010; van Rijsbergen, Elbers, Ruben, & Njuguna, 2016). On the 
other hand, some criticize cooperatives for retaining the Fair Trade social premium, claiming that 
supporting cooperatives does not reduce farmer poverty (Haight, 2011). We can see from the 
example below why cooperatives may choose to do this. As Weber (2011) points out, ‘small or zero 
Chapter 7 
Page | 158 
 
net premiums do not necessarily imply that certification programs are unimportant to coffee growing 
households, communities or consumers.’  
The financial incentives for voluntary coffee certifications are weak and variable. However, even 
though market demand is low and management costs are high, in times of low world price of coffee, 
cooperatives are often able to earn a significant amount from Fair Trade, organic and Utz 
certifications. When the world price of coffee is high, this premium may disappear. Even though the 
financial benefit at both the cooperative and farm level may be absent in years when the world price 
of coffee is high, cooperatives find that the certification provides a buffer against the lows of a 
volatile market. The former manager of a Coocafe founding-member cooperative explains ‘Fair Trade 
gave us the possibility to survive when the price of coffee was low.’ This protection from market lows 
lends some financial stability to coffee farming.  
It is true, however, that even when there is a certification premium, the effect on household incomes 
is often negligible, particularly in a middle-income country like Costa Rica. To understand the 
differential impact of certification premium on cooperative and household income we can look first 
at the example of Fair Trade. This illustrates why cooperatives choose different strategies to 
distribute the premiums. We can revisit in more detail the discussion presented in Chapter 4 and 
consider the case of a large Type 3 cooperative in Coto Brus and a small Type 2 cooperative in 
Tarrazú. Both cooperatives sold approximately the same volume of coffee with Fair Trade 
certification in 2012/2013, but used different strategies to distribute the premium. 
In 2013 the Coto Brus cooperative paid approximately $4140 in Fair Trade certification fees, but was 
able to sell only 8% of its total harvest to Fair Trade markets. However, this was still a profitable 
venture for the cooperative, since the $20/quintal social premium alone totaled $232,000 (Since 
2013 was a year of low coffee prices, the cooperative likely also benefited from the Fair Trade 
minimum price, but this would vary by the terms of each contract). Had this premium been divided 
equally among all members, each member would receive a payment of less than $40. For this reason, 
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the cooperative members voted to use the premium to fund a reforestation program. Members 
received free shade tree seedlings to plant on their farms. The goals of the reforestation program 
were to reduce erosion, protect soil fertility and increase coffee bean quality. In this way the 
premium has the potential to make a community-level impact rather than a farm-level impact.  
On the other hand, we can consider the example of a small Type 2 cooperative in Tarrazú. The 
cooperative pays $1/quintal of coffee exported in fees to Coocafe to be included in their Fair Trade 
certification. However, the cooperative receives $20/quintal for the Fair Trade premium. In 2013 the 
cooperative sold 60% of its harvest (11,580 quintals) in Fair Trade contracts. This amounts to 
$231,600 in premiums and $11,580 in fees. The cooperative passes 75% of the premium on to the 
members in the form of a direct payment, which amounts to an average of approximately 
$270/member (the payment is pro-rated by the amount of coffee the member sells to the 
cooperative). As stated in Chapter 4, the average rural income in Costa Rica is $862/month (Censos, 
2012), so a $270 payment for the year is not significant. This confirms the criticism of low impact on 
household income. However Leon Cortez, the canton where this cooperative is located, is one of the 
poorest in the country, and the cooperative feels it has an obligation to the members to increase the 
profitability of coffee farming. As the agronomist said in an interview, ‘as a business we think it is 
important that this money goes directly to the producer.’ The members also benefit from the 25% of 
the premium that is retained by the cooperative. This portion of the premium is used for educational 
programs to improve production practices and coffee quality. 
Fair Trade certification is an extreme example, because 100% of the cooperative’s members must be 
certified and the premium must be distributed in an equitable way. Other certifications do not have 
this rule and, therefore, widespread farm-level impacts are possible (though not guaranteed). 
Globally, only 26% of Utz-compliant coffee is sold as such (Potts et al., 2014). We can look at the 
example of a large Type 4 cooperative with Utz certification. In the 2012/2013 harvest the 
cooperative sold 3210 quintals with Utz certification and the cooperative reports a premium of 5 
cents/pound ($5/quintal). This amounts to a total premium of $16,050 which easily covers the 
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auditing costs of $3,332 that the cooperative paid that year for Utz certification. If this premium, 
after auditing costs are subtracted, was divided among the 2100 members of the cooperative, each 
member would receive an average of approximately $6.00. If other related costs of additional 
training, site visits and support were deducted, the per-member distribution would be nearly zero 
(although members would still benefit from the additional services related to certification and the 
enhanced management practices required by Utz certification). This cooperative chooses an 
entrepreneurial approach, certifying only 15 of its members’ farms. Most of these farms are large 
and the members have already demonstrated good management practices and a loyalty to the 
cooperative. The cooperative chooses to pass the 5 cents/pound premium directly to the certified 
members (without deducting auditing costs) to reward good management practices and offset the 
upgrades that were needed to comply with certification. These 15 certified farmers receive an 
average of $1070 in premiums for their harvest. The cooperative has found that this amount 
encourages farmers to become certified. The following year, when the NYSE price was higher and the 
Utz premium was lower, the cooperative did not sell any coffee with Utz certification and the 
certified members did not receive a premium. 
A small Type 2 cooperative acknowledges that individual certifications could generate benefits for 
certain farmers, but this goes against its cooperative philosophy. ‘The message we want to send to 
our members is that everyone is equal,’ says the cooperative agronomist. This cooperative chooses to 
manage its CAFÉ Practices certification collectively and distribute profits to all members. The 
cooperative sold 30% of the harvest, or 5790 quintals with CAFÉ Practices certification in 2012/2013 
and paid $4000 in auditing costs. The cooperative states that there was no premium for CAFÉ 
Practices that year, classifying the $30/quintal that they received over they NYSE price as a quality 
premium.  Any profits earned are returned to all members equally in the final sale price of coffee. 
Non-financial benefits of certifications 
Existing literature has criticized certifications for small effects on the sustainability of farming 
practices (Allen Blackman & Rivera, 2010). However, the structure of the certified coffee industry, 
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including low market demand for certified product, weak and variable pricing incentives and high 
auditing and management costs incentivized cooperatives to certify only a portion of their most 
compliant members. This may include farmers who already comply with the majority of certification 
standards or those with the largest farms. The result is that certifications are mostly used to reward 
progressive farmers rather than engendering widespread improvements in the sustainability of 
farming practices. However, there are more indirect benefits to certification. 
Promoting a holistic approach to coffee production 
As demonstrated in Chapter 5, certifications incite cooperatives to develop a more holistic approach 
to small-holder coffee farming. They do this indirectly by influencing the advisory services that 
cooperatives provide to their members. Before certifications, cooperative advisory services were 
dependent on the training and knowledge of one or more agronomists employed by the cooperative. 
Certification standards require that members receive training (Ruben & Zuñiga, 2011) on subjects 
that may be outside the expertise of the agronomists, such as training on adaptation to climate 
change, integrated pest management or employer-labor relations. This requirement obliges 
cooperatives to form or renegotiate relationships with outside organizations to acquire access to 
new knowledge and techniques (Alvarez et al., 2010; Bitzer et al., 2008). These new services and 
knowledge add to the existing discourse about sustainability in the cooperative and in the 
community. This discourse is also influenced by governmental regulation of the coffee industry and 
other stakeholders in the community as discussed above.  
The holistic approach to coffee production better supports sustainable agriculture than the previous 
approach of focusing on inputs and outputs. It encourages producers to consider allowing a certain 
threshold of pests on their crop and encourages soil management for the long-term fertility of soils. 
Shade trees, while they may lower short-term productivity, protect soils and improve bean quality 
(Vaast et al., 2006). These changes in perceptions about farming practices take time and are not 
easily quantified, particularly in the short term.  
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Increased human and social capital 
To provide a more holistic approach to coffee production, an increase in human capital was needed. 
All case-study cooperatives stated that both group and individual advisory services increased with 
certification. Cooperative administrators receive business and technical training from NGOs, 
consortia and governmental agencies and members receive technical training from cooperative staff 
and other stakeholders. The result is a more efficiently-run cooperative which builds trust in the 
administration and greater farmer knowledge about sustainable production practices. 
This increase in interaction between cooperative administration and members increases social 
capital. Members interact with other members at cooperative training events, lectures and field days 
and strengthen bonding social capital. They also interact more regularly with cooperative 
administration, building trust which facilitates employing new agricultural practices (Klerkx & 
Proctor, 2013). 
Balancing financial incentives with member equality 
I found that individual certifications may increase the inequality within a cooperative. Cooperatives 
focus limited resources, such as farm visits and plant material, on certified farmers. This creates a 
difficult situation for the cooperative, as it contradicts the principles of cooperative organizations in 
which all members have an equal stake in the organization. Previous research warns that high levels 
of inequality and exclusion can destroy a cooperative (Fraser et al., 2013; González & Nigh, 2005). 
However, making changes to agricultural practices to comply with certification may present 
significant costs to producers (for example building a pesticide storage shed, increased labor costs for 
manual weeding and integrated pest management, purchase and labor costs for using compost), and 
producers often require at least a portion of these costs to be covered by a higher sale price. 
Some Costa Rican cooperatives address this conundrum by focusing services on certified farmers but 
distributing financial benefits to both certified and uncertified farmers. This dilutes incentives for 
individually-certified farmers but maintains harmony within the cooperative.  
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Cooperatives with a high sense of solidarity (high bonding social capital) may completely reject 
individual certifications. They feel that equality among the members is of the highest importance and 
may make management decisions that, to the outsider, appear to be counter-productive to the 
financial profitability of the cooperative, just to maintain this equality. If this sense of solidarity is not 
shared by the membership, these policies may result in members leaving the cooperative or side-
selling to private mills to receive a higher price for specialty coffee. 
As demonstrated in Chapter 6, the level of social capital of the organization as a strong effect on the 
policies of the cooperative which in turn affect the social capital of the membership. There is 
extensive literature on the social capital of groups and communities, less on the social capital of 
organizations (Cohen & Prusak, 2001) but the interaction between social capital at the two levels is 
virtually unstudied. The leadership in an organization is vital to consider because the strategies and 
policies a leader employs shape the character and the social structure of an organization (Mintzberg, 
2009) which can build or destroy social capital. 
Balancing extrinsic and intrinsic motivations 
Considering that financial incentives are weak and variable while certification costs are high, one 
might wonder why cooperatives and individuals pursue certifications. 
 In Chapter 6 we see that individuals with high social capital (as measured by generalized trust) are 
more likely to pursue a certification, in this case Rainforest Alliance, for environmental motivations, 
even if no financial incentive is provided. Generalized trust reflects ‘belief in the benevolence of 
human nature,’ (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). In the case of certifications, this benevolence is 
manifested in the protection of soil, wildlife habitats, and water resources. People with high levels of 
generalized trust are willing to voluntarily comply with standards because they believe that others 
will do so as well. These individuals have intrinsic motivations to certify, and have internalized the 
social norms of certification (Flora et al., 2015). This is demonstrated by a small-holder farmer 
converting to Rainforest Alliance certification who explains ‘[The certification] is not for me but for 
the birds and the animals that live in the coffee field.’ 
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There is also evidence of internalization of the norms of certification at the cooperative level. I 
observed a difference in the compliance of the different cooperatives with Fair Trade certification. In 
comparing Cooperative 3 (from Chapter 4), a small Guanacaste cooperative and Cooperative 19 (also 
from Chapter 4), a large Tarrazú cooperative, we can see differences in the efforts made to improve 
the sustainability of the cooperative mill. While both cooperatives comply with the standard, 
Cooperative 19 has gone beyond the requirements by developing a sustainability program which 
includes efforts to use only renewable energy, including solar. A manager says ‘We have a 
commitment to sustainable production, to protect the environment, to satisfy the expectations of the 
clients and improve the quality of life of their members and the community in general.’ This displays 
responsible leadership which is both an indicator of high social capital in the administration and a 
means to build social capital within the organization (Maak, 2007). Cooperative 19 appears to be a 
more mature group in the transformation of its social and human capital as described by Pretty and 
Ward (2001). The cooperative has reached Stage Two in Pretty’s transformation of capital in which 
organizations develop their own rules and norms. 
Cooperative 3 seems to still be in Stage 1 in the development of its social and human capital. At this 
stage organizations simply react to the requirements imposed by external agencies (Pretty & Ward, 
2001). The manager from Cooperative 3 never mentions sustainability in the interviews. These two 
cooperatives are, of course, very different and many of the differences come from the size of the 
cooperatives and the different economic reality for the two due to the demand for the quality of the 
coffee produced and the cooperatives’ financial capital.  However, there seems to also be a 
difference in the intrinsic motivations for certifying. While the manager at Cooperative 19 
emphasizes that certifications are a means to achieve the cooperative’s sustainability goals, the 
manager at Cooperative 3 does not seem to see this value. When asked about non-financial benefits 
of certification, he was unable to mention any. When pressed further he admitted, ‘Perhaps the 
members are better at keeping records.’ However, he did not see certifications as a vehicle to induce 
greater changes. This may account for some of the discrepancies between studies which have found 
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that certifications induce large changes at the cooperative level (Ronchi, 2002) and those which have 
found little change (van Rijsbergen et al., 2016). 
This presents interesting questions for future research about how best to manage certifications, both 
in situations where social capital is low and in situations where it is high. While there seems to be a 
link between intrinsic motivations for voluntary activities (Degli Antoni, 2009), research has not fully 
explored this link. Economic theory, which does not consider intrinsic motivations for undertaking an 
activity such as voluntary certification, would suggest that economic incentives are not needed if the 
supply of certified coffee (the number of farmers volunteering for certification) meets the 
cooperative’s demand (the amount of certified coffee the cooperative has contracts for) (Frey & 
Jegen, 1999). Sociological theory, however, which considers an individual’s intrinsic motivations for 
undertaking an activity, such as the belief that something is the ‘right thing to do,’ suggests that the 
payment of a premium for voluntary certification would reward intrinsic motivations and improve 
performance (Flora et al., 2015; Frey & Jegen, 1999). Nevertheless, there is a lack of research on the 
effect of certification premiums on the construction of social capital. Before making 
recommendations about how to incentivize individuals to pursue certifications we need to better 
understand if paid participation in certification schemes inhibits or increases the production of social 
capital. In areas of low social capital, paid participation may be the only option for cooperatives who 
wish to encourage compliance with certification standards. However, the premiums for certification 
rarely cover the farm-level changes needed to comply with standards. A combination of financial 
incentives and intrinsic motivations (high social capital) may result in the most sustainable changes at 
the farm level. 
Limits of the study 
While every effort was made to accurately portray the situation in Costa Rican coffee cooperatives, 
there are limits to the study. The first limit is that of national context. This thesis was undertaken to 
study the context of certifications in Costa Rica in order to apply that information to the situation in 
other countries. However, with the exception of a short field project in Uganda1, primary data was 
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only collected in Costa Rica. I have made an attempt to use secondary data from the literature to 
compare the situation in Costa Rica to that of other countries. While the conclusions drawn from this 
study are only applicable to Costa Rica, I hope that policy recommendations drawn from this study 
can help improve the efficacy of certification in other countries. 
The second limitation is equilibrium between qualitative and quantitative data. This is in part due to 
the lack of available records in the cooperative, for example training records. For this reason I had to 
rely heavily on qualitative data from interviews. In no cases were training records available from 
before certification. While the availability of training records improved with certification, one 
cooperative was only able (or perhaps only willing) to give me the training records for the current 
year. I compensated for this by triangulating changes in advisory services with members, agronomists 
and managers. I have no doubt that advisory services are more intensive and diverse because of 
certifications – there is unanimous and unsolicited confirmation of this from every administrator 
interviewed. Unfortunately the changes in intensity and scope are impossible to quantify. 
The time limits were a constraint for collecting quantitative data from the social capital surveys. The 
number of surveys that I felt was realistic to complete in the available time was divided in proportion 
to the number members in each cooperative. The result was that I could survey fewer than 2% of the 
members of the cooperatives. The logistics of efficiently finding members to interview in the more 
geographically disperse cooperatives resulted in my surveying fewer members than originally 
anticipated. However, the consistency of the results of the surveys gives confidence that more 
surveys would not have significantly changed the results. In fact, the two cooperatives in Los Santos 
have the same elliptical regression, suggesting consistency in the cooperatives which overlap 
geographically and only small differences with other more distant cooperatives.  
One month was scheduled to live in and collect data in each case study cooperative. While this 
proved sufficient for the smaller cooperatives, it was a limitation for the large cooperatives. The large 
cooperatives offer more programs and services and the management is less centralized, requiring 
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interviews with multiple agronomists and managers. However, these managers and agronomists 
respond quickly to emails and phone calls, and when information was missing or needed clarification 
is was available. 
A final limitation is that the majority of the data was collected at the cooperative level. The focus of 
the study is the role of farmers’ organizations in the management of voluntary certifications, and so 
this study relies heavily on interviews with cooperative administrators. However, the analysis would 
have benefitted from more data regarding changes and perceptions at the farm level. Collecting this 
data is time-consuming and as with all interviews that rely on participants recalling past events, 
participants may have difficulty remembering when they changed farming practices. I attempted to 
minimize this limitation by linking changes in farming practices with locally relevant events (the hiring 
of the current cooperative agronomist, the certification of their farm, etc.). Also, farm-level data was 
only collected in interview form. It did not include visits to the farm to assess the farming practices. 
Recommendations 
I recommend that public policy focus on strengthening farmers’ organizations. Farmers’ 
organizations benefit from higher levels of human capital including training in management, internal 
control and professionalism. We can see the effect that consortia have had on helping cooperatives 
access certifications by building capacity in cooperatives’ staff members. Certifications can place a 
considerable strain on the resources of small cooperatives. Additional support should be considered 
for farmers’ organizations, particularly in areas where NGOs and other supporting stakeholders are 
not abundant. In addition to capacity building among staff, this support could be in the form of 
advisory services which promote sustainable practices to farmers or provision of materials such as 
shade trees or disease-resistant plant material. 
While certifications may compensate for situations in which governance is weak, they are most 
effective when they are complemented by well-enforced environmental and social policy. Well-
enforced environmental and social laws not only facilitate access to certifications, the enforcement 
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may compensate for low levels of interpersonal trust within a country, which enhances the function 
of certifications. 
Because the unique policy and social environment of a country can affect the function of 
certifications, certification bodies should take a more regional approach to the design and 
implementation of certifications. In areas where environmental and social regulation or enforcement 
of these regulations is weak, special care must be taken. This may include extra support to farmers’ 
organizations who wish to pursue certification or collaboration with NGOs or other organizations to 
upgrade compliance. Fairtrade International considers producers’ access to support before adding 
countries to their list of accepted producers. Therefore, in countries with limited access to support, 
other certifying organizations may consider Fair Trade as a prerequisite to further certification. 
Certifications should only be employed in farmers’ organizations with adequate levels of 
organizational social capital. Certifications may augment inequality and distrust if they are not 
properly managed. If social capital is lacking within the organization, efforts should be made to 
increase social capital before the implementation of certifications. This may include addressing issues 
of corruption or exclusion of certain social or ethnic groups. The social capital of the organization has 
a stronger effect on the efficacy and inclusiveness of certifications than does the social capital of the 
membership. A well-managed and transparent certification scheme can build social capital within the 
membership. 
I recommend that future research regarding the impact of certifications focuses more on farmers’ 
organizations. Some previous studies have concluded that farmers do not benefit financially from 
certification. I have shown that, while there may be a premium associated with certified coffee, if 
divided among all of the members of the cooperative, the premium may be insignificant, particularly 
in medium-income countries such as Costa Rica. Premiums distributed only to individually-certified 
members may promote inequality in the cooperative. Therefore, future research should explore 
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more deeply how the financial and non-financial benefits of certifications strengthen farmers’ 
organizations and indirectly benefit farmers. 
I also feel that the roles that social capital, particularly interpersonal trust, plays in an individual’s 
decision to pursue certification deserves further study. I have found preliminary evidence that people 
with higher levels of interpersonal trust are more likely to voluntarily pursue Rainforest Alliance 
certification when no financial incentive is offered. However, no link was found between 
interpersonal trust and Utz certification. Further research is needed to determine if this is because of 
the difference in focus of the two certifications (environmental and social focus of Rainforest Alliance 
versus the management and traceability focus of Utz) or because of the financial incentive provided. 
Determining the role of social capital in this decision would be useful in designing incentive policies 
for certifications. Cooperatives may also find that building social capital within the cooperative is 
complimentary to their certification program. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
1 This conference communication (Snider 2014) is a result of the author’s participation in the AgTraIn/ARI 
(Agriculture and Rural Innovation) field methods class in Nnindye, Uganda. It was presented  as a poster at the 
2014 Tropentag Conference in Prague, Czech Republic. It is included as Appendix F.
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Abstract 
This thesis was undertaken to answer the question What is the role of Costa Rican cooperatives in the 
management of voluntary coffee certifications? It has demonstrated that cooperatives play an 
important role by facilitating small farmer access to certifications, acting as an intermediary between 
other stakeholders to provide more intensive advisory services to members and make important 
decisions regarding how to balance the financial incentives for certification with the solidarity within 
the cooperative. 
It next examined how certifications change advisory services in the cooperative. It was demonstrated 
that certifications oblige cooperatives to diversify and intensify advisory services. They do this by 
engaging other stakeholders to provide services. In some cases these are new collaborations and in 
other cases cooperatives are forced to reconfigure existing collaborations with stakeholders. These 
new advisory services influence farming practices and farmers’ paradigms about sustainable 
practices. 
In order to better understand how the benefits of certification can be realized in other regions, I 
asked What role does social capital play in the management of certifications? Social capital was 
found to have an effect on the distribution of incentives for certification and the cooperatives’ 
decisions about collective or individual certifications. The social capital of individuals also plays a role 
in their acceptance of voluntary environmental certifications. If well-managed, certifications have the 
potential to create a virtuous cycle of building social capital within a cooperative. 
Résumé 
Cette thèse vise à répondre à la question Quel est le rôle des coopératives au Costa Rica dans la 
gestion de la certification volontaire du café? Elle a démontré que les coopératives jouent un rôle 
important, en facilitant l'accès à la certification pour les petits producteurs. Les coopératives jouent 
aussi un rôle d'intermédiaire entre les autres parties prenantes, fournissent des services de appui et 
conseil plus intensifs à leurs membres et prennent des décisions importantes quant à la façon 
Chapter 8 
Page | 172 
 
d'équilibrer les motivations économiques à la certification, tout en conservant une dimension de 
solidarité. 
Cette thèse a ensuite examiné comment les certifications changent les services consultatifs au sein 
de la coopérative. Il a été démontré que les certifications obligent les coopératives à diversifier et 
intensifier leurs services. Elles le font en impliquant d'autres parties prenantes. Dans certains cas, ce 
sont de nouvelles collaborations qui sont mises en place. Dans d'autres cas, les coopératives sont 
obligées de reconfigurer les collaborations existantes. Ces nouveaux services consultatifs influencent 
les pratiques agricoles et la compréhension des agriculteurs du paradigme des pratiques durables. 
Afin de mieux comprendre comment les avantages de la certification peuvent être reproduits dans 
d'autres régions, nous posons la question du rôle du capital social dans la gestion de la certification? 
Nous constatons que le capital social a un effet sur les incitations économiques à la certification, et 
les décisions des coopératives quant à la mise en place de certifications collectives ou individuelles. 
Le capital social des individus joue également un rôle dans leur acceptation des certifications 
environnementales volontaires. Si elle est bien gérée, la certification a le potentiel de créer un cercle 
vertueux de renforcement du capital social au sein d'une coopérative. 
Resumen 
Esta tesis se realizó para responder a la pregunta ¿Cuál es el papel de las cooperativas de Costa Rica 
en la gestión de certificaciones voluntarias de café? Se ha demostrado que las cooperativas 
desempeñan un papel importante facilitando el acceso de los pequeños agricultores a las 
certificaciones, que actúa como intermediario entre otras partes interesadas para proporcionar más 
servicios de asesoramiento intensivo a los miembros y tomar decisiones importantes con respecto a 
la forma de equilibrar los incentivos financieros para la certificación con la solidaridad dentro de la 
cooperativa. 
Luego se examinó la forma en que las certificaciones cambian los servicios de asesoramiento en la 
cooperativa. Se demostró que las certificaciones obligan a las cooperativas a diversificar e intensificar 
Conclusions 
173 | P a g e  
  
los servicios de asesoramiento. Lo hacen mediante la participación de otras partes interesadas para 
proporcionar servicios. En algunos casos se trata de nuevas colaboraciones y en otros casos las 
cooperativas se ven obligadas a volver a configurar las colaboraciones existentes con las partes 
interesadas. Estos nuevos servicios de asesoramiento influyen en las prácticas agrícolas y los 
paradigmas de los agricultores acerca de las prácticas sostenibles. 
Con el fin de comprender mejor cómo los beneficios de la certificación se pueden realizar en otras 
regiones, pregunté ¿Qué papel juega el capital social en la gestión de las certificaciones? Se encontró 
que el capital social tiene un efecto sobre la distribución de los incentivos para la certificación y las 
decisiones de las cooperativas sobre las certificaciones colectivas o individuales. El capital social de 
los individuos también juega un papel en su aceptación de las certificaciones voluntarias 
ambientales. Si son bien administradas, las certificaciones tienen el de potencial de crear un círculo 
virtuoso de la construcción de capital social dentro de una cooperativa. 
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This thesis began asking the general question: What is the role of Costa Rican coffee cooperatives in 
the management of voluntary coffee certifications? 
This question is further broken down in the following subquestions: What factors influence the 
decisions that cooperatives make regarding the management of certifications?; What financial and 
non-financial incentives are offered to cooperatives and their members to encourage participation in 
voluntary certifications?; What are the effects of certification at the cooperative level? 
Cooperatives play a vital role in managing certifications and helping small farmers access certified 
markets. This role includes implementing a system of internal control and traceability to ensure 
quality and separate certified and non-certified product. Cooperatives also assess the needs of the 
members regarding advisory services needed to change farming practices and increase traceability. 
They provide the needed services to their members. These services can put a considerable strain on 
the human resources of the cooperative and the amount of coffee sold with certification may be 
quite low. For these reasons cooperatives often choose to certify only a portion of their members.  
When deciding which certifications to pursue, cooperatives consider the quality and quantity of 
coffee they produce. Cooperatives with low quality coffee (particularly small and medium-sized 
cooperatives located at low altitudes) often choose Fair Trade and possibly organic certification. 
Large cooperatives with high quality coffee are more likely to pursue CAFE Practices, Rainforest 
Alliance and Utz. They often pursue multiple certifications but do not sell more than 30% of the 
harvest in any one certification. Small cooperatives which produce high quality coffee often find that 
they do not need certifications to obtain a high price for their coffee. 
Cooperatives may or may not receive a premium for certified coffee. The premium depends on the 
world price of coffee and on the type of certification. Premiums for certifications such as Fair Trade, 
organic and Utz fluctuate inversely with the world price of coffee. Financial incentives for these 
certifications may completely disappear in times of high world prices. While the premium for 
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Rainforest Alliance appears to be quite stable, the premium for CAFE Practices appears to fluctuate 
along with market highs and lows. In times of low world prices financial incentives may be absent. 
Even if cooperatives receive a premium for certified coffee, they may not be able or willing to offer a 
premium to individually certified members. This is because certifications induce cooperatives to offer 
more intense and diversified services to their members, which leads us to the next research 
questions: 
 How do a cooperative’s advisory services change with certification? 
 How do certifications affect outside stakeholders’ influence on cooperative services? 
 Which services (group training, farm visits, provision of plant material, etc.) are most effective 
in increasing the sustainability of farming practices?  
Certifications compel cooperatives to promote a more holistic approach to coffee production. In 
addition to traditional advisory services which focus on the management of pests and disease and 
raising productivity, certification standards oblige cooperatives to offer services related to soil and 
water protection, pesticide safety and handling and adaptation to climate change. Cooperatives 
engage in new partnerships with outside stakeholders or reconfigure existing relationships to provide 
these services. Cooperative administrators agree that this holistic approach has changed farmers’ 
perceptions about their farming practices. Farmers gradually realize that they can manage their 
farms without the prohibited pesticides and that a certain pest threshold is acceptable. 
Group training is the most effective in changing management practices such as maintaining a farm 
record book, wearing a mask while applying pesticides. Certifications do not seem to be very 
effective in increasing the sustainability of farming practices which compete directly with yield or 
quality. Only organic certification, which offers a (sometimes substantial) premium to compensate 
for loss of yield is able to significantly decrease agrochemical use. Other farming practices, such as 
the use of shade trees, are linked to more tangible services, like the free provision of plant material. 
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As cooperatives form new relationships with stakeholders, they increase their networks. This can be 
considered an increase in social capital. Members benefit from this social network by accessing 
information from new sources. This leads us to the final research questions: 
 What role does the social capital of the members and the organization play in the 
management of voluntary certifications? 
 What is the potential for certifications to build social capital in cooperatives? 
Cooperatives which participate in certifications have medium to high levels of social capital at the 
organizational level. A certain level of social capital is necessary to cooperate with outside 
organizations and to ensure an equitable and transparent distribution of financial and non-financial 
incentives for certification. Cooperatives with high levels of bridging social capital have a more 
commercial approach to certifications, and a few select members may reap the benefits of 
certification. Cooperatives with a strong sense of solidarity among all members choose collective 
certifications and an equal distribution of financial and in-kind incentives. Cooperatives with low 
levels of both types of social capital are not able to access certifications because of lack of 
empowerment or collaboration with other organizations and lack of solidarity within the group.  
The social capital of the individuals in the cooperative also effects the management of certifications. 
Individuals who voluntarily pursue Rainforest Alliance certification without financial compensation 
are more likely to have generalized trust in others. Higher generalized trust was not found in 
members individually certified in Utz and who were paid a certification premium. 
On one hand, certifications have the potential to increase the social capital of the membership by 
strengthening the community embeddedness of farmers’ organizations. Consistent and regular 
contact between farmers and cooperative staff builds trust and can facilitate the production of 
knowledge about new farming practices. The enforcement of the norms of certification can also build 
trust and reciprocity within the cooperative.  
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On the other hand, poorly managed certifications can increase the inequality within an organization 
and destroy trust. The national context into which the certification is adopted must be considered 
and, if necessary, the levels of social capital should be ameliorated before the adoption of 
certification. 
In conclusion, Costa Rica provides an interesting environmental to study coffee certifications because 
of the important role played by farmers’ organizations and the unique policy conditions. I have 
demonstrated that cooperatives play an important role by facilitating small farmer access to 
certifications, acting as an intermediary between other stakeholders to provide services including 
more intensive advisory services to members and make important decisions regarding how to 
balance the financial incentives for certification with the solidarity within the cooperative. 
Certifications change advisory services in the cooperative. I demonstrated that certifications compel 
cooperatives to diversify and intensify advisory services. They do this by engaging other stakeholders 
to directly provide services or to help the cooperatives to improve services delivery. In some cases 
these are new collaborations and in other cases cooperatives are forced to reconfigure existing 
collaborations with stakeholders. These new advisory services influence farming practices and 
farmers’ perceptions about sustainable practices.  
Social capital plays an interesting role in the management of voluntary coffee certifications. The 
balance of social capital in a cooperative affects the equality in the distribution of financial and in-
kind incentives. The social capital of individuals also plays a role in their acceptance of voluntary 
environmental certifications. If well-managed, certifications have the potential to create a virtuous 
cycle of social capital creation within a cooperative.  
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Social Capital Survey Questions 
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Dimension Questions which measure bridging 
social capital 
Point value of response 
Groups and networks I would like to ask you about the 
groups or organizations, networks, 
associations to which you belong. 
Of how many such groups are you a 
member? 
Absolute number of groups 
Trust and solidarity Generally speaking, would you say 
that most people can be trusted or 
that you can’t be too careful in 
dealing with people? 
0= One cannot be too careful, 1= In 
general one can trust 
Trust and solidarity How much do you trust local 
government officials? 
0= to a very small extent, 1= to a small 
extent, 2= neither great nor small 
extent, 3= to a great extent, 4= to a 
very great extent 
Trust and solidarity How much do you trust national 
government officials? 
0= to a very small extent, 1= to a small 
extent, 2= neither great nor small 
extent, 3= to a great extent, 4= to a 
very great extent 
Trust and solidarity How much do you trust the police? 0= to a very small extent, 1= to a small 
extent, 2= neither great nor small 
extent, 3= to a great extent, 4= to a 
very great extent 
Information and 
communication 
Which are the most important 
sources of information for you 
regarding coffee cultivation, and 
pests and disease? 
Absolute number of sources 
Empowerment and political 
action 
In general, how happy do you 
consider yourself to be? 
0= very unhappy, 1= moderately 
unhappy 2= neither happy nor 
unhappy, 3= moderately happy, 4= 
very happy 
Empowerment and political 
action 
Do you feel that you have the 
power to make important decisions 
that change the course of your life? 
0= Totally unable to change life, 1= 
Mostly unable to change life, 2= 
neither unable nor able, 3= mostly 
able to change life, 4= totally able to 
change life 
Empowerment and political 
action 
To what extent to local government 
and local leaders take into account 
concerns voiced by you and people 
like you when they make decisions 
that affect you? 
0= not at all, 1= a little, 2= a lot 
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Variable Questions which measure bonding 
social capital 
Point value of response 
Groups and networks Do attend the cooperative's bi-
annual general assemblies? 
0= No, 1= yes 
Groups and networks Do you attend other cooperative 
events like talks and group 
trainings? 
0= Never, 1= sometimes, 2= always 
Groups and networks In general the cooperative's 
administration operates 
0= ineffectively, 1= Neither effectively 
nor ineffectively, 2= effectively 
Trust and solidarity The majority of the members of the 
cooperative are willing to help 
when it is necessary 
0= Totally disagree, 1= disagree, 2= 
neither agree nor disagree, 3= agree, 
4= totally agree 
Trust and solidarity The majority of the members of this 
neighborhood are willing to help 
when it is necessary 
0= Totally disagree, 1= disagree, 2= 
neither agree nor disagree, 3= agree, 
4= totally agree 
Trust and solidarity How much do you trust the 
cooperative's administration? 
0= to a very small extent, 1= to a small 
extent, 2= neither great nor small 
extent, 3= to a great extent, 4= to a 
very great extent 
Trust and solidarity Do you think that in the last 10 
years the level of trust in the 
cooperative has improved, gotten 
worse, or stayed the same? 
0= gotten worse, 1= stayed the same, 
2= improved 
Trust and solidarity If a community project does not 
directly benefit you but has benefits 
for many others in the village, 
would you contribute time to the 
project? 
0= would not contribute time, 1= 
would contribute time 
Trust and solidarity If a community project does not 
directly benefit you but has benefits 
for many others in the village, 
would you contribute money to the 
project? 
0= would not contribute money, 1= 
would contribute money 
Social cohesion and inclusion How would you characterize the 
social unity in the cooperative? 
0= very ununited, 1= ununited, 2= 
neither united nor ununited, 3= 
united, 4= very united 
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Social cohesion and inclusion There are often differences in 
characteristic between people in an 
organization. For example 
differences in wealth, income, 
social status or ethnic background. 
There can also be differences in 
religious or political beliefs or 
differences due to age or sex. To 
what extent do any such 
differences characterize the 
cooperative? 
0= To a very great extent, 1= to a 
great extent, 2= neither great nor 
small extent, 3= to a small extent, 5= 
to a very small extent 
Social cohesion and inclusion Do you think that the cooperative's 
policy on pricing differentials 
(paying/not paying a premium for 
certification or altitude, depending 
on the cooperative) causes tension 
among the members? 
0= To a very great extent, 1= to a 
great extent, 2= neither great nor 
small extent, 3= to a small extent, 5= 
to a very small extent 
Collective action and 
cooperation 
In the past 12 months have you or 
anyone in your family worked with 
others in the village to do 
something for the benefit of the 
community? 
0= No, 1= yes 
Collective action and 
cooperation 
Did many people from the 
community participate in this 
(these) project(s)? 
0= very few, 1= few, 2= neither few 
nor many, 3= many 4= very many 
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Appendix B: 
Coffee Cooperative Census Questions 
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PARTE 1: DATOS GENERALES 
1-A: Nombre de la cooperativa/asociación _______________________________________ 
1-B: ¿Cuantos productores estaban miembros de su organización en 2012?___ 
 1-C: ¿Que fue el área total de los cafetales cultivado de sus miembros en 2012 en hectáreas? ____  
1-D: ¿A que altura se encuentra  el cafetal más alto de su organización? ______________________m 
1-E: ¿A que altura se encuentra el cafetal mas bajo de su organización?  ______________________m 
1-F: ¿Cuál es la cantidad total de café que se vende por su organización en la cosecha 2012-2013? 
__________________________quintales 
1-G: ¿Cual porcentaje de su cosecha de 2012-2013 se vendió de cada calidad?  
SHB+_____________% 
SHB______________% 
GHB______________% 
HB_______________% 
PARTE 2: COSTOS DE CERTIFICACION 
 
 Por favor, completa los cuadros siguientes para cada sello.  
 
Certificación 
2-A: 
¿Cuanto pagó su 
organización en gastos 
por cada certificación en 
2012? 
2-B: 
¿Cuánto pagó su 
organización por las 
auditorías por cada 
certificación? 
Comercio Justo     
Rainforest Alliance     
Orgánico     
CAFE Practices     
Utz Certified     
4C     
Nespresso AAA   
Otras (Especificar) 
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PARTE 3 : PARTICIPACION EN CERTIFICACIONES 
 
 
 
Certificación 
3-A 
 
 
 
 
¿Cuanta área 
de tierra fue 
certificada en 
2012? 
3-B  
 
 
 
 
Certificación 
colectiva (c) o 
Individual (I) ? 
3-C 
¿Cuantos 
miembros 
certificados 
tenia su 
organización en 
cada sello en 
2012? 
3-D 
 
 
¿Cuanto 
café se vendió en 
la cosecha 2012-
2013? 
3-E 
 
 
 
¿Cual fue 
el primer año 
que se tiene 
cada 
certificación? 
3-F 
 
 
Por favor marque la casilla 
correspondiente a cada año que 
fueron certificados en cada sello 
3-G 
¿Qué porcentaje de 
contratos recibió 
una prima del 
comprador en 2012 
(adicional a la prima 
de calidad) por cada 
certificación? 
3-H 
¿Cuanto recibió su 
organización en 
promedio en 
primas (adicional a 
la prima de 
calidad) en 2012? 
En US$/quintal 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Comercio 
Justo    c  
 
               
Rainforest 
Alliance   
    
        
 
  
 
Orgánico     
 
                  
CAFE 
Practices 
     
              
Utz Certified                         
4C 
 
                      
Nespresso 
AAA             
Otras  
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PARTE 4: PRIMAS 
4-A: ¿En la cosecha 2012-2013 ha recibido una prima por la calidad de su café?  
4-B: ¿Si recibió ¿Cuál es la cantidad promedio de la prima ___________________________$/quintal 
4-C 
 
 
 
  Si No 
Que es el monto 
de la prima 
pagado por el 
comprador? 
Que es el monto 
de la prima 
pagado a los 
productores? En 
$/quintal 
¿La organización pago una prima a productores en 2012?         
¿Basado en la calidad del café? 
 
      
¿Basado en el porcentaje rojo/verde?         
¿Por certificación Comercio Justo?         
¿Por certificación Rainforest Alliance?         
¿Por producción orgánico?         
¿Por certificación CAFE Practices?         
¿Por certificación Utz?   
 
    
¿Por certificación 4C?   
 
    
¿Por certificación Nespresso AAA?     
¿Por otras certificaciones?         
 
 
PARTE 5: GASTOS DE ADMINISTRACION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5-B: ¿Tiene su organización un empleo dedicado a certificación?  
5-C: ¿Tiene su organización un empleo que dedica parte de su tiempo a certificación?  
5-D: Si tiene, ¿Cuánto porcentaje de su tiempo esta dedicada a certificación?__ __ ____________ 
5-E: ¿La organización ha comprado algunos equipos a cumplir con las reglas de certificación?  
5-F: ¿Hay otros tipos de infraestructura que había que poner en práctica (por favor explique)? 
______ ___________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PARTE 6: TRAZABILIDAD 
 
Puede explicar su sistema de trazabilidad? 
5-A: ¿La certificación ha subido los gastos de 
administración de su cooperativa por… Si No 
…¿Implementación de la sistema de control interno? 
  …¿Tramites asociada con la certificación? 
  …¿Tiempo en reuniones con los certificadores? 
  …¿Transporte a los reuniones? 
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 6-C 
¿En 2012, se separa la 
cosecha… 
  
…por 
productor? 
…por 
certificación? 
Comercio Justo     
Rainforest Alliance     
Orgánico     
CAFE Practices     
Utz Certified     
4C     
Nespresso AAA   
Otras (Specificar)     
 
PARTE 7: MOTIVACIONES Y INVESTIGACIONES 
7-1: ¿Cuál es la motivación más importante que usted tiene para elegir una certificación? 
_______Para cumplir con la petición de un comprador 
_______Para mejorar la sostenibilidad ambiental de la cooperativa 
_______Para mejorar la sostenibilidad social de la cooperativa 
_______Para encontrar nuevos mercados para su café 
_______Para ganar una prima por el café 
_______El acceso a la financiación 
_______Otros motivaciones (por favor, explique____________________________________ 
 
7-2 ¿Cuáles son los mayores desafíos para su organización? _______ _________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Esas son todas mis preguntas, ¿Quiere añadir algo? 
¿Quiere preguntarme algo? 
 
¡Muchas gracias por sus respuestas! 
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Appendix C: Farming Practices  
Questionnaire 
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Semi-structured survey with cooperative members 
A: Basic Information 
A1: Who makes the decisions concerning the management of your coffee farm? 
A2: For how long have you been the person who makes decisions? 
A3: What is the area of your coffee farm(s)? 
A4: Are you a member of a cooperative? Which one(s)? 
A5: Do you sell your entire harvest to the cooperative? Do you sell to private mills? 
A6: Does your cooperative participate in any certifications? (information cross-checked with 
cooperative staff) 
A7: Does your farm have any certifications? (please list) 
 If yes,  
 since what year? 
 Why did you decide to certify your farm? 
 What changes did you have to make to your farm to comply with (each) certification? 
 What do you think about (each) certification? 
 
B: Training and services 
 
B1: For you, what is the most important source of information regarding growing coffee? 
 
B2: Do you attend training sessions sponsored by the cooperative? How many times in an average 
year? What are the topics? 
References 
Page | 200 
 
 
B3: Do you attend training sessions sponsored by any other organizations? Which ones? How many 
times in an average year? What are the topics? 
 
B4: Do you receive site visits from the cooperative agronomist? How many times in an average year? 
What do you talk about? 
 
B5: Do you receive site visits from an agronomist from any other organization? Which one(s)? How 
many times in an average year? What do you talk about? 
 
B6: Do you attend any other events sponsored by the cooperative? What type of event? What other 
organizations are involved (Icafe, MAG, chemical companies etc)? 
 
B7: Have you used any of the other services of the cooperative (credit, shade trees, live barriers, 
signage for pesticide sheds etc)? Please explain. 
 
C: Management Practices 
 
C1: Do you use a farm record book to record earnings, expenses, applications of chemicals, etc? 
When did you start using it? Why did you start using it? Did you learn how to use it at a training 
class? 
 
C2: Do you apply pesticides on your farm (or does a hired laborer or family member apply them)? (If 
the farmer applies them personally) Can you please describe what protective equipment you wear 
when you apply pesticides? Over the past 20 years, have you changed what you wear when you 
apply pesticides? Why did you change? 
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D: Farming Practices: 
 
D1: Do you use fungicides on your coffee farm? How many times did you apply fungicides last year? 
Would you have applied more fungicides if the price had been lower? Over the past 20 years, has 
your use of fungicides changed? Why did it change? Have the products that you used changed? Why? 
 
D2: Do you use chemical herbicides on your coffee farm? How many times did you apply herbicides 
last year? Over the past 20 years, has your use of herbicides changed? When did it change? Why did 
it change? 
 
D3: Do you use chemical fertilizers on your coffee farm? How many times did you apply fertilizers last 
year? Would you have applied more fertilizers last year if the price of fertilizers had been lower? 
Over the past 20 years, have you changed how you fertilize your coffee farm? Why did you change? 
Do you use a soil test to determine the amount of fertilizer you should apply?  
 
D4: Do you have shade trees (or other shade species) in your coffee plantation? What species do you 
have? Over the past 20 years, has the number of shade trees on your coffee farm increased? Why? 
Over the past 20 years, has the number of species of shade trees on your coffee farm increase?  
Why? What organizations promote the use of shade tree on coffee farms? 
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Social Capital Index Data 
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Coop 1 Coop 1 Coop 1 Coop 1 Coop 1 Coop 1 Coop 1 Coop 1 Coop 1 Coop 1 Coop 1 Coop 1 Coop 1 Coop 1 Coop 1 Coop 1 Coop 1 Coop 1
Bonding 0,916667 0,884615 0,846154 0,634615 0,596154 0,884615 0,865385 0,961538 0,865385 0,788462 0,769231 0,826923 0,681818 0,692308 0,673077 0,615385 0,807692 0,846154
Bridging 0,640741 0,572222 0,588889 0,451852 0,364815 0,52037 0,652083 0,585185 0,629167 0,612963 0,612963 0,720833 0,288889 0,609259 0,502083 0,445238 0,509524 0,861111
Coop 2 Coop 2 Coop 2 Coop 2 Coop 2 Coop 2 Coop 2 Coop 2 Coop 2 Coop 2 Coop 2 Coop 2 Coop 2 Coop 2 Coop 2 Coop 2 Coop 2 Coop 2
Bonding 0,892857 0,857143 0,875 0,482143 0,767857 0,767857 0,839286 0,678571 0,875 0,857143 0,875 0,833333 0,785714 0,821429 0,767857 0,711538 0,892857 0,714286
Bridging 0,683333 0,751852 0,580952 0,62963 0,724074 0,47963 0,564583 0,618519 0,738889 0,666667 0,622222 0,670833 0,707407 0,718519 0,451852 0,427778 0,833333 0,512963
Coop 2 Coop 2 Coop 2 Coop 2 Coop 2 Coop 2 Coop 2 Coop 2 Coop 2 Coop 2 Coop 2 Coop 2 Coop 2 Coop 2 Coop 2 Coop 2 Coop 2 Coop 2 Coop 2 Coop 2 Coop 2 Coop 2 Coop 2 Coop 2 Coop 2
Bonding 0,5 0,642857 0,807692 0,767857 0,767857 0,964286 0,615385 0,75 0,839286 0,692308 0,714286 0,839286 0,807692 0,903846 0,803571 0,732143 0,714286 0,803571 0,964286 0,839286 0,946429 0,732143 0,571429 0,666667 0,4375
Bridging 0,37963 0,559259 0,531481 0,598148 0,6 0,777778 0,457407 0,624074 0,694444 0,47037 0,644444 0,275926 0,927778 0,705556 0,640741 0,512963 0,772222 0,794444 0,624074 0,690741 0,761111 0,52963 0,435185 0,347917 0,191667
Coop 3 Coop 3 Coop 3 Coop 3 Coop 3 Coop 3 Coop 3 Coop 3 Coop 3 Coop 3 Coop 3 Coop 3 Coop 3
Bonding 0,678571 0,75 0,946429 0,576923 0,769231 0,596154 0,625 0,875 0,803571 0,604167 0,458333 0,730769 0,75
Bridging 0,655556 0,355556 0,735185 0,540741 0,355556 0,475926 0,612963 0,664583 0,587037 0,507407 0,612963 0,448148 0,716667
Coop 4 Coop 4 Coop 4 Coop 4 Coop 4 Coop 4 Coop 4 Coop 4 Coop 4 Coop 4 Coop 4 Coop 4 Coop 4 Coop 4 Coop 4 Coop 4 Coop 4 Coop 4
Bonding 0,65 1 0,729167 0,625 0,5 0,857143 0,892857 0,982143 0,928571 0,557692 0,961538 0,928571 0,767857 0,821429 0,660714 0,444444 0,535714 0,625
Bridging 0,448148 0,674074 0,581481 0,646296 0,22381 0,8 0,581481 0,52037 0,568519 0,383333 0,474074 0,835185 0,540741 0,735185 0,562963 0,547222 0,646296 0,418519
Coop 4 Coop 4 Coop 4 Coop 4 Coop 4 Coop 4 Coop 4 Coop 4 Coop 4 Coop 4 Coop 4 Coop 4 Coop 4 Coop 4 Coop 4 Coop 4 Coop 4 Coop 4 Coop 4 Coop 4 Coop 4 Coop 4 Coop 4 Coop 4 Coop 4
Bonding 0,727273 0,704545 0,678571 0,75 0,785714 0,788462 0,725 0,75 0,696429 0,708333 0,596154 0,678571 1 0,785714 1 0,732143 0,803571 0,767857 0,785714 0,839286 0,821429 0,53125 0,821429 0,865385 0,590909
Bridging 0,55 0,457407 0,540741 0,568519 0,614815 0,587037 0,590741 0,452083 0,512963 0,688889 0,47963 0,437037 0,694444 0,451852 0,701852 0,410417 0,574074 0,52963 0,540741 0,668519 0,618519 0,61875 0,309259 0,401852 0,588889
Coop 5 Coop 5
Bonding 0,791667 0,916667
Bridging 0,507407 0,546296
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Tropentag 2014, Prague, Czech Republic 
September 17-19, 2014 
Conference on International Research on Food Security, Natural 
Resource Management and Rural Development 
organised by the Czech University of Life Sciences Prague 
 
Farmers’ Organizations: Building Social Capital for the Conservation of Natural 
Resources in Uganda 
Anna Snidera,e, Vincent Canwatb, Nashon Mogonchic, Nawa Malumod, Andreas de Neergaardb, Nicole Sibeleta,e 
aCIRAD UMR Innovation, 34398 Montpellier France, bUniversity of Copenhagen, Denmark, cEdgerton 
University, Kenya, dMakerere University, Uganda eCATIE, IDEA Turrialba 30501; Costa Rica 
Introduction 
Several studies have shown that social capital, defined as trust in others, social networks and 
norms of reciprocity, is essential to foment the collective action necessary to manage natural 
resources (Sonderskov, 2009). Social capital is normally divided into two categories: bridging 
social capital, which refers to horizontal networks of kin and close-knit groups and bonding 
social capital which refers to vertical networks across many groups. A balance between high 
bridging and high bonding social capital can cultivate progressive participation in determining 
community priorities and shared resources. When both types of social capital are low, 
communities are plagued by extreme individualism and opportunistic exploitation of common 
resources. An imbalance in bridging and bonding social capitals can cause community 
priorities to be determined by outside entities or resistance to change and maligning of 
outsiders (Flora, Flora, Spears, & Swanson, 2013). Organizations which are able to build 
social capital in the form of shared norms promote collective action and reduce the cost of 
monitoring and sanctioning those who exploit natural resources (Ostrom, 1990). 
This research investigates if Savings and Internal Lending Communities (SILCs) can build 
social capital among their members which can then be used to collectively manage group 
natural resources. 
Empirical research finds that social capital, as defined as trust in others, is very low in the 
parts of Africa historically affected by the trans-Atlantic slave trade (Nunn & Wantchekon, 
2011) and violent conflict (Colletta, 2000). The Nnindye area where this study was conducted 
was affected by both the trans-Atlantic slave trade and, more recently by violent conflict 
during the civil war and the war with Tanzania. 
Pappila (2013) found that active participation in community natural resource conservation 
schemes can build trust among the participants. However, facilitation by an NGO or other 
outside organization may be needed. 
Four features are important to consider regarding building social capital within organizations: 
relations of trust; reciprocity and exchanges; common rules, norms and sanctions; and 
connectedness in networks and groups (Pretty, 2003). We looked for evidence that NGO- 
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supported SILC schemes are building these important features which could then facilitate the 
conservation of community natural resources. 
Material and Methods 
This research was undertaken as part of a field methods training course for two PhD 
programs: Agriculture Transformation by Innovation (AgTraIn) administered by the 
University of 
Copenhagen and Agriculture and Rural Innovation (ARI) administered by Makerere 
University in Kampala, Uganda. The research group consisted of two AgTraIn students and 
two ARI students. Results are a compliation of six days of fieldwork which consisted of four 
focus groups, 
(three with members of various farmers’ groups and one with non-members), semi-
structuredinterviews (Sibelet, Mutel et al., 2013) with key informants, employees of NGOs 
which sponsor farmers’ organizations in the area (UPFORD and World Vision International), 
members of farmers’ organizations and non-members of organizations. Research also 
included a review of the record books of two SILC groups and organizational records of 
UPFORD. 
Interviews were translated into English from Luganda by a local interpreter. 
Results and Discussion 
There is a high density of farmers’ organizations in Nnindye parish with several organizations 
in each village. All organizations observed were either self-initiated and externally supported 
or externally initiated and externally supported. Organizations without external support 
quickly dissolve. Despite Putnam’s proxy (Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1994) which uses 
density of voluntary organizations as a proxy for social capital in an area, there are indications 
of low levels of trust in Nnindye which inhibits progressive participation in the community. 
We maintain that the density of voluntary organizations in the area is artificially high due to 
external governmental and NGO support. 
This paper will consider only those groups which were externally supported by the NGO 
University Partnership for Outreach Research and Development (UPFORD). These groups 
consist of two components: a Savings and Internal Lending Community (SILC) and a group 
banana project. In the SILC component, members contribute to their personal savings 
accounts at every weekly meeting. The proceeds earned from the banana project as well as the 
interest paid on loans are used to provide microloans to the members. Personal loans are 
generally used for agricultural purposes, investment in a small business or for school fees. 
The banana project consists of community banana plot managed by the group. Virus-
free banana plantlets are provided by UPFORD. These plantlets are multiplied and managed 
on group land and the resulting suckers are distributed among the members. UPFORD 
provides training in good agricultural practices and members are expected to work together to 
maintain the plot. 
The members of the groups are relatively demographically homogenous. Seventy percent of 
the members are women and most are over forty years old. UPFORD organizers report that 
men, particularly those under forty years old, are not interested in the SILC/banana projects 
and prefer more lucrative individual schemes. 
Building Social Capital in SILC Groups 
The SILC groups in Nnindye, Uganda are building the four elements of social capital 
considered important by Pretty (2003): relations of trust; reciprocity and exchanges; common 
Appendix 
211 | P a g e  
  
rules, norms and sanctions; and connectedness in networks and groups. The support and 
guidance provided by UPFORD helps to build this capital. UPFORD provides leadership, 
empowerment and transparency training to group members and group rules are designed to 
reduce the members’ susceptibility to coercion. Groups with high levels of transparency enjoy 
relations of trust. Reciprocity and exchange are key tenants of Savings and Internal Lending 
Communities. As members pay back their loans, more money is available to other group 
members for loans. The groups enjoyed a 95% repayment rate on loans. 
UPFORD encourages the groups to make and enforce rules related to personal savings and the 
repayment of loans. The members vote on the rules and apply sanctions as a group. However 
there are some instances of the group approving rules that they were not willing to enforce, 
for example the use of land as collateral for loans. 
The SILC groups increased the networking and the interconnectedness of the participants. 
Groups meet weekly and members are penalized if they do not attend the meetings. Members 
listed 
meeting people and “the spirit of teamwork” as two of the benefits that they enjoyed because 
of their participation. In addition to increasing in-group networking, the SILC groups have 
some interaction with the greater community. Ten percent of the groups’ profit is distributed 
to members of the village identified as vulnerable persons. However, the members of the 27 
groups supported by UPFORD have no contact with the other UPFORD groups; therefore 
there is little opportunity to build new contacts in different villages. 
Group members develop connections with representatives of UPFORD and with community 
leaders, but build few connections in other communities. For this reason, we assume that most 
of the social capital built within these SILC groups is bonding social capital. We found some 
evidence of this during the interviews and fieldwork. Group rules inhibited the addition of 
new members. Some groups allowed new members only if they matched the level of personal 
savings that founding group members had built up over the three and a half years of the 
group’s existence. Other groups refused new members, “They were not interested in the 
beginning. Now they see our progress and they want to join.” These potential members were 
told that they must start their own groups. When asked if they would allow their daughters to 
join, one woman replied “she can have my place (in the group) when I die.” 
The fact that the schemes cater mainly to women limits their potential to build bridging social 
capital among the participants. These schemes target women because the organizers feel that 
empowerment among women is particularly low in this area. However, low empowerment 
among men may inhibit the groups’ ability to build empowerment among women. We heard 
several reports of men removing their wives from the groups because they had become “too 
empowered.” One woman explained to us that she had to sneak out of the house to attend the 
weekly meetings because her husband did not want her to participate in the group, stating, “If 
we get money we won’t be submissive.” We feel that the empowerment of both men and 
women is necessary for successful collective action. 
Groups have also displayed bonding social capital in their decision making. Representatives 
of 
UPFORD found a buyer for the bananas produced on one group’s plot. The group did not 
honor the contract and decided instead to sell the bananas to group members at a deep 
discount, reducing the profit available for the group’s activities. 
Protection of Group Natural Resources 
While the SILC groups have the dual goals of poverty alleviation through savings and 
microcredit as well as the promotion of conservation and good agricultural practices, the 
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group members prioritize the savings and microcredit portion. Members work in the banana 
plots weekly but do not always adhere to the cultural practices for which they received 
training. They are more likely to use the practices in their own banana plots. 
Though 70% of the participants in the Nnindye SILC groups are women, male members and 
non- members are more likely to benefit from the distribution of seedstock. Of the twelve 
SILC groups in the Nnindye Parish for which data is available, men received 45% of the 
suckers distributed. 
UPFORD reports state that many of the suckers perished because they were taken by 
members who did not properly care for them or did not have an adequate place to plant them. 
Despite UPFORD’s goal of self-sustaining groups which are not dependent on external 
support, representatives stated that, after three and a half years, groups would likely dissolve 
without their support. Though human and social capital has been built within the groups, 
members still have not made plans for continuation of the group after UPFORD’s support 
ceases (in 1.5 years). The 
SILC portion of the group has been very active, but less attention has been paid to the group 
resource management. 
However, there is some evidence that the banana scheme has benefited from the leadership 
and transparency training provided for the SILC groups. One member told us that he left a 
corrupt group (which was not supported by UPFORD) because group leaders exploited the 
group resources for their personal gain. He chose the UPFORD-supported group because he 
trusted the members and recognized the importance of transparency and group decision-
making. 
Conclusions and Outlook 
The literature suggests and our observations confirm that both bridging and bonding social 
capital are low in the area studied. Due to the important role that social capital can play in 
collective action for the conservation of natural resources, the cultivation of social capital 
among the farmers in Uganda is an important goal. 
SILC groups have the potential to build social capital among the participants by creating 
social networks, rules and norms and a culture of reciprocity. Self-initiated collective action 
has a potential to build social capital, but no “pure” forms of collective action were found in 
the area. 
Social capital within the community is too low for collective action without the support of an 
external agent such as an NGO. Lacking the social capital needed for collective action, we 
conclude that the externally-supported SILC groups are building trust in the community, 
albeit slowly. 
Because of the local appeal for savings and lending schemes, we feel that this model could be 
expanded to include other community resources such as sources of drinking water and forest 
resource protection. 
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